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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a combination of five essays: one introductory essay (Chapter 1), three core 
essays (Chapter 2, 3 and 4) and one concluding essay (Chapter 5). The first essay (Chapter 
1) gives an overview of management on marine capture fisheries. The second essay 
(Chapter 2) investigates the effect of input control on vessels’ performance of the industrial 
marine fisheries of Bangladesh and the vessels’ performance in this study is measured in 
term of technical efficiency and productivity. The third essay (Chapter 3) estimates 
biological reference points of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh in order to find out 
the current status of the industrial marine fisheries. The fourth essay (Chapter 4) measures 
the economic performance of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. The fifth essay 
discusses the impact of traditional command and control approaches to marine fisheries 
management in light of evidence from industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. 
 
Chapter 1 gives an overview of management of marine capture fisheries. Challenges in 
marine fisheries management; and policy evolution of marine fisheries management from 
biological, economic and eco-system perspectives are covered in this Chapter. The Chapter 
finally focuses on the importance of economic perspectives and analyses in fisheries 
management that allow managers to generate performance criteria to quantify management 
goals; to employ models to compare management strategies and policies; and to use 
methods to calculate performance criteria and adjust policies and regulations to better 
achieve targets. 
 
Chapter 2 is a first kind of study to measure performance of vessels of industrial marine 
fisheries of Bangladesh. A panel data set for the period 2001-2007 for Translog production 
function and technical efficiency effect model is used to measure efficiency; and Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) is used to measure productivity.  Theoretical consistencies of 
Translog production function for vessel, output elasticity associated with all inputs, 
elasticity of scale and marginal productivity of all inputs are examined in this study.  
Technical efficiency, technical progress and scale change are also estimated to find out the 
sources of productivity. The study shows that vessels are producing below the maximum 
level of output and are too small in their scale of operation. It also shows input control 
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induces vessels’ operators to use unregulated inputs. The study shows that the input control 
that is employed in industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh fails to increase vessels 
efficiency and productivity. Hence, an alternative management strategy is needed to 
increase technical efficiency and productivity of the industrial marine shrimp and fish 
fisheries of Bangladesh. 
 
Chapter 3 measures the biological reference points of the industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh. Biomass dynamic models: a dynamic version of surplus production models, 
are used to estimate biological reference points and a time series data for the period 1992- 
2007 is used. This study is a first of its kind in terms of study area and use of models to 
calculate the biological parameters. This study covers the area that is beyond 40 metres 
depth within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Bangladesh and uses Clarke, 
Yoshimoto & Pooley (CY&P) models to calculate the biological parameters. Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) technique is applied to calculate the biological parameters. Using these 
biological parameters- the current abundance of biomass, biomass at Maximum Sustainable 
Yield (MSY) and the biomass at the steady-state are measured. The study shows that the 
shrimp stock of the industrial marine fisheries is over-exploited and the fall in catch per 
unit effort (CPUE) over time of the industrial marine shrimp fishery is due to the fall in 
stock size. On the other hand, the fish stock of the industrial marine fisheries is under-
exploited and the fall in CPUE over time of the industrial marine fish fishery is due to 
inadequate knowledge and information on the availability of the sizes of different fish 
stocks and lack of technological developments for harvesting the new resources. The study 
also shows that to maintain steady-state equilibrium and an adequate growth rate of both 
shrimp and fish, fishing patterns need to be modified. The study also indicates that the 
current management strategy fails to increase the level of high-valued shrimp stocks and to 
increase the catch level of the low-valued stocks. Hence, an alternative management 
strategy is needed for industrial marine shrimp and fish fisheries of Bangladesh. 
 
Chapter 4 is also a first study of its kind that covers shrimp and fish of the industrial marine 
fisheries of Bangladesh. This study develops two single-species and single-fleet models 
separately for both shrimp and fish fisheries. Current and potential economic performance 
of both shrimp and fish fisheries in this study are measured using three different bio-
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economic models, including a bio-economic model for open access fishery, a static profit 
maximization problem and a dynamic present value-maximization problem in continuous 
time. For both shrimp and fish fisheries of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh, this is 
the first kind of study that uses the Gompertz curve in the biological growth models; 
biological parameters are derived following CY&P models; price of harvest and cost per 
unit effort are estimated separately. The equilibrium biomass, effort and profit at bio-
economic equilibrium of open access fishery, at static Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) 
and dynamic MEY are compared with the MSY. Sensitivity to changes in the price of 
harvest; changes in cost per unit effort and changes in social discount rate on biomass are 
also examined.  The study shows that excessive use of efforts makes both shrimp and fish 
fisheries economically inefficient in the form of low stock biomass and profit. The study 
suggests that both economically viable (with high profit) and ecologically sustainable (with 
high stock biomass) shrimp and fish fisheries in industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh 
could be achieved by setting management target at the MEY level and hence excessive use 
of efforts in both shrimp and fish fisheries needs to be reduced. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of traditional ‘command and control’ approach to reduce 
overcapacity and overexploitation in marine fisheries management with an evidence of 
industrial marine fishery of Bangladesh. The causes of overfishing and overcapacity in 
fisheries management; and traditional ‘command and control’ approaches to fisheries 
management also cover to analyze the impact. The evidences conclude that command and 
control approaches to the industrial marine fisheries management of Bangladesh fail to 
increase efficiency and to control overcapitalization. Evidence shows that fisheries suffer 
overcapacity and fisheries are economically unprofitable. As marine fisheries legislation in 
Bangladesh is too old and fisheries policies are more focused on increased production with 
little emphasis on conservation or sustainable fisheries management, a reform in legislation 
and management systems of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is needed. To 
protect economic and biological overfishing, a correct management target and right-based 
approach that is, an incentive adjusting approach is needed so that the fisheries can be both 
economically profitable and biologically sustainable.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Natural resource management:  
an overview of marine capture fisheries 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the early 1980s concerns about unsustainability of marine fisheries have grown, 
as stocks continued to decline despite the adoption of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 (Garcia 2010). Overcapacity, overharvesting, 
poor economic returns and habitat damage are considered the main reasons for the 
depletion of world fish stocks (Hilborn et al 2003). Over the last 30 years global 
fisheries fleet has increased over 75 percent and Asia accounts for highest number of 
vessels (Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 2007). An increase both in vessel 
numbers and in vessel technology has enhanced the capacity of the global fleet and 
facilitated access to an expanding range of marine fisheries resources. Despite the 
expansion of fishing efforts, the global marine catch has been stagnant for more than a 
decade and the difference between the global cost of harvest and value of harvest has 
narrowed. Hence, the world fisheries are underperforming or subject to economic 
overfishing and global marine catch has stagnated at a level of 80-85 million tonnes 
since 1990 (Willmann & Kelleher 2010). According to the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) report (2011), 57.4 percent of the world’s marine fisheries are fully 
exploited in 2009, producing at, or close to, their Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) 
and there is no room for further expansion in catch and some stocks are at risk of 
decline if not properly managed. The report also shows that among the remaining stocks 
29.9 percent are over-exploited, depleted or recovering from depletion and yielding less 
than MSY and 12.7 percent are under-exploited or moderately exploited, where under-
exploited stocks are low-valued stocks/species.  
 
It is widely recognized that overfishing is increasingly threatening the world’s marine 
capture fisheries (Jackson et al 2001; Myers & Worm 2003). On the other hand, Sunken 
Billions Study shows a significant loss of potential economic rent in the global fishery 
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due to massive overcapacity in the global fleet (Arnason et al 2009).  As a result, marine 
fisheries have become a main focus of societal attention (Garcia 2010).  
 
Between 1990 and 2030 the world’s population is likely to increase by 3.7 billion, 
where ninety percent of this increase will be in developing countries (Bojo 2000).  
Increasing trends of population increases the demand for consumption in developing 
countries. The FAO report (2009) shows that, in the past four decades, the per capita 
fish consumption has increased from an average 9.9 kg in the 1960s to 16.4 kg in 2005 
and the human consumption of fish in 2005 is 107 million tonnes, where Asia accounted 
for two-thirds of total consumption. FAO (2009) estimated that at least 50 percent of 
total animal protein intake in developing countries (such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Ghana, Indonesia, etc.) comes from fish.  During the past three decades the number of 
fishers and fish farmers has also grown at a higher rate than the world’s population 
growth rate and Asia has by far the highest share and growth rate in the number of 
fishers and fish farmers (FAO 2007). Increases in the number of fishery workers in 
many developing countries are due to the growing poverty trap, and in the absence of an 
alternative, is considered a livelihood of last resort.   
 
In addition, globalization increases the trade and increases the competition in exploiting 
fish resources. Fish and fishery products export reached US $85.9 billion in 2006 in the 
world and total production increased more than 37 percent, in circumstances where 79 
percent fishery production of the world comes from developing countries (FAO 2009). 
In many fish exporting developing countries, the fisheries play an important role to the 
economy. Fish exports in developing countries grew from US $1.8 billion in 1976 to US 
$24.6 billion in 2006 and developing countries contributed 59 percent (31.6 million 
tonnes) of world exports of fish and fishery products; 35 percent (by quantity) of world 
exports of fish meal; and 70 percent (in terms of quantity) of world non-food fishery 
exports (FAO 2009). In a globalizing fisheries world, the interdependence between 
developing and developed countries is also increasing. The fishery industry of 
developing countries relies on developed countries’ markets. In recent decades, the 
flexibility of custom duties increased the access of fishery products in the developed 
countries’ markets from developing countries. FAO report (2009) shows that in 2006, 
40 percent of the value of fish and fishery products imported by developing countries 
originated from developed countries, and 25 percent of the value of fisheries exports 
was traded between developing countries.  
3 
 
Economically healthy fisheries are fundamental to achieving goals for the fisheries 
sectors such as improved livelihoods, food security, increased exports and the 
restoration of fish stocks (World Summit on the Sustainable Development (WSSD), 
2002). But, most of the world’s fisheries including industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh suffer overfishing and overcapacity; and the management of fisheries faces 
many challenges in the conservation and management of marine fisheries (Clark 2010). 
Many differences exist across fisheries, but, almost all fisheries consist of some 
common characteristics1. Some of these problems, such as tragedy of the commons2, are 
widely recognized, but others have been somewhat ignored. This thesis examines the 
management of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. Industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh are a common property resource, which are subject to possible 
overexploitation in the absence of efficient and effective management.  
 
The Bangladesh coastline extends for 714 km with an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
of 166,000 square km of which 44 percent is continental shelf. The marine water 
extends beyond the continental shelf, measuring 200 nautical miles from the base line 
(10 fathoms) including rivers and estuaries. Marine fisheries of Bangladesh consist of 
two fisheries: artisanal3 fisheries and industrial4 fisheries. The industrial fishing vessels 
are divided into two broad categories: shrimp5 fleet and fish6 fleet. The management of 
the industrial marine fisheries is mainly governed by the Marine Fisheries Ordinance 
1983 and the Marine Fisheries Rules 1983. The management system for shrimp vessels 
is closed season, licensing and input control. On the other hand, the management system 
for fish vessels is licensing and input control. Industrial fleets of the open access 
industrial marine fisheries have been expanding over time (Marine Fisheries 
Department (MFD) 2009).   
                                                 
1
 Such as fisheries are common pool resources, uncertainty in fisheries, fishers before fish and ecosystem 
(Grafton et al 2010a). 
2
 In an open access resource few issues, such as lack of property rights over the fish, effective 
management of the resource, cooperation among harvesters and free entry into a fishery by outsiders 
increase negative externalities in fisheries, known as tragedy of the commons (Grafton et al 2006b; 
Hardin 1968).  
3
 The artisanal fisheries are small-scale onshore fisheries and fishing occurs up to 40 metres depth with 
mechanized and non-mechanized boats. 
4
 The industrial fisheries are large-scale offshore fisheries and fishing occurs beyond 40 metres depth 
within the EEZ of Bangladesh with industrial vessels. 
5
 Vessels in the shrimp fleet are double-rigged vessels, fitted with two side beams from which two 
shrimp-trawl nets are simultaneously operated. A standard shrimp vessel is made of steel hull and mesh 
size of the net at the cod-end is 45mm. 
6
 Vessels in fish fleet are stern vessels with a single-rigged trawl-net operated behind the vessels. These 
vessels generally have both wooden and steel hulls and the mesh size of the net at the cod-end is 60mm. 
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Marine shrimp species7 and fin fish species8 are commercially important and are 
normally harvested by the industrial fishing vessels. These vessels were officially 
introduced in 1984 with a large number of imported second hand trawlers/vessels. 
According to the data of the MFD (2009), between 2001 and 2007, the major amount of 
total targeted catches of shrimp comes from shrimp fleet (99.09 percent) and the amount 
of total targeted catches of fish comes from fish fleet (71.93 percent). Both shrimp and 
fish are demersal9 resources of the industrial marine fisheries. The management 
conditions allow both shrimp and fish fleets to catch 30 percent of bycatch, but due to 
the use of different gear and mesh sizes, the average bycatch of both fleets, in fact, are 
very low. So, the bycatch of both shrimp fleet (28.73 percent fish) and fish fleet (0.91 
percent shrimp) are ignored in this research and the targeted resources (shrimp and fish) 
are considered as homogeneous biomasses. On the other hand, both shrimp and fish 
fleets are operated with two different sets of gear: double rigger (for shrimp) and stern 
trawl (for fish) with 45mm and 60mm mesh sizes of the net at the cod-end, respectively. 
All vessels within the fleets are considered as homogeneous vessels in terms of gear. 
Both fleets are independent in their targeted catch. Hence, the industrial marine fisheries 
of Bangladesh in this research are considered as single-species and single-fleet for both 
the shrimp fishery and the fish fishery. This research has done three different studies on 
industrial vessels’ performance, stock assessment and economic efficiency.  
 
The objective of this Chapter is to give an overview of marine fisheries management. 
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1.2 describes 
challenges in marine fisheries management. Section 1.3 discusses the policy evolution 
of marine fisheries management from biological and economic perspectives followed by 
eco-system perspective in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 focuses on the importance of 
economic perspective in fisheries management. Section 1.6 presents the structure of the 
thesis.  
 
                                                 
7
 The key commercial marine shrimp species those are harvested by the industrial vessels are tiger shrimp 
(Penaeus monodon) and brown shrimp (Metapenaeus monodon). Penaeus monodon (tiger shrimp) is the 
most valuable and hence the targeted species. But the highest (almost two thirds of the total) contribution 
to the total catch is from Metapenaeus monodon (brown shrimp). 
8
 More than ninety fish species are commercially important. These fall under the common group. The 
major commercial fin fish species exploited by the industrial vessels are pomfret (Pampus argenteus), 
goatfish (Upenuus sulphureus), bream (N. japonicas), lizard fish (Saurida tumbil), grunter (Popmadasys 
hasta), red snapper (Lutjanus johnii) and carangid (Arioma indica) (MFD 2009). 
9
 Demersal and ground fish are those that feed on ocean or lake bottoms and typically do not range over a 
wide area. 
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1.2 Challenges in marine fisheries management   
 
The main challenge of marine fisheries is how to effectively achieve sustainable fishing 
and to stop overfishing (Metuzals et al 2010).  In open access10 fisheries resources use, 
the existence of market failure can lead to extinctions of fish stocks (Hartwick & 
Olewiler 1998). Lack of property rights to the fish can lead to overfishing, and even 
lead to the extinction of fish species because fish stocks are common pool resources 
(Hardin 1968) and have two distinct features (Grafton et al 2004). Firstly, the catches in 
common pool resources are rivalrous, where fishing by one person reduces the catch 
available to others and secondly, common pool resources are costly to effectively 
control the access and the harvest from them. In common pool resources, it is difficult 
to monitor the fishers and to enforce the regulation. In many fisheries, incentives for 
fishers do not exit and hence, fishers do not care about the sustainability of resource, 
rather care about their own interest. As a result, difficulties exist in implementing 
adequate monitoring, control and surveillance. Open access/common pool cannot 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources without some form of government 
intervention, the creation of private property rights or both (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). 
For example, the common property problem in many fisheries requires controls of some 
sort on fishing effort and/or harvests. However, many open accesses are in danger of 
being exhausted even with various types of government regulation. Many regulations 
have not been successful due to putting fishers before fish, which has contributed to the 
problems of overfishing (Larkin 1978). Munro & Scott (1985) argue that unlike other 
renewable resources, the common property fishery resources are difficult to manage 
effectively.  
 
In many fisheries, regulations and management are mainly designed to achieve the 
sustainable level of fishing mortality by restricting the number of vessels into a fishery 
or by limiting the length of vessels permitted to fish. That said that fishers often 
substitute their inputs (Kompas et al 2004; Squires 1987; Wilen 1979). Failure to 
understand the incentives of fishers and respond to regulations leads to poor outcomes 
in fisheries management (Hilborn et al 2005). An incentive-based approach helps to 
ensure the individual incentives of fishers coincide with the overall interests of the 
                                                 
10
 Open access natural resources include many fisheries and environmental resources, such as air and 
water. Fisheries and environmental resources have remained as open-access for long period of times 
(Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). 
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fishery (Grafton et al 2006a, 2010a; Hilborn 2007b) and allows fishers either 
individually or collectively, to have catch shares or rights over particular fishing 
locations. To conserve fish stocks managers can change the dynamics of fishing 
behavior from racing to catch the fish before someone else, and hence minimize 
harvesting costs and protect the future returns from fishing.  
 
Another important challenge of managing marine fisheries is unforeseen fluctuations. 
There exists an inherent uncertainty in marine capture fisheries that will never be 
overcome (Ludwig et al 1993). Much of the fluctuations in fish stocks are results of 
environmental changes, such as increases in surface ocean temperatures, ocean 
acidification resulting from increased atmospheric carbon dioxide, which is beyond 
control. Effective management of fisheries requires explicit recognition of these 
uncertainties, however what method should be used to deal with uncertainty is not yet 
widely agreed upon (Clark 2010).  The challenges of overfishing and conservation are 
also magnified by climate change (Beddington et al 2007; Grafton et al 2010a). 
Externally generated changes to the marine environment such as oceanic pollution from 
terrestrial runoff and from ocean dumping; increased variability of ocean current, rising 
sea levels, and changes in salinity are important challenges to effective fisheries 
management (Beddington et al 2007; Clark 2010). Fisheries productivity on local and 
global scales can be reduced due to these externally generated changes and these need to 
be effectively managed to ensure the sustainability of the world’s fisheries. Climate 
change adversely affects fish stocks by altering physiology, behavior and growth, 
development, reproductive capacity, mortality and distribution (Perry et al 2009). 
Climate change also alters the productivity structure, and composition of the eco-
systems on which fish depends for food and shelter (Brander 2010).  
 
Management of fisheries and of marine eco-systems has not yet succeeded in dealing 
adequately with overfishing, which is of greater immediate concern than the effects of 
climate change (Beddington et al 2007). Overfishing affects biodiversity in a variety of 
ways, such as through directed catches (direct mortality on target and overfishing), 
impact on non-target species (catchability of the bycatch, productivity and sustainable 
mortality rate), and impact on fish habitats (fishing gear, such as drift nets, long-lines, 
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set nets, pound nets, and trawl gear/bottom trawling affect)11; illegal fishing (such as sea 
turtles and shark) (Agnew et al 2008; Berkes et al 2006; FAO 2002a); widespread 
piracy (Berkes et al 2006; Heithaus et al 2008) as well as unreported and unregulated 
catch (FAO 2001, 2002b; Metuzals et al 2010). The key factors encouraging overfishing 
are rising demand for seafood; serious overcapacity of fishing fleets; high profitability, 
a pernicious combination of poorly crafted regulations and weak enforcement in 
developed countries; corruption and concealment and the ease of obtaining false 
documentation in developing countries; and failure to regulate high seas fishing 
(Metuzals et al 2010). As a result, most fish stocks are in decline (Myers & Worm 2003; 
Worm et al 2005). There is, for example, a decrease in the average size of tuna (Golet et 
al 2007), and reduction in the marine food chain (Pauley et al 1998; Myers et al 2007). 
Recognition of these impacts of fishing on marine eco-systems has led to the 
development of eco-system approaches to fisheries management (Garcia et al 2003; 
Pikitch et al 2004).  
 
An effective management system can protect fish stocks and effective management 
depends on efficiency, optimality and sustainability (Perman et al 2011).  Feasibility of 
sustainable policies depends on a variety of factors, including the degree of 
substitutability between fish stocks and produced capital, technology/technical change, 
secure property rights and efficient pricing. A principle of sustainability is not to allow 
the stocks to decline, which means that there must be a sufficiently large stock of the 
marine resources to generate a flow that can be sustained over time (Hartwick & 
Olewiler 1998). But, fisheries management faces severe problems of implementing 
controls such as the monitoring and enforcement of catch quotas; prevention of illegal 
fishing; monitoring and control of bycatch and discards; and control of habitat 
degradation (Clark 2010) and hence marine fisheries experience overcapacity, 
overharvesting, habitat damage and poor economic returns (Hilborn et al 2003). Strong 
management can ensure that biological targets are met, but it is essential that regulations 
are enforceable, and this has often proved to be difficult. Less-than-perfect enforcement 
can lead to illegal fishing, poor scientific data, and a failure to meet biological targets 
(Beddington et al 2007). Every method of fisheries management requires enforcement 
of the regulations (Clark 2010), but it is recognized that existing governance systems for 
                                                 
11
 For example: Auster & Langton 1998; Barbier 2000; Barbier & Cox 2004; Collie et al 2000; Crouse 
2000; Harrington et al 2005; Hughes 1994; Mc Manus & Polsenberg 2004; Nichols et al 2010; Pauly 
2007; Peckham et al 2007; Rice & Ridgeway 2010; Roberts 2002; Schwinghamer et al 1996; Thrush et al 
1998; Watling & Norse 1998. 
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high sea fisheries failed totally (Hilborn 2007a). Current management techniques and 
strategies that are widely used in the common pool marine fisheries are: a complete lack 
of management or pure open access; limited entry such as license restriction; closed 
seasons and area closures; input control such as vessel tonnage, mesh size, gear 
restrictions; harvest control such as Total Annual Catch (TAC); and right-based fishing 
such as Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQ) (Clark 2010). The next section gives an 
overview how these management techniques comes into effect over the year since 1950.  
 
1.3 Policy evolution: biological and economic perspectives  
 
Prior to World War II, there was no real consensus that renewable resources, such as 
fisheries, needed active management as very few of the world’s fisheries were subject to 
any control at that time. The post-war boom in ship building in a few nations such as 
Soviet Union, Japan, China, South Korea and Poland introduced large trawl fleets to 
fish the world’s fish stocks (Wilen 1999). As a result, exploitation rates rose 
exponentially, evidence of biomass declines began to accumulate and conflicts began to 
emerge between domestic and foreign fleets.  Hence, the rational of renewable resources 
management emerged in the 1950s from two perspectives: biological and economical. 
On the other hand, mathematical modeling started in the early years of the 20th century 
(Baranav 1918) and extended during the first half of that century (Graham 1935) and 
mid-century (Beverton & Holt 1957; Ricker 1954; Schaefer 1954).  
 
The conceptual foundations for a biological rationale for management are established by 
the studies done by Beverton & Holt (1957) and Schaefer (1957); and economical 
rationales for management are established by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955). The 
studies based on economical rationale for management revealed the implication of open 
access resource use (Gordon 1954) and the concept of resource conservation (Scott 
1955). On the other hand, the studies based on biological rationale for management 
revealed the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by linking fishing effort, 
fishing mortality and stocks dynamics. MSY is used as a benchmark management 
policy as well as to identify conditions and symptoms of overfishing and the stock 
status.  
 
In the 1960s, regulatory programs introduced worldwide originated with new paradigms 
based on biological rationale for management; however, none of these programs were 
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established to address economic rationale for management. Restriction on fishing 
technologies, such as minimum mesh size or complete prohibition of certain gear types, 
were the most commonly used regulations (Wilen 1999). To conserve fish stocks, many 
voluntary regulatory bodies were formed and developed a number of multilateral 
agreements during the 1960s and early 1970s. But, lack of agreement over regulations 
and over enforcement meant that most of these tilted towards failure. During the same 
time, fisheries policy economists focused on normative issues to guide policy, other 
than MSY. Economists argued that society should be trying to maximize sustainable 
rent or economic yield and that restricting technology and prohibiting efficient gear 
types are ultimately folly if society is interested in economic returns from resource. 
Economists also defined the policy problems such as lack of property rights and open 
access incentive.   
 
To manage resources over time, the dynamic theory of the sole owned fishery was 
introduced and the optimal steady-state was defined.  Throughout the 1960s, resource 
economists continued to place great effort on understanding and clarifying the nature of 
dynamic formulations of the renewable resources problem. At the end of the 1960s, a 
methodological revolution of considerable consequence was introduced in the 
environmental and resource economics. The conceptual cores of ideas of static 
framework of welfare economics, externalities and public goods were introduced in 
environmental economics; and dynamic analysis in natural resource economics. In 
resource economics, optimal control theory (Pontryagin et al 1962) and calculus of 
variation (Crutchfield & Zellner 1962) were introduced to solve the optimal steady-state 
of the resources. As the natural resource use often involves the time paths of outputs 
and inputs in an essential way and involves decision-making over time (Hartwick & 
Olewiler 1998), later these conceptual ideas were introduced to describe the optimal use 
path for both renewable12 and non-renewable13 resources.  
 
Given the property rights in most fisheries are incompletely defined, at the end of the 
1960s new resource economists focused on the fundamental conservation of the 
                                                 
12
 A natural resource which supplies productive inputs to an economic system indefinitely is known as 
renewable resources, such as fish, forests, solar energy, water, atmosphere, etc. (Hartwick & Olewiler 
1998). Renewable resources have the potential to regenerate new supplies to replace those used by the 
economic system, but, most renewable resources can be depleted or exhausted and can become non-
renewable. 
13
 Natural resource with finite stock/supply, once used up, is gone is known as non-renewable resource, 
such as, minerals, oil, gas, etc. (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). 
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resource. They argued that resources can reach towards the economic optimum either 
fixing the property rights problem by creating property institutions or inducing efficient 
behavior by altering private incentives with prices or quantity mechanisms (Wilen 
1999). In the early 1970s, property rights solutions were ignored and instead, Pigouvian 
solutions involving landings and vessel taxes were more focused to examine the 
pollution problem of fishing.  
 
In 1975 Clark & Munro (1975) outlined the dynamic fisheries problem as a capital14 
theory problem and applied some of the new techniques emerging in the capital theory 
literature in economics. At nearly the same time in 1976, the United States and other 
coastal nations expanded their jurisdiction over territorial waters and fisheries up to 200 
miles, from 3-12 miles. These actions opened up a new area of concern about 
transboundary stocks and stocks inhabiting areas, which do not fall into the territorial 
boundaries (Copeland 1990; Fisher & Mirman 1996; Munro 1990). With these changes 
in property rights, most of the world’s fisheries came under a legal and administrative 
framework.  In the same year, a new legislation15 was created in the United States to 
regulate fisheries in the new Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), based on the argument 
promoting fisheries’ economically efficient management rather than strictly biologically 
based management. Economists argued that these new institutional settings would 
improve economic efficiency in the use of renewable natural resources. But decision-
makers in the Fisheries Management Council in the United States were more convinced 
about the biologically based management and accepted the recommendations of 
biologists about the level of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) to keep fisheries at the MSY 
level.  
 
These management actions raised several questions (Wilen 1999) related to resource 
allocation, where the efficiency questions were totally ignored. Consequently several 
empirical and predictive analyses were done by the economists related to the problem of 
incomplete property rights that led to the overcapitalization and economic inefficiency 
of the fisheries. With the rapid changing status of the world’s fisheries, in order to 
contain capital growth, economists argued (Anderson 1977) to prevent 
                                                 
14
 Most natural resources have some characteristics that make them very similar to capital, such as natural 
resources are used for consumption or in production process and hence, they are extracted or harvested; 
and yield productive service over time (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). 
15
 Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) 1976.  
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overcapitalization and suggested policy-makers consider the limited-entry16 programs 
similar to the few fisheries17 (Wilen 1999). But, the findings of the empirical analysis 
on limited entry program (such as the British Columbia salmon fishery) show that 
fishermen replaced older, smaller vessels with larger and high-powered vessels 
(Campbell 1991; Fraser 1979; Pearse & Wilen 1979). The policy-makers then 
introduced input-control (for example, in the British Columbia salmon fishery) by 
restricting vessel tonnage. As a result, fishers increased their vessel length and input 
control measure became unsuccessful as the changes in input restrictions induced 
fishers to substitute inputs with the unregulated inputs. Similar evidence of rent 
dissipation through substitution of regulated inputs with the unregulated inputs also 
showed in the Australian prawn and rock lobstar cases, British Columbia roe herring 
cases, and the Alaska salmon programs (Wilen 1999). Thus, input control failed to 
increase efficiency in many fisheries around the world, such as the mid-Atlantic sea 
scallop fishery (Kirkley et al 1995, 1998); longline fishery in Hawaii (Sharma & Leung 
1999),  Dutch beam trawler fishery (Pascoe et al 2001), English Channel fishery 
(Pascoe & Coglan 2002), British Columbia halibut fishery (Grafton et al 2000), 
Australia’s banana prawn fishery (Kompas et al 2004), New South Wales, Australia 
ocean prawn trawl fishery (Greenville et al 2006) and in many other fisheries including 
the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh (see Chapter 2).  
  
Following the failure of the fisheries management through input control, policy 
emerged in favor of using property rights, namely, Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), 
that would establish the overall allocation in order to maintain stocks level at the MSY.  
In the early 1980s, both Iceland and New Zealand adopted ITQ programs followed by 
Canada, Australia and the Netherlands. The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) report (1997) shows that 55 fisheries around the world are 
managed using ITQs. Though, the United States has been slow to implement ITQ 
programs with four in place: mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, the 
South Atlantic wreckfish fishery, North Pacific halibut and sablefish fisheries (Hsu & 
Wilen 1997; Wilen 1999) ITQ programs worked well for decades in fisheries 
                                                 
16
 In 1957, Scott proposed a limit on the number of fishermen to avoid wasteful expansion of the fleet and 
on the number of crew (Turvey & Wiseman 1957). The limited-entry programs control fishing mortality 
growth by a license limitation. 
17
 South African pilchard and mackerel fishery (1953); Western Australia rock lobstar fishery (1963); 
Australian prawn fishery (1965);  Canadian maritime lobstar program (1967); British Columbia salmon 
program (1968); several in Eastern Canada including herring (1970); the Bay of Fundy scallops, offshore 
scallops and lobster and ground fish fisheries  (all in 1973);  Alaska and Washington salmon fisheries 
(1974).  
12 
 
throughout the world (Kompas 2005) including Iceland, New Zealand, United States, 
Australia and Canada (Hannesson 2004). ITQ confers a number of benefits given that 
rights are transferable. Benefits include greater assurance of catch given harvesting 
rights and regulations can enable autonomous adjustment of fishing fleet (Kompas 
2005; Grafton et al 2006b).  
 
1.4 Policy evolution: single-species and eco-system (multi-
species) perspective  
 
Fisheries modeling determining sustainable yields are mainly focused on single-species 
fisheries (Funk et al 2000; Hilborn & Walters 1992; Motos & Wilson 2006) and 
mathematical modeling beyond a single-species approach to fisheries modeling did not 
arise until the 1970s and 1980s (Smith & Fulton 2010). Fisheries shifted gradually 
under a sustainable development paradigm, that is, in Ecosystem-Based Fisheries 
Management (EBFM) (Pikitch et al 2004) or Eco-system Approach for Fishery (EAF)18 
(Garcia et al 2003) following the United Nations Summit of Human Environment 1972 
and World Conference on Environment and Development 1987. The sustainable 
development principles show the influence of large-scale development policies on 
fisheries and the fishery sector (Garcia 2010) and take account of externalities such as 
environmental influences on stock dynamics, species interactions, economic drivers, 
and performance.  
 
Most recently, policies have taken account of management system itself and the way in 
which fishers interact with and respond to it. Fishers are also seen as part of a linked 
bio-physical, socio-economic and governance system (Smith & Fulton 2010) and adopt 
a precautionary approach to uncertainty (Pikitch et al 2004). These focuses arise from 
concerns about a number of wider impacts of fishing19 such as discard of species other 
than target species or other commercially valuable species. Secondly, impact of fishing 
on threatened, endangered and protected species. Thirdly, impacts of certain gear types 
(mainly trawls and dredges) on habitats. Fourthly, impacts at the level of eco-system 
                                                 
18
 The eco-system approach for fishery (EAF) was formalized in 2001 and the implication of EAF for 
governance stem for three sources of complexity related to the (i) fishery system; (ii) diversity and 
dynamics of the institution involved and (iii) strong influence of strong drivers (Garcia 2010).  
19
 For example:  Auster & Langton 1998; Collie et al 2000; Schwinghamer et al 1996; Smith & Fulton 
2010; Thrush et al 1998. 
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itself20, impacts of targeted fishing on predator or prey species21 as well as whole 
system impacts such as regime shifts (Reid et al 2001). The approach focuses more on 
external influences on fish stocks; intra-ecosystem interactions; and full impact of the 
activity on the eco-system (FAO 2003; Garcia & Cochrane 2005; Rice et al 2005; Rice 
& Ridgeway 2010).  
 
Very few of early studies of eco-systems focus on fisheries assessment and management 
(Smith & Fulton 2010), but the wider focus of fisheries management through EBFM, 
over the past decade has seen a considerable expansion in the application of ecological 
and ecosystem models to fisheries management issues. Examples include current 
approaches to ecological modeling (Walters & Martell 2004); EAF modeling (Plaganyi 
2007); modeling framework on Ecopath with Ecoism (EwE) (Polovina 1984; 
Christensen & Walters 2004; Walters et al 1997); multi-species models, such as 
BORMICON (Stefansson & Palsson 1998) and GADGET ( Begley & Howell 2004) 
and a good deal of mathematical modeling on multi-species and/or multi-fleet 
fisheries22.   
 
Though the application of eco-system models to fisheries management is almost three 
decades old, single-species approaches23 (stock assessment/population dynamic) are 
widely accepted and used in fisheries management to inform strategic decision-making 
in fisheries, such as the setting of annual quota, for at least five decades (Smith & 
Fulton 2010). With the development of formal harvesting strategies and management 
procedures (Butterworth & Punt 1999), the use of stock assessment models has become 
deeply embedded in the whole adaptive management cycle of stock management (Smith 
& Fulton 2010). 
  
 
                                                 
20
 Bax 1985; Laevastu & Larkins 1981; Polovina 1984. 
21
 For example:  Beddington & May 1982; Helgason & Gislason 1979; May et al 1979; Pope 1979. 
22
 For example: Anderson & Ursin 1977; Agar & Sutinen 2004; Bhat & Bhatta 2006; Chaudhuri 1986; 
Chaudhuri 1988; Crutchfield 1983; Eggert 1998; Fredou et al 2009; Kompas & Che 2006; Kompas et al 
2010; Lleonart et al 2003; Matsuda & Abrams 2006; Pelletier et al 2009; Pope 1991; Pradhan & 
Chaudhuri 1999; Sparre 1991; Ruttan et al 2000; Ulrich et al 2002; Ward 1994.   
23
 For example: Abaunza et al 2003; Anderson 2002; Armstrong & Skonhoft 2006; Bene et al 2001; 
Bjorndal et al 2004; Bolmo et al 1978; Chaudhuri & Johnson 1990; Christensen & Vestergaard 1993; 
Clarke et al 1992; Conard 1989; Eggert & Ulmestrand 2000; Grant et al 1981; Holland 2000; Ibaibarriaga 
et al 2008; Kar & Matsuda 2008; Mackinson et al 1997; McConnell & Sutinen 1979; Rettig 1987. 
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1.5 Fisheries management: importance of an economic 
perspective 
 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)24 is used as a benchmark management policy as 
well as to identify conditions and symptoms of overfishing and the stock status. The 
concept of MSY serves as the foundation of most biological reference points, which 
give decision-makers guidance in determining whether stocks are too small or fishing 
pressure is too large (Gulland 1983). The MSY is applicable to spawner-recruit models, 
surplus production models, delay-difference models, age-structured and size-structured 
models and so on (eg., Getz & Haight 1989; Hilborn & Walters 1992; Quinn & Deriso 
1999). In the absence of information on age or length structure, surplus production 
models are used and the analyses are done based on effort and catch data (Chen & 
Andrew 1998; Hilborn & Walters 1992), which is applied in many fisheries, for 
example,  industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh (see, Chapter 3).  
 
Though the level of sustainable yield and controlling catches has been considered a 
scientific approach to management, this approach entirely ignores economics and 
human behavior (Clark 2006, 2010). Effective management requires an understanding 
of how the fishery system is performing relative to reference points (Beddington et al 
2007) and it requires understanding of how fishers are behaving in response to policy 
instruments. When multiple fishers compete to catch fish from a given population, each 
fisher maximizes his net income by continuing to fish as long as the value of his catch 
exceeds the cost of catching it. Arguments show that biological models are necessary, 
but far from sufficient for successful management (Clark 2010), hence the current 
widespread phenomenon of excess capacity is largely an unintended consequence of the 
biologically based approach to management. Managing any fishery requires both the 
use of mathematical modeling of population biology and an economic analysis of 
human behavior in fisheries.  
 
Economic analyses allows managers to generate performance criteria to quantify 
management goals; to employ models to compare management strategies and policies; 
and to use methods to calculate performance criteria and adjust policies and regulations 
to better achieve target. To achieve the biological target MSY more effectively (if 
                                                 
24
 MSY is a sustainable harvest level, which maximizes revenue from fishing, or generates the largest 
value of sustainable catch in numbers or kilograms (Kompas 2005). 
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manager choose MSY or some other biological target), the economic analysis of fishers 
helps managers set incentives such that fishers no longer find race-to-fish (that 
generates effort-creep and overcapacity) is profitable (Grafton et al 1996; Hilborn 
2007b).  Efficiency, capacity and productivity analysis are the pillars of the economic 
approach to fisheries along with bio-economic modeling (Grafton et al 2006b). These 
approaches complement each other and can be used to measure both economic and 
biological performance; to evaluate existing strategies and tactics; to give insights as to 
how to improve fisheries outcomes; and guide to managers to achieve more profitable, 
but also sustainable fisheries.  
 
Efficiency analysis is used to assess what factors are affecting the economic 
performance of the fishery and the impacts of fisheries regulation. On the other hand, 
productivity measures are also considered as useful indicators. For instance, declines 
over time in overall productivity, as measured by changes in catch per unit effort 
(CPUE), may be an indicator of declining fish stocks or abundance. If regulators are 
interested in a better understanding of fishers’ performance, productivity measures can 
be used to provide information about stocks or abundance (Squires 1992, 1994). In the 
absence of stock information, fishery managers may find that the productivity 
performance of the fishing fleet improves over the period if the harvest increases by a 
proportion greater than the proportional increase in fishing effort. Managers are able to 
identify changing economic conditions and can separate these changes from variations 
in fish stocks or abundance by tracking changes in fleet productivity over time (Grafton 
et al 2006b).  
 
To measure efficiency and productivity of industrial and commercial vessels Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) is accepted as an appropriate technique due to the stochastic 
nature of harvesting marine resources (Sharma & Leung 1999). But, the SFA is limited 
in its application to commercial fisheries25, though it has been extensively applied to a    
                                                 
25
 Campbell & Hand 1998; Coglan et al 1993; Dey et al 2000; Eggert 2001; Felthoven 2002; Fousekis & 
Klonaris 2003; Grafton et al 2000; Greenville et al 2006; Holloway et al 2005; Holloway  & Tomberlin 
2007; Hoyo et al 2004; Kirkley et al 1995; Kirkley et al 1998; Kompas et al 2004; Kompas & Che 2005; 
Pascoe & Coglan 2002; Pascoe et al 2001; Pascoe et al 2003a; Pascoe et al 2003b; Pascoe & Mardle 
2003; Pascoe & Robinson 1996; Pascoe & Tingley 2007; Sharma & Leung 1999; Squires et al 2003; 
Tingley et al 2005; Tomberlin 2010; Tomberlin & Holloway 2007;  Vestergaard et al 2002; Weninger 
1998. 
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wide range of industries26 and agricultural27activities. Studies28 those employed SFA 
technique in fisheries, including industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh (see Chapter 
2), show many possible applications of efficiency analysis, such as the impact of input 
control on technical efficiency29. For example, in the Australian Northern Prawn 
Fishery (Kompas et al 2004) controls on inputs by the regulator has had the net effect of 
reducing technical efficiency and input substitution by the fishers raised the technical 
inefficiency. Such an outcome runs counter to the stated objective of the fishery 
regulator to both maximize economic efficiency and ensure the sustainability of the 
resource.  
 
On the other hand, an analysis of the influence of individual output controls on 
economic efficiency in British Columbia halibut fishery (Grafton et al 2000) shows that 
before the introduction of individual vessel quota (IVQ), there was a decline in 
efficiency for both small and large vessels. After the transferability of IVQ, fishers were 
able to adjust their harvest to the appropriate scale of harvest and adjust the mix of 
inputs in a better way to take advantage of the increase in the fishing season. As a result, 
both short run technical efficiency and economic efficiency increased for small and 
large vessels (Grafton et al 2000). An examination of how vessels, gear, skipper and 
crew characteristics affect technical efficiency in Malaysian artisanal gill net fishery 
shows high levels of technical efficiency and few benefits from improvements in gear 
and equipment (Squires et al 2003). All this efficiency analysis shows the factors 
affecting the economic performance of the fishery and the impacts of fisheries 
regulations. If an effective management structure exists that prevents biological and 
economic overexploitation, improvements of efficiency by vessels are desirable. 
Changes in efficiency of vessels are also strongly influenced by regulations. Imposing 
                                                 
26
  For example: manufacturing (Harris 1993; Sheehan 1997), steel production (Wu 1996). 
27
 For example: dairy farms (Battese & Coelli 1988; Hallam & Machado 1996; Jaforullah & Devlin 1996; 
Kompas & Che 2004) and crop farms (Bravo-Ureta & Pinherio 1993; Heshmati & Kumbhakar 1997; 
Kompas 2002; Neff et al 1993). 
28
 The SFA was first employed in the mid-Atlantic sea scallop fishery (Kirkley et al 1995, 1998) followed 
by longline fishery in Hawaii (Sharma & Leung 1999), mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery 
(Weninger 2001), Dutch beam trawler fishery (Pascoe et al 2001), English Channel fishery (Pascoe & 
Coglan 2002), British Columbia halibut fishery (Grafton et al 2000), Malaysian artisanal gill net fishery 
(Squires et al 2003); Australia’s banana prawn fishery (Kompas et al 2004), New South Wales, Australia 
ocean prawn trawl fishery (Greenville et al 2006) and many other fisheries. 
29
 ‘…Technical efficiency is usually what fishery managers refer to when making efficiency comparisons 
across vessels, or over time. An input-oriented way of defining technical efficiency is the minimum 
amount of inputs required to produce a given level of output. In many fisheries, fishing vessels are not 
technically efficient because they use too many inputs, or, are overcapitalized in the sense that a lower 
level of input (often measured in number of vessels) could be used to catch the same total harvest. 
Technical efficiency may surface for many reasons, but, a major cause is input controls that fail to prevent 
effort creep due to input substitution….’ (Grafton et al 2006b). 
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restrictions on what gear can be used by fishers affects the ability of vessels to harvest 
fish, and thus their efficiency. Efficiency in fisheries is not possible without appropriate 
governance and management (Grafton et al 2006b).   
 
In the absence of any effective controls or management a fishery will converge to a bio-
economic equilibrium30.  In many fisheries, the bio- economic equilibrium coincides 
with a lower fish stock than that which maximizes the sustained yield and will always 
be at a level where fishing effort exceeds that which maximizes the economic surplus or 
economic profit from fishing. To achieve maximum economic efficiency from a fishery 
correct and effective management targets are important. A benchmark to compare 
current economic performances in fisheries with potential economic performances is 
explained by Maximum Economic Yield (MEY)31. MEY is generated by the 
management structure, stock level, nature and extent of fishing effort, which depends on 
a combination of biological and economic factors.  
 
Maximizing economic efficiency in fisheries requires setting appropriate levels of catch 
and effort levels. To hold MEY, vessels efficiency must be maximized. For example, 
vessel level efficiency studies both on the Australian Northern prawn fishery (NPF) and 
the Australian South East trawl fishery (SETF) show overcapitalization (Kompas et al 
2009), where NPF introduced a MEY target, but the instrument used in the fishery 
(input control) generates considerable efficiency losses. On the other hand, in the SETF 
rights-based instrument, the Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) is used to ensure 
vessel-level efficiency, which is easily transferrable, but doesn’t employ an appropriate 
target. So, correct and effective management targets are important to achieve maximum 
economic efficiency from a fishery. In the absence of correct management targets, 
inefficient fisheries, such as industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh (see Chapter 4) 
suffer overcapacity, excess fishing capacity and low profits and hence fisheries become 
both biologically over-exploited and economically unprofitable. Efficient management 
of fisheries protects stocks, guarantees sustainability and assures correct allocation of 
resources in a way that maximizes the returns from fishing (Grafton et al 2006b; 
Kompas 2005).   
 
                                                 
30
 In the bio-economic equilibrium, there is no economic surplus. 
31
 MEY is a sustainable catch or effort level, which creates the largest difference between (discounted) 
total revenues and the total cost of fishing (Kompas 2005). 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is a combination of three core essays (Chapter 2-4) on management of 
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh followed by a concluding essay (Chapter 5) on 
the impact of traditional command and control approaches to marine fisheries 
management with evidence of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. The first core 
essay (Chapter 2) investigates the effect of input control on vessels’ performances of the 
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh and the vessels’ performance is measured in 
term of technical efficiency and productivity. The study shows that vessels are 
producing below the maximum level of output and are too small in their scale of 
operation. It also shows input control induces vessels operators to intensify usage of 
unregulated inputs. The study shows that the input control that is employed in industrial 
marine fisheries in Bangladesh fails to increase vessels efficiency and productivity. 
Hence, an alternative management strategy is needed to increase technical efficiency 
and productivity of both industrial marine shrimp and fish fisheries of Bangladesh.  
 
The second core essay (Chapter 3) estimates biological reference points of single-
species and single-fleet industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh in order to find out the 
current status of the industrial marine fisheries. The study shows that the shrimp stock 
of the industrial marine fisheries is over-exploited and the fall in catch per unit effort 
(CPUE) over time of the industrial marine shrimp fishery is due to the fall in stock size. 
On the other hand, the fish stock of the industrial marine fisheries is under-exploited 
and the fall in CPUE over time of the industrial marine fish fishery is due to inadequate 
knowledge and information on the availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and 
lack of technological developments for harvesting the new resources. The study also 
shows that to maintain steady-state equilibrium and adequate growth rate of both shrimp 
and fish, fishing patterns need to be modified. The study also indicates that the current 
management strategy fails to increase the level of high-valued shrimp stocks and to 
increase the catch level of the low-valued stocks. Hence, an alternative management 
strategy is needed for both industrial marine shrimp and fish fisheries of Bangladesh.  
 
The third core essay (Chapter 4) measures the economic performance of the single-
species and single-fleet industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. The study shows that 
excessive use of efforts makes both shrimp and fish fisheries economically inefficient in 
the form of low stock biomass and profit.  The study also shows that reductions in the 
19 
 
number of vessels in both shrimp and fish fleets are needed. The study indicates that the 
MEY is the best management target compare to the MSY to improve the economic 
efficiency of both industrial marine shrimp and fish fisheries of Bangladesh. Based on 
the findings of these three core essays, this research confirms that in the absence of 
correct management targets and property rights, the open access Bangladesh industrial 
marine fisheries becomes inefficient and overcapitalized. The fishery also suffers 
overcapacity and is economically unprofitable. This research also confirms that the 
industrial shrimp fishery is biologically over-exploited.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Technical efficiency and productivity of the industrial 
marine fisheries of Bangladesh 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In natural resource-based industries, such as fishing, the performance of vessels is 
important to policy decisions regarding fisheries management and to prevent 
overfishing. It is often argued that fisheries managers are more concerned with 
biological assessment of the marine resource rather the economic performances of 
vessels. Literature shows that the knowledge of the productive performance of 
individual vessels relative to the available technology and its interaction with other 
socio-economic factors are important consideration when formulating appropriate 
regulation (Sharma & Leung 1999). In order to maximize social benefit from the marine 
fisheries, efficient utilization of resources associated with fishery production and 
sustainable management of resource stocks are also important.  
 
To prevent overfishing, fisheries managers often employ input controls under the 
assumption that it restricts input use and indirectly leads to a level of output being 
achieved. Input control normally controls the use of those inputs that are readily 
measureable, for example vessel size, engine power, gear use and fishing days (Pascoe 
& Coglan 2002). Studies show that input control fails to reduce fishing pressure 
(Greenville et al 2006). Arguments show that control placed on the use of one input 
induces fishers to overuse unregulated inputs in production process. In many cases 
fishers substitute inputs with unregulated inputs (Kompas et al 2004). Studies show that 
input control fails to produce maximum levels of output in most fisheries. So, efficiency 
and productivity measures are important to assess a vessel’s performance and in 
determining the effects of fisheries policies.  
 
Due to the stochastic nature of harvesting marine resources, Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) is accepted as an appropriate technique to measure efficiency and 
productivity of industrial and commercial vessels (Sharma & Leung 1999).  The SFA 
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has been extensively applied to a wide range of industries32 and agricultural33 activities, 
but, is limited in its application to commercial fisheries34. The SFA was first employed 
in the mid-Atlantic sea scallop fishery (Kirkley et al 1995, 1998) followed by longline 
fishery in Hawaii (Sharma & Leung 1999), mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog 
fishery (Weninger 2001), Dutch beam trawler fishery (Pascoe et al 2001), English 
Channel fishery (Pascoe & Coglan 2002), British Columbia halibut fishery (Grafton et 
al 2000), Australia’s banana prawn fishery (Kompas et al 2004) and New South Wales, 
Australia ocean prawn trawl fishery (Greenville et al 2006).  Sharma & Leung (1999) 
adopted the methodological coherent approach to estimate the efficiency of longline 
fishery in Hawaii that requires a simultaneous estimation of production frontier model 
and an inefficiency effect model by maximum likelihood estimation (Coelli et al 2005; 
Battese & Coelli 1995; Huang & Liu 1994). 
 
The objective of this study is to determine the effect of input control on vessels’ 
performances in the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh and the vessels’ 
performance of this study is measured in terms of efficiency and productivity. This is 
the first kind of study to measure performance of vessels in the industrial marine 
fisheries of Bangladesh. A panel data set for the period 2001-2007 for Translog 
production function and technical efficiency effect model is used to measure efficiency; 
and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is used to measure productivity. Theoretical 
consistencies of translog production function for vessel, output elasticity associated with 
all inputs, elasticity of scale and marginal productivity of all inputs are examined in this 
study. Technical efficiency, technical progress and scale change are also estimated to 
find out the sources of productivity. The study shows that vessels are producing below 
the maximum level of output and are too small in their scale of operation. It also shows 
input control induces vessels operators to intensify use of unregulated inputs. 
  
                                                 
32
 For example: manufacturing (Harris 1993; Sheehan 1997), steel production (Wu 1996). 
33
 For example: dairy farms (Battese & Coelli 1988; Hallam & Machado 1996; Jaforullah & Devlin 1996; 
Kompas & Che 2004) and crop farms (Bravo-Ureta & Pinherio 1993; Heshmati & Kumbhakar 1997; 
Kompas 2002; Neff et al 1993). 
34
 Campbell & Hand 1998; Coglan et al 1999; Dey et al 2000; Eggert 2001; Felthoven 2002; Fousekis & 
Klonaris 2003; Grafton et al 2000; Greenville et al 2006; Holloway et al 2005; Holloway  & Tomberlin 
2007; Hoyo et al 2004; Kirkley et al 1995; Kirkley et al 1998; Kompas et al 2004; Kompas & Che 2005; 
Pascoe & Coglan 2002; Pascoe et al 2001; Pascoe et al 2003a; Pascoe et al 2003b; Pascoe & Mardle 
2003; Pascoe & Robinson 1996; Pascoe & Tingley 2007; Sharma & Leung 1999; Squires et al 2003; 
Tingley et al 2005; Tomberlin 2010; Tomberlin & Holloway 2007;  Vestergaard et al 2002; Weninger 
1998. 
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The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 provides a 
theoretical framework followed by data sources and variables in Section 2.3. The 
econometric specification is described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents results and 
discussion. Section 2.6 offers conclusions.  
 
2.2  Theoretical framework 
  
Productivity and productivity changes are important indicators of performance 
measurement of firms and vessels.  To compare performance of firms in a given point in 
time, measures of productivity are used, and to show movement in productivity 
performance of firms or an industry over time, measure of productivity change is used. 
A more suitable performance measurement and comparisons across firms and vessels 
for a given firm or vessel over time is the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which can be 
measured either using a top-down35 approach or bottom-up36 approach (Coelli et al 
2005).  
 
Total factor productivity can be decomposed into three or four components. In a non-
constant returns to scale production system, the commonly used sources of productivity 
change are technical change, technical efficiency change, scale change and allocative 
efficiency change. Allocative efficiency changes can be used when input prices paid by 
the producers are known. Balk (2001) identifies another source of productivity, which is 
known as output/input mix effect (OME/IME). OME/IME measures the effect of 
changes in the composition of the output and input over different periods and can be 
used for multi-output and multi-input firms, but, is not commonly discussed in the 
literature.  In the absence of price data, efficiency and productivity measurement are 
restricted to the measurement of technical efficiency, scale change and technical change 
(Coelli et al 2005). In this study, prices paid for the inputs are unknown hence three 
sources of productivity growth of the vessels are used: technical change, technical 
efficiency change and scale change.   
 
Technical change (TC) is an important source of productivity growth that results from 
shift in the production technology, while the technical efficiency change (TEC) is 
                                                 
35
 Such as Hicks-Moorsteen approach, Profitability approach, Caves-Christensen-Diewert (CCD) 
approach and Component-based approach of TFP.  
36
  The approach that identifies sources of productivity changes and constructs a measure of the growth in 
TFP. 
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another important source of productivity that comes from improvement of technical 
efficiency in the firm/vessel’s ability to use the available technology. Changes in 
technical efficiency define the rate at which producers move closer to, or, further away 
from the production function.   
 
Efficiency measurement is first introduced by Farrell (1957) based on the work done by 
Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to define a simple measure of firm efficiency.  
The efficiency of a firm depends on two components, namely, technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency shows the ability of a firm to obtain 
maximum output from a given set of inputs and the allocative efficiency measures the 
ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices 
and production technology (Kumbhakar & Lovell 2000). The combination of these two 
efficiency measures provides the economic efficiency of a firm. As prices paid for the 
inputs are unknown, efficiency measure in this study refers to technical efficiency and 
could be measured with both parametric and non-parametric functions.  
 
 Another important source of productivity growth is scale change (SC) that originates 
from improvements in the scale of operations of the firm or vessel, which moves 
towards a technologically optimum scale of operations. Arguments show that TFP may 
produce biased measures if the scale changes do not capture the measure of productivity 
changes (Coelli et al 2005). There have been several attempts to measure scale change 
and its influence on productivity change over time. Fare et al (1998) define scale change 
and use it in deriving decomposition of productivity changes over time. A formal 
framework for scale change and the role of scale change in productivity changes are 
also provided by Balk (2001) and show a comparison of earlier literatures37 in 
decomposing productivity change into efficiency change, technical change and scale 
change.  Another formal measure of scale change is proposed by Orea (2002). He 
suggests that the scale issue can be addressed using Denney et al (1981) and can be 
measured by using output elasticity of inputs and total elasticity of production/elasticity 
of scale. 
 
A stochastic production frontier is used in this study to measure technical efficiency. 
Stochastic frontier analysis assumes a given functional form for the relationship 
                                                 
37
  Fare et al (1994), Ray & Desli (1997), Grifell-Tatje & Lovell (1999), Wheelock & Wilson (1999), 
Zofio & Lovell (1999).  
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between input and output. Stochastic production frontiers were developed by Aigner et 
al (1977) and by Meeusen & van den Broeck (1977). The specification of these authors 
allow for a non-negative random component in the error term to generate a measure of 
technical inefficiency, or the ratio of actual to expected maximum output, given inputs 
and the existing technology. The idea can be applied to both cross section data 
(Kalirajan & Shand 1994) and panel data (Battese & Coelli 1995; Coelli et al 2005).   
 
The stochastic frontier production function model for cross section data can be written 
as: 
 
 = 
 + 
 −            (2.1) 
 
Where  represents the output of the i-th firm;  is a )1( k× vector containing the 
logarithms of inputs;  is a )1( ×k  vector of unknown parameters in the model; 
 is a 
symmetric random error to account for statistical noise, which can be positive or 
negative, and  is a non-negative random variable associated with technical 
inefficiency. Adding a subscript  to represent time, the panel data form of the 
stochastic frontier production function model of the Equation 2.1 can be written as: 
 
 = 
  + 
 −         (2.2) 
 
Panel data contains more observations than cross-sectional data and can give efficient 
estimators of the unknown parameters and more efficient predictors of technical 
efficiency.  
 
An appropriate functional form, either first-order flexible38 or second-order flexible39, is 
normally used to estimate stochastic production frontier. To confirm appropriate 
functional form the parameters of different models can be estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and then these models can be compared using a 
generalized likelihood ratio test. To use the maximum likelihood principle to estimate 
the parameters of the model and in order to identify the random effects and technical 
                                                 
38
  A first-order flexible functional form has enough parameters to provide a first-order differential 
approximation to an arbitrary function at a single point. For example: Cobb-Douglas. 
39
 A second-order flexible form has enough parameters to provide a second-order approximation. For 
example: Translog. 
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inefficiency effects in the model, an assumption concerning the distribution of the error 
terms is important (Coelli et al 2005).  
 
The maximum likelihood approach involves making stronger distributional assumptions 
concerning the itu .  Different distributional assumptions of itu  are commonly used, such 
as, a half-normal distribution truncated with zero mean and variance 2uσ , 
( )2,0~ ui iidNu σ+  (Aigner et al 1977; Pit & Lee 1981) and a truncated normal 
distribution with mean µ  and variance 2uσ , ( )2,~ ui iidNu σµ+  (Stevenson 1980; Battese 
& Coelli 1988).  A gamma distribution with mean λ  and degrees of freedom m  , 
( )miidGui ,~ λ  (Green 1990; Coelli et al 2005 ) and an exponential distribution with 
mean λ , ( )0,~ λiidGui  (Coelli et al 2005) are also used in some studies.  The log-
likelihood functions on different distributions, such as, truncated normal, gamma and an 
exponential distribution for different models can also be found in Kumbhakar & Lovell 
(2000).  
 
A time-invariant and a time-varying structure of itu  are also commonly used in the 
literature.  A time-invariant structure of itu  takes the form of iit uu =  and iu  is treated as 
either a fixed parameter or a random variable and these models are usually known as 
fixed effects models and random effects model. Fixed effects models can be estimated 
in a standard regression framework and random effects model can be estimated with 
either least squares or maximum likelihood techniques (Coelli et al 2005).  A time-
varying technical inefficiency takes the form of  ( ) tit utfu .=   where ( )tf  is a function 
that determines how technical efficiency varies over time and two functional forms of
( )tf  are commonly used, such as, ( ) [ ] 121 −++= ttetf βα  (Kumbhakar 1990) and 
( ) ( )[ ]Ttetf −= η (Battese & Coelli 1995).  
 
In this study, a Translog functional form of a stochastic production function model is 
used, which can be written as: 
 

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In the model,  represents the production of the i-th vessel and i=1,2,3, n at time t and 
t= 1,2, T; itX  a )1( k× vector of inputs used in production;  a )1( ×k vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated; the error term itv  is assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed as ),0( 2vN σ and captures random variation in output due to 
factors beyond the control of vessels, which can be positive or negative; the error term 
itu  a non-negative random variable and captures vessel-specific technical inefficiency. 
itu  is obtained by a non-negative truncation of ),( 2uitzN σδ , which allows the 
inefficiency effects in the frontier model to vary with  itz  a )1( m× vector of vessel-
specific explanatory variables; and δ a )1( ×m  vector of unknown coefficients to be 
estimated. Thus, itu  in the production model of this study can be specified as: 
 
  ititit wzu += δ                    (2.4) 
 
Where, itw a random variable that is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed and 0≥itu . The condition 0≥itu  guarantees that all observations lie on or 
beneath the stochastic production frontier. Vessel specific characteristics can also be 
picked up by adding vessel dummy variables in itu . 
 
The technical efficiency (TE) of the i-th vessel in the t-th period can be defined as:  
 
ititit wzu
ititit
ititit
ee
XuYE
XuYE
TE −−− ==
=
=
δ
),0(
)(
,
                                                                     (2.5) 
 
and must have a value between zero and one. The measure of TE is based on the 
conditional expectation given by Equation 2.5, given the values of itit uv − evaluated at 
the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the model, where the expected 
maximum value of itY  is conditional on 0=itu .  
 
Efficiency can be calculated for each individual vessel per year by: 
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for 2)1( σγγσ −=a  and (.)φ  the density function of a standard normal variable 
(Battese & Coelli 1988; Kompas et al 2004).   
 
The likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters (a normal 
distribution with some restrictions) (Coelli et al 2005).  The variance terms are 
parameterized by Battese & Corra (1977) by replacing 2vσ  and 2uσ  with 222 uv σσσ +=  
and 22
2
uv
u
σσ
σγ
+
= .  A value of γ close to zero denotes that deviation from the frontier is 
due entirely to noise and then the expected value of the TE score is one, while a value of 
γ
 close to one would indicate that all deviations are due to inefficiency. So 0=γ  
implies there are no deviations in output due to inefficiency; 1=γ  implies deviations in 
output are due to technical inefficiency effects and 10 << γ  implies deviations in 
output are due to both noise and technical inefficiency.  
 
A trend can also be included in the Equation 2.1 to capture time-variant effects and the 
time trend in Translog model allows non-neutral technical change and technological 
change effect to increase or decrease with time.   
 
A firm or vessel can be technically efficient, but the scale of operation of the firm may 
not be optimal. A firm may be either too small in its scale of operation and fall within 
the increasing returns to scale (IRS) of the production function or, too large and may 
operate within the decreasing returns to scale (DRS). In both cases efficiency of the firm 
can be improved by changing their scale of operations. A firm is automatically scale 
efficient if its production technology shows constant returns to scale (CRS) (Coelli et al 
2005). A widely-used measure of returns to scale is the elasticity of scale or, total 
elasticity of production, which is considered in this study to measure scale of operation 
of the vessels. Thus, the elasticity of scale of the vessels can be calculated as:  
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ββε is the output elasticity with respect to n inputs 
and n =1,2,3, N. 
 
Using output elasticity, the marginal product of −n th input (n =1,2,3,N ) at mean 
values of output and relevant input variables can be calculated as: 
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The total factor productivity (TFP) of the individual vessels per year can be calculated 
as: 
 
 1,1,1,1, −−−− ++= tittittittit SCTECTCTFP                                                                            (2.9) 
 
Where, 
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tit eTC  is the technical change, and the technological progress (TP) 
for t and 1−t  period can be calculated from the production function as,  
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TETEC  is the technical efficiency change and 
for t and 1−t  period technical efficiency change can be calculated from technical 
inefficiency effect model as, ii wzi eTE
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is 
the scale change (Greenville et al 2006) and for t and 1−t  period scale change can be 
calculated using Equation 2.7. 
 
2.3  Data and variables 
 
All data used in this study is collected mainly from fishing log books data, license 
renewals data and other office based records from the Marine Fisheries Department 
(MFD) under Department of Fishery (DoF) of Bangladesh.  
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The industrial/commercial fishing in the marine waters of Bangladesh was officially 
introduced in 1984 with a large number of imported second hand trawlers and vessels. 
Industrial fishing vessels of Bangladesh are divided into two broad categories: shrimp 
and fish, and these fisheries are commonly known as industrial marine fisheries. Vessels 
in the shrimp fleet are double-rigged vessels, fitted with two side beams from which two 
shrimp-trawl nets are simultaneously operated. A standard shrimp vessel is made of a 
steel hull and mesh size of the net at the cod-end is 45mm. Shrimp vessels target three 
principal species; Penaeus monodon (tiger shrimp), Penaeus indicus (white shrimp), 
Metapenaeus monodon (brown shrimp) as well as pink shrimp. Shrimp trawls occur 
beyond 40 metres depth within the EEZ of Bangladesh to catch shrimp and fish.  
 
On the other hand, vessels in fish fleet are stern vessels with a single-rigged trawl-net 
operated behind the vessels and these vessels are smaller than shrimp vessels (MFD 
2009). These vessels generally have both wooden and steel hulls and the mesh size of 
the net at the cod-end is 60mm. Fish vessels target fin fish, demersal white fish and mid 
water fish. Fish trawls occur in four different fishing areas. Traditional fish trawls occur 
beyond 40 metres depth at high tide to catch fin fish and shrimp; modern fish trawls 
occur between 40 and 100 metres depth to catch fin fish; demersal trawls occur between 
100-200 metres depth to target demersal white fish and mid water trawls occur beyond 
40 metres depth to catch mid water fish.  
 
According to the Marine Fisheries Department (MFD) of Bangladesh, the management 
system for shrimp vessels is closed season, licensing and input control. On the other 
hand, the management system for fish vessels is licensing and input control. License 
fees are based on Gross Tonnage (GT) of the vessels. Each year all vessels have to 
renew their license with the specific amount of fees fixed by the Government. The 
license fee of shrimp vessels varies from US $15 (for 0-10 GT) to US $1090 (for 600 
and above GT) and fish vessels vary from US $10 (for 0-10 GT) to US                                           
$727 (for 600 and above GT). Input control allows replacement of vessels and input 
restriction is imposed on vessel size, gross tonnage, engine size, mesh size and fishing 
days.  Input restriction allows vessels to fish at least 150 days per year (MFD 2009).   
 
The management of the industrial marine fisheries is governed by the Marine Fisheries 
Ordinance 1983, the Marine Fisheries Rules 1983 and the Fish and Fish Products 
(Inspection and Quality Control) Ordinance 1983. The Marine Fisheries Ordinance 
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1983 regulates the management, conservation and development of marine fisheries. The 
Marine Fisheries Rules 1983 regulates the issuance and conditions of fishing license, 
license conditions, types of fishing gear, mesh size, fishing area and fishing days. The 
Fish and Fish Products (Inspection and Quality Control) Ordinance 1983 regulates the 
issuance of licenses to ensure food safety requirements for fish products and to increase 
the quality of catch by all vessels.  
 
Shrimp and fish vessels use different technologies in different target areas and target 
different species. Both shrimp and fish vessels have considerable heterogeneity in terms 
of total value of catch, engine power, total crew, fishing days, gear length, vessel age, 
storage capacity, number of owner/s, cost of quality control and market orientation.  
 
The total number of vessels of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is 
increasing over time due to policy shifts, first in 2000 and then in 2004 (Table 2.1).   
 
Table 2.1 Number of vessels, total catch (tonnes) and catch per vessels (1992-2011) 
 
 
Period Maximum Minimum Average Difference 
between 
period 
↑ 
or 
↓ 
Number of vessels 1992-1996 57 49 53 - - 
1996-2001 75 55 63 11 ↑ 
2001-2006 122 80 98 35 ↑ 
2006-2011 158 127 142 44 ↑ 
Total catch  
(tonnes) 
 
1992-1996 12454 11715 12089 - - 
1996-2001 23901 13564 16972 4883 ↑ 
2001-2006 34114 25165 30785 13813 ↑ 
2006-2011 41643 34159 36161 5376 ↑ 
Catch per vessel 
(tonnes) 
1992-1996 250 206 231 - - 
1996-2001 319 247 267 36 ↑ 
2001-2006 347 279 315 48 ↑ 
2006-2011 279 225 255 -60 ↓ 
Source: Author’s calculation based on ‘Fisheries Statistics, Department of Fishery, Ministry of Fisheries 
and Animal Resources, various editions, Dhaka’. 
 
The average number of industrial vessels for every five years of data between 1992 and 
2011 in Table 2.1 shows a dramatic increase in average number of vessels during 1996- 
2011 and consequently both catch per vessel and the volume of average total catch show 
a significant drop between 2006 and 2011.  The yearly data also shows a sharp increase 
in the number of industrial vessels from 1996 onwards (Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1 shows 
that the total number of shrimp vessels is almost constant over time, but, there is a sharp 
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increase in the number of fish vessels from 1996 onwards and hence a sharp increase in 
total industrial vessels. 
 
Figure 2.1 Number of industrial vessels over time 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on ‘Fisheries Statistics, Department of Fishery, Ministry of Fisheries 
and Animal Resources, various editions, Dhaka’. 
 
The yearly data in Figure 2.2 shows during 1995-2003, an increasing trend along with a 
sharp drop in 2000 in catch per vessels (tonnes) with a sharp increase in volume of 
industrial vessels from 1996 to onwards (Figure 2.1), but, a sharp decline in catch per 
vessel is reported from 2004 to onwards (Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 Catch per industrial vessel over time 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on ‘Fisheries Statistics, Department of Fishery, Ministry of Fisheries 
and Animal Resources, various editions, Dhaka’. 
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The study investigates vessels’ performances in terms of efficiency and productivity 
during 2001-2007 for both shrimp and fish vessels separately40. The average total 
number of shrimp and fish vessels operated during the period 2001-2007 is 43 and 56, 
respectively (Table 2.2).  
  
Table 2.2 Number of vessels over time 
 
Year Shrimp Fish Total 
2001 44 31 75 
2002 44 36 80 
2003 45 42 87 
2004 45 49 94 
2005 45 64 109 
2006 42 80 122 
2007 39 88 127 
Average 43 56 99 
Source: ‘Fisheries Statistics, Department of Fishery, Ministry of Fisheries and Animal Resources, 
various editions, Dhaka’. 
 
Of them, only 18 shrimp vessels and 8 fish vessels are selected for this study. For 
instance, Coglan et al (1999) used only 63 boats out of 457 boats and Kirkley et al 
(1995, 1998) considered only 10 boats in their analyses. The first study considered only 
those vessels which had observations for at least 4 months a year in at least 3 of the 4 
years. The later study considered only those boats which had a long and consistent time 
series. 
 
In this study, the presence of outliers in data is addressed by dropping the invalid 
observations. Vessels with few or no observations and vessels that operated for only  a 
few years are excluded and unity-based normalization is done for all variables for both 
shrimp and fish vessels.  As a result, a balanced panel data set for both vessels over the 
period 2001-2007 is used to compare different vessels in the different time period. Thus, 
the total number of observations for shrimp and fish vessels is 126 and 56, respectively. 
Considering all heterogeneity, two separate production functions with two inefficiency 
effects models are used in this study for both shrimp and fish vessels.  
 
                                                 
40
 The status of the fishery data up to 2011 (such as: number of vessels, total catch) is available in the 
published office documents and in the website.  On the other hand, input data that is used in this study 
collected during field work in early 2009 from log books and license renewal papers. During that period 
input data is available up to 2007. As the data, after 2007 are not available in any published documents or 
in the web site, collecting more recent data through field visit is time consuming. Hence, more recent data 
is not used. 
54 
 
2.3.1 Variables in production function 
 
Shrimp and fish vessels both produce two outputs, shrimp and fish, using the same set 
of inputs.  In most studies in fishery, when single-species are examined a landed weight 
is considered an output measure and value of catch is considered when multiple species 
are harvested. For example, value per trip is used for a mixed Hawaiian longline fishery 
(Sharma & Leung 1999) and value of catch per month is used in an analysis of English 
Channel demersal trawl fishery (Pascoe & Coglan 2002). As Bangladesh’s industrial 
marine fisheries is producing both shrimp and fish by both shrimp and fish vessels, the 
aggregate value of total catch is used in this study for the output variable in both 
production functions. Data for the amount of shrimp and fish catch (tonnes per year) is 
collected from fisheries log books of MFD under DoF and is converted into values 
(thousand US dollars per year) using shrimp and fish prices. Both shrimp and fish prices 
are calculated using value of export (taka) and quantity of export (tonnes) of both 
shrimp and fish.  Value and quantity of export are collected from various editions of the 
Fisheries Statistical Year Book published by DoF. Shrimp and fish prices measured in 
taka and converted into US dollars using the Annual Nominal Exchange Rate (ANER) 
are collected from Bangladesh Economic Review (Ministry of Finance (MoF) 2012).  A 
common price for all vessels for both shrimp and fish is used. The price of shrimp and 
fish are different and varies between 2001 and 2007. The total value of catch per shrimp 
vessel varies between US $110,000 and US $2125,000 with an average of US $943,000 
per year and the standard deviation is US $511,400 per year. On the other hand, the total 
value of catch per fish vessel varies between US $435,000 and US $2459,000 with an 
average of US $1391,000 per year and the standard deviation is US $510,890 per year. 
Data used in this study shows that the total value of catch of fish vessels is much higher 
than that of shrimp vessels.  
 
Different studies use different choices of input variables to explain production frontier 
and the choice of input variables differs based on characteristics of the fishery. For 
example, crew size, trip length and the cost of other variable inputs, such as fuel, bait, 
ice, etc are used by Sharma & Leung (1999) in longline fishery; crew size, days at sea, 
gear, and size of boats are considered by Kirkley et al (1995, 1998) in Atlantic Scallop 
fishery and engine power, number of trip each month, gear, and size of boats are used 
by Pascoe & Coglan (2002) in English Channel demersal trawl fishery. As both shrimp 
and fish vessels in Bangladesh’s industrial marine fisheries are using the same set of 
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inputs, engine power, crew size and fishing days are considered as input variables for 
both production functions in this study. All input data used in both production functions 
is collected from MFD.  
 
Engine power is considered a fixed input for both production functions and measured in 
Brake Horse Power (BHP). For both shrimp and fish vessels, engine power varies 
between 450 and 960 BHP with an average of 664 BHP and a standard deviation of 168 
BHP for shrimp vessels and an average of 694 BHP and a standard deviation of 205 
BHP for fish vessels. Data use in this study shows that the average of engine power of 
fish vessels is a little higher than that of shrimp vessels.   
 
Vessel specific total crew data is used in this study as quality/category specific crew 
size is not available. For both shrimp and fish vessels, crew size is fixed between 2001 
and 2007 for all vessels, but, varies between vessels. The size of crew for shrimp 
vessels varies between 26 and 41 with an average of 32 and the standard deviation is 6. 
On the other hand, the size of crew for fish vessels varies between 24 and 41 with an 
average of 30 and the standard deviation is 6.  Data use in this study shows that the 
average of the size of crew of shrimp vessels is a little higher than that of fish vessels.  
 
Fishing days are considered as a variable input for both production functions and 
measured in days per year. For shrimp vessels, fishing days per year vary between 14 
and 246 with an average of 175 days per year and the standard deviation is 43 days. On 
the other hand, fishing days for fish vessels per year varies between 120 and 254 with 
an average of 169 days per year and the standard deviation is 28 days. Data use in this 
study shows that the average of fishing days per year of shrimp vessels is a little higher 
than that of fish vessels. According to the Marine Fisheries Rules, freezer vessels can 
fish 20-25 days per trip and non-freezer vessels can fish 10-12 days per trip (MFD 
2009). All shrimp vessels are freezer vessels, but fish vessels are both freezer and non-
freezer vessels.  
 
A time trend is used to capture technical change (such as technological innovation, 
changes in fishing patterns and practices and so forth) over time on harvest. A binary 
variable for the year 2004 is used in the production function to capture change in 
regulation. 
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2.3.2 Variables in inefficiency model 
 
Vessel specific factors including vessel age, gear length, market orientation and 
ownership are considered in the inefficiency effect models for both shrimp and fish 
vessels. In addition, storage capacity, quality control costs and vessel specific dummy 
variables are used in the inefficiency effect model for shrimp vessels. All data use in 
this model is collected from MFD. 
 
Storage capacity shows the size of vessels. It is measured in tonnes and varies between 
41 and 181 tonnes for shrimp vessels with an average of 76 tonnes and a standard 
deviation of 33 tonnes. On the other hand, storage capacity for fish vessels varies 
between 54 and 119 tonnes with an average of 90 tonnes and a standard deviation of 24 
tonnes. Data use in this study shows fish vessels have higher storage capacity than those 
of shrimp vessels, that is, fish vessels are larger than shrimp vessels.  
 
The quality control variable used in this study is a sum of expenditure on hygiene and 
quality control; and quality and laboratory certificates and the average cost per year for 
shrimp vessels is US $6,000 per and for fish vessels is US $174. The cost varies for 
shrimp vessels between US $200 and US $16,000 per year with a standard deviation of 
US $4,000 per year and for fish vessels between US $150 and US $195 with a standard 
deviation of US $14 per year. All expenditure is calculated in taka and converted into 
US dollars using the annual exchange rate. The quality control cost per year for shrimp 
vessels is higher than that of fish vessels. Most shrimp vessels exploit high-valued 
stocks and are export-oriented vessels that incur quality control costs to meet the 
conditions of foreign buyers. On the other hand, fish vessels have domestic buyers, 
commonly known as commission agents, and do not face many conditions to fulfill 
(most conditions are met by the commission agents) and hence cost less to maintain 
compared to shrimp vessels.  
 
Vessel age is measured in years. All vessels in this study are imported second hand 
vessels and their starting age is the first entry of operation in the Bangladesh marine 
water. Data shows that shrimp vessel age varies between 4 and 25 years with an average 
of 18 years and the standard deviation is 5 years. On the other hand, fish vessels age 
varies between 2 and 19 years with an average of 11 years and the standard deviation is 
5 years. Data used in this study shows that shrimp vessels are older than fish vessels.  
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Gear length is measured in meters and varies from 22 to 32 metres for shrimp vessels, 
with a standard deviation of 2 metres and average of 23 metres.  On the other hand, gear 
length varies from 30 to 40 metres for fish vessels, with a standard deviation of 4 metres 
and average of 33 metres. The average length of gear for fish vessels is much higher 
than that of shrimp vessels.  
 
A binary variable market orientation is used to capture whether the vessel is domestic 
market oriented (one) or foreign market oriented (zero). Most shrimp vessels export 
their harvest directly to the foreign market and only a few of them export via domestic 
commission agents. But, most fish vessels export their harvest via domestic commission 
agents and only a few of them export directly to the foreign market.  
 
The binary variable for owner use in this study indicates whether the vessel is multiple 
owners managed (one) or single owner managed (zero). The number of owners varies 
between 1 and 10 for shrimp vessels with an average of 4 and standard deviation is 3. 
On the other hand, the number of owner varies between 1 and 10 for fish vessels with 
an average of 3 and standard deviation is 4. Data shows that the average number of 
owners in shrimp vessels is higher than that of fish vessels. Vessel specific dummy 
variables used in this study captures vessel-specific fixed effects and describes vessels- 
specific characteristics not captured by the inefficiency model.  
 
The summary statistics of the variables used in this study for both shrimp and fish 
vessels are shown in Table 2.3 (Appendix A).  
 
2.4   Econometric Specifications 
 
Generalized likelihood ratio tests are used to confirm the functional form and 
specification for both shrimp and fish vessels, with the relevant test statistics given by: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }10 lnln2 HLHLLR −−=              (2.10) 
                                                                               
Where ( )0HL  and ( )1HL  are the values of the likelihood function under the null and 
alternative hypotheses. The correct critical values for the test statistics are drawn from 
both Kodde & Palm (1986) and from the normal 2χ statistic. The Kodde & Palm (1986) 
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tables are used for the test of the one sided inefficiency term and the normal 2χ statistic 
is used for the other tests. To confirm the functional form and the specification, various 
hypotheses are tested.  
 
2.4.1 Hypothesis test and model specification: shrimp vessel 
 
The hypothesis tests for shrimp vessels are presented in Table 2.4 (Appendix A). At a 5 
per cent level of significance, the generalized likelihood ratio tests for shrimp vessels in 
Table 3.4 show the inefficiency effects are stochastic and the stochastic production 
frontier is appropriate ( 0:0 =γH  is rejected). The tests also show the Translog 
functional form of the production function is suitable ( 0:0 === ntttnmH βββ  is rejected 
and 3,2,1, =mn ). The test confirms the presence of technical inefficiency (
0....: 23100 ===== δδδγH  is rejected) and shows that the distribution of inefficiency 
effects is neither half-normal ( 0....: 23100 ==== δδδH
 
is rejected) nor, truncated 
normal ( 0....: 2310 === δδH is rejected). The test also confirms that both vessels’ 
specific fixed effects and gear length significantly affect the technical efficiency of the 
shrimp vessels ( 0....: 2370 === δδH  and 0: 40 =δH  are rejected) and hence, are 
included in the technical inefficiency effect model. The generalized likelihood ratio tests 
also show an existence of technical change ( 0:0 === nttttH βββ  is rejected and
3,2,1=n ), which is non-neutral ( 0:0 == ntttH ββ  is rejected and 3,2,1=n ). Thus, the 
Translog production function and the technical inefficiency effect model for shrimp 
vessels are confirmed. Comparison of these different models for shrimp vessels are 
presented in Table 2.5 and 2.6 (Appendix A). 
 
The specification of the Translog production function for shrimp vessels is: 
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Where, vessel i=1,2,3,……, 18 and year t= 1,2,…,7; itY  is the value of total catch, itX1  
is the engine power, itX2  is the size of crew, itX3  is the fishing days and t is time trend. 
iYear  is a dummy variable for the year 2004.  
 
Vessel specific factors are used in the technical inefficiency model for shrimp vessels: 
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Where, itz1 is the storage capacity, itz2 is the quality expenditure that captures the cost of 
hygiene and quality control, and laboratory certificate, itz3  is the vessels age and itz4  is 
the gear length. iD1  and iD2 are dummy variables for market orientation and ownership 
of the vessels, respectively. kiV  is a dummy variable that captures vessel specific fixed 
effects, those are not captured anywhere in the model and k=1,2,3,……, 17. 
 
2.4.2 Hypothesis test and model specification: fish vessel 
 
The hypothesis tests for fish vessels are presented in Table 2.7 (Appendix A). At a 5 per 
cent level of significance, the generalized likelihood ratio tests in Table 2.7 show the 
inefficiency effects are stochastic and the stochastic production frontier is appropriate (
0:0 =γH  is rejected). The tests also show the Translog functional form of the 
production function is suitable ( 0:0 === ntttnmH βββ  is rejected and 3,2,1, =mn ). The 
test confirms the presence of technical inefficiency ( 0....: 4100 ===== δδδγH  is 
rejected) and shows that the distribution of inefficiency effects is neither half-normal (
0....: 4100 ==== δδδH
 
is rejected) nor, truncated normal ( 0....: 410 === δδH is 
rejected). The test also confirms that both storage capacity and a vessels’ specific fixed 
effects are not significant for the technical efficiency of fish vessels (
0:
_0 =capacitystorageH δ and
 
0....: 1150 === δδH are accepted) and hence, are excluded 
from the technical inefficiency effect model, but, the gear length significantly affects the 
technical efficiency of the fish vessels ( 0: 20 =δH  are rejected) and, hence is included in 
the technical inefficiency effect model. The generalized likelihood ratio tests also show 
an existence of technical change ( 0:0 === nttttH βββ  is rejected and 3,2,1=n ), 
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which is non-neutral ( 0:0 == ntttH ββ  is rejected and 3,2,1=n ). Thus, the Translog 
production function and the technical inefficiency effect model for fish vessels are 
confirmed. Comparison of these different models for fish vessels are presented in Table 
2.8 and 2.9 (Appendix A). 
 
The specification of the Translog production function for fish vessels is: 
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Where, vessel i=1,2,3,……, 8 and year t= 1,2,…,7; itY  is the value of total catch, itX1  
is the engine power, itX2  is the size of crew, itX3  is the fishing days and t is time trend. 
iYear  is a dummy variable for the year 2004.  
 
Vessel specific factors are used in the technical inefficiency model for fish vessels: 
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Where, itz1 is the vessels age and itz2  is the gear length. iD1  and iD2 are dummy 
variables for market orientation and ownership of the vessels, respectively.  
 
2.5  Results 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) is obtained using Frontier 4.1 (Coelli 1996) for 
both shrimp and fish vessels. The Frontier 4.1 program follows a three-step procedure. 
In the first step, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the parameter of the 
production function are obtained, which provides unbiased estimators of all parameters 
except the intercept. The second step conducts a two-phase grid search of gamma and 
OLS estimates are used as starting values. The intercept and variance parameters are 
adjusted by the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS). In the third step, Davidson-
Fletcher-Powell Quasi-Newton method is used to obtain the final MLE. The values 
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selected in the grid search are used as starting values in this iterative procedure. The 
estimates of the parameters of both the Translog model and the inefficiency effects 
model of this study are presented in Table 2.10 and 2.11 for both shrimp and fish 
vessels, respectively (Appendix A). 
 
2.5.1 Theoretical consistency of production function 
 
The theoretical consistencies of both production functions for shrimp and fish vessels 
are checked and results are reported in Table 2.12. Translog function consists of 
quadratic terms, which shows a parabolic form that implies increasing and decreasing 
branches by definition causing inconsistencies in monotonicity and/or violation in 
curvature conditions (Sauer et al 2006).  
  
Table  2.12 Theoretical consistency 
 
 Shrimp vessel Fish vessel 
Monotonicity 
1f  0.16 > 0    0.44 > 0 
2f  0.53 > 0    0.45 > 0 
3f  0.39 > 0     0.61 > 0 
Law of diminishing returns 
11f  -0.48 < 0    -2.15 < 0 
22f  -1.05 < 0    -0.37 < 0 
33f  -0.28 < 0    -0.33 < 0 
12f  0.71 > 0     3.39 > 0 
13f  0.38 > 0     0.40 > 0 
23f  0.52 > 0     0.42 > 0 
Curvature (quasi-concavity)* 
1B  
-0.03 < 0    -0.19 < 0 
2B  
0.28 > 0     1.85 > 0 
3B  
-0.37 < 0     1.27 > 0 
Note: * denotes B is Boarded Hessian 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
In this study, both production functions show that output increases monotonically with 
all inputs for both shrimp and fish vessels; and the law of diminishing returns holds for 
both production functions. A slight violation of curvature condition for fish vessels is 
reported and curvature condition for shrimp vessels is fulfilled. For shrimp vessels, all 
three principle leading minors of the Bordered Hessian matrix alternate its sign, but for 
fish vessels, though the first two principle minors alternate its sign, the last one doesn’t. 
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So, it is confirmed that the production function of shrimp vessels is strictly quasi-
concave and the level set is convex as the input bundle is negative definite, but the 
curvature condition for fish vessels is violated.  Literature shows that violation of 
curvature condition for translog production function can be expected and this is caused 
by logarithmic transformation of input variables (Sauer et al 2006). Overall, production 
function for shrimp vessels is theoretically consistent, while the production function for 
fish vessels shows consistency in monotonicity, but, inconsistence with the curvature 
condition.  
 
However, monotonicity condition is particularly important for estimating relative 
efficiency of individual firms for a reasonable interpretation of the results (Hennigsen & 
Henning 2009). As monotonicity conditions for both production functions are 
consistent, the estimated production functions for both shrimp and fish vessels are 
accepted as well-behaved production functions. Monotonicity of translog production 
function requires all marginal products with respect to all inputs should be positive and 
thus elasticity of outputs with respect to all inputs is non-negative. Marginal products of 
all inputs are calculated using mean values of output, input variables and output 
elasticities of inputs. 
 
2.5.2 Output elasticity of inputs and elasticity of scale 
 
The estimated results of both production functions show output elasticity for all inputs 
are positive and hence, the marginal products of all inputs are positive (Table 2.12). The 
positive value of output elasticity for all inputs suggests that the estimated translog 
production function is a well-behaved production technology (Sharma & Leung 1999; 
Greenville et al 2006). The output elasticity with respect to all inputs and the elasticity 
of scale for both shrimp and fish vessels are reported in Table 2.13.  
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Table 2.13 Output elasticity with respect to inputs  
 
Year Engine power Crew Fishing  days Elasticity of scale 
Shrimp 
vessel 
Fish  
vessel 
Shrimp  
vessel 
Fish 
vessel 
Shrimp  
vessel 
Fish  
vessel 
Shrimp 
vessel 
Fish 
vessel 
2001 0.07 0.22 0.89 0.05 1.30 1.28 2.26 1.54 
2002 0.11 0.24 0.82 0.17 1.15 1.07 2.08 1.47 
2003 0.15 0.27 0.75 0.28 0.99 0.85 1.90 1.40 
2004 0.22 0.28 0.66 0.39 0.79 0.65 1.68 1.32 
2005 0.20 0.33 0.65 0.53 0.75 0.42 1.60 1.27 
2006 0.24 0.35 0.58 0.64 0.60 0.20 1.43 1.20 
2007 0.33 0.36 0.48 0.74 0.37 0.01 1.18 1.11 
Mean 0.19 0.29 0.69 0.40 0.85 0.64 1.73 1.33 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Table 2.13 shows that during 2001-07 mean output elasticity with respect to engine 
power, size of crew and fishing days for shrimp vessels are 0.19, 0.69 and 0.85, 
respectively and for fish vessels are 0.29, 0.40 and 0.64 respectively.  
 
Results show that for both shrimp and fish vessels, the mean output elasticity associated 
with fishing days is higher, followed by size of crew and engine power. The elasticity 
associated with fishing days for shrimp vessels (0.85) is higher than fish vessels (0.64). 
A larger elasticity of days at sea (1.25) is estimated by Sharma & Leung (1999) for mid-
Atlantic scallop fishery based on the estimated results of Kirkley et al (1995); and 
elasticity of days fished (1.233) is estimated by Greenville et al (2006) for NSW ocean 
prawn trawl fishery. The elasticity of trip days (0.71) estimated by Sharma & Leung 
(1999) for longline fishery in Hawaii is also quite large. It is noted that the elasticity 
associated with fishing days for both shrimp and fish vessels is decreasing over time. 
 
The elasticity of output associated with size of crew is also higher for shrimp vessels 
(0.69) compare to fish vessels (0.40). Sharma & Leung (1999) estimated the highest 
elasticity (0.84) in crew size for longline fishery in Hawaii and the study also calculated 
the elasticity of crew size (0.48) for mid-Atlantic scallop fishery based on the estimated 
results of Kirkley et al (1995).  Output elasticity associated with size of crew also shows 
a similar trend as fishing days for shrimp vessels, which is, decreasing over time and an 
opposite trend for fish vessels, that is, increasing over time.  
 
Results show that elasticity associated with engine power for shrimp vessels (0.19) is 
smaller than that of fish vessels (0.29). Elasticity of output associated with engine 
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power of fish vessels (0.29) is almost similar to the elasticity of output associated with 
the engine power (0.25), estimated for Australia’s banana prawn fishery (Kompas et al 
2004). The output elasticity associated with engine power for both shrimp and fish 
vessels shows an increasing trend over time and is smaller compared to fishing days and 
size of crew for both vessels. 
 
During 2001-2007, the mean elasticity of scale for shrimp and fish vessels is 1.73 and 
1.33, respectively. Results show that both shrimp and fish vessels are operating at 
Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) with a decreasing trend. Studies on Australia’s south 
east trawl fishery (Kompas & Che 2005) and Australia’s banana prawn fishery (Kompas 
et al 2004) show Constant Returns to Scale (CRS); Swedish trawl fishery (Eggert 2001) 
and Solomon Island pole and line fishery (Campbell & Hand 1998) show Decreasing 
Returns to Scale (DRS); while NSW Australia ocean prawn trawl fishery (Greenville et 
al 2006), longline fishery in Hawaii (Sharma & Leung 1999) and mid-Atlantic sea 
scallop fishery (Kirkley et al 1995) show IRS. The IRS of these fisheries are calculated 
as 2.628, 1.87 and above 2, respectively. The returns to scale is not reported in the study 
done by Kirkley et al (1995), but estimated by Sharma & Leung (1999) based on 
Kirkley et al (1995)’s results.  
 
Between 2001 and 2007, the estimated change in scale of shrimp vessels varies from  
-0.02 to 0.06 with a mean of 0.01 and fish vessels varies from -0.04 to 1.38 with a mean 
of 0.19, which indicates the mean change in the scale of fish vessels is much higher than 
that of shrimp vessels.  
 
IRS indicates two possible implications in the scale of operation of vessels. The first 
implication is the existence of small vessels in both shrimp and fish vessels, which are 
too small in its scale of operation. The second implication is the use inputs, which 
shows that vessels’ are using high proportion of inputs and this leads to an increase in 
output that is proportionately more than the use of inputs. Thus the elasticity of scale for 
both shrimp and fish vessels suggests that the scale efficiency of both shrimp and fish 
vessels can be improved by removing small vessels so that the remaining vessels can 
adjust the use of inputs in its production process. 
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2.5.3  Technical efficiency 
 
The value of gamma for both shrimp and fish vessels is 0.99 and highly significant, 
which is similar to Kirkley et al (1995) and Kompas & Che (2005).  Gamma shows that 
the deviation in output for both shrimp and fish vessels is due to inefficiency effects  
( itu ), although the random effect ( itv ) still matters.  
 
The predicted mean efficiency score between 2001 and 2007 of shrimp vessels vary 
from 0.25 to 0.94 with a mean technical efficiency of 0.65 and fish vessels vary from 
0.51 to 0.91 with a mean technical efficiency of 0.71. The mean technical efficiency for 
both shrimp vessels (0.65) and fish vessels (0.71) indicate that although vessels are 
operating close to efficient frontier, inefficiency exists for both shrimp (35%) and fish 
(29%) vessels, that is, vessels are not producing a maximum level of output with the 
given set of inputs. It can be seen from the mean actual output and frontier output for 
both shrimp and fish vessels depicted in Figure 2.3 (Appendix B), which shows that 
with the given set of inputs, vessels are producing below (actual output) the maximum 
(frontier output) level of output. 
 
Studies on Australian south east trawl fishery (Kompas & Che 2005), longline fishery in 
Hawaii (Sharma & Leung 1999), mid-Atlantic sea scallop fishery (Kirkley et al 1995), 
Australia’s banana prawn fishery (Kompas et al 2004) and Swedish trawl fishery 
(Eggert 2001) also show existence of inefficiency in these fisheries and the estimated 
mean technical efficiency of theses fisheries are 0.92 0.84, 0.75, 0.774 and 0.658, 
respectively.   
 
The frequency distribution of estimated technical efficiency for both shrimp and fish 
vessels are shown in Figure 2.4.  The frequency distribution of this study shows most 
(39%) shrimp vessels’ technical efficiency is in the range of 0.70-0.79 followed by the 
range of 0.60-0.69 (17%), 0.80-0.89 (11%) and 0.50-0.59 (11%).  The lowest range of 
technical efficiency scores of shrimp vessels is 0.20-0.29 and 6 percent of shrimp 
vessels’ technical efficiency lies in this range. Result also show that most (38%) fish 
vessels’ technical efficiency lies in the similar range (0.70-0.79) of shrimp vessels, 
followed by 0.50-0.59 (25%), which is the lowest range of technical efficiency score of 
fish vessels.  
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Figure 2.4 Frequency distribution of technical efficiency  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The mean efficiency of shrimp and fish vessels over time in Figure 2.5 shows that 
between 2001 and 2003, the technical efficiency of both shrimp and fish vessels have 
similar trends (first declining and then increasing), but, different trends between 2004 
and 2007.  Between 2004 and 2006, the technical efficiency of shrimp vessels shows an 
increasing trend, while fish vessels show a decreasing trend. On the other hand, between 
2006 and 2007 a declining trend in shrimp vessels and an increasing trend in fish 
vessels are seen. These trends may be due to policy changes in 2000 and 2004. 
 
Figure 2.5 Technical Efficiency (TE) over time 
  
A. Shrimp vessel B. Fish vessel 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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The main sources of technical inefficiency are identified in this study from the 
estimated technical inefficiency effect model. All variables included in the technical 
inefficiency effect model for both shrimp and fish vessels are statistically significant 
(Table 2.10 and 2.11, Appendix A). The estimated technical inefficiency effect model 
shows that use of older vessels is a common source of technical inefficiency for both 
shrimp and fish vessels as vessel age variable for both shrimp and fish vessels has 
positive sign. This indicates that both vessels aren’t producing at the maximum level 
and the existence of old vessels show that input controls may make replacement of 
vessels more difficult. Results also show that the overuse of inputs is also an important 
source of technical inefficiency for both shrimp and fish vessels. For example, larger 
shrimp vessels are technically inefficient as storage capacity variable has positive sign 
and fish vessels those using larger gears are technically inefficient as gear length 
variable has positive sign. That is, using these inputs, shrimp and fish vessels aren’t 
producing at the maximum levels of output. This also indicates that input controls 
induce vessels’ operators to use more unregulated inputs intensively.  
 
Results show that vessels those are overusing inputs are mainly domestic market 
oriented vessels as market orientation variable for both shrimp and fish vessels have 
positive sign. The estimated results show shrimp vessels with high quality control costs 
and shrimp vessels using small gear are technically efficient, as all these variables have 
a negative sign in the estimated model. Results also show that both shrimp and fish 
vessels with single ownership are technically efficient. A generalized likelihood ratio 
test shows that vessel specific fixed effect also affects the technical efficiency of shrimp 
vessels. 
 
2.5.4 Technical progress 
 
Non-neutral41 technical change exists in both shrimp and fish vessels, which is 
confirmed by the generalized ratio test. The estimated mean technical progress of both 
shrimp and fish vessels is the same and the rate of mean technical progress for both 
vessels is -0.06. The rate of technical progress varies between 2001 and 2007 for both 
                                                 
41
 Technical change is neutral when it raises the productivity of all factors inputs in production (e.g., 
capital and labor) by the same proportion. It is non-neutral when it raises the productivity of some factors 
more than others. 
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vessels and the rate varies from -0.17 to 0.08 for shrimp vessels and from -0.15 to 0.07 
for fish vessels. The estimated results show that only 25 percent fish vessels and 27.8 
percent shrimp vessels have positive technical progress (Figure 2.6) and most shrimp 
(72.2 percent) and fish (75 percent) vessels’ technical progress is negative.  
 
Figure 2.6 Frequency distribution of technical progress 
 
 
     Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The mean technical progress of shrimp and fish vessels over time in Figure 2.7 shows 
the mean technical progress of shrimp vessels is increasing and the mean technical 
progress of fish vessels is decreasing over time.  
 
Figure 2.7 Technical Progress (TP) over time  
 
A. Shrimp vessel B. Fish vessel 
C.  
  
Source: Author’s calculation 
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highly significant, indicating that the rate of technical change of shrimp vessels is 
increasing at an increasing rate through time, while the rate of technical change of fish 
vessels is decreasing at a decreasing rate. The coefficient of time interacted with engine 
power, crew and fishing days are positive, negative and negative respectively for shrimp 
vessels; and positive, positive and negative respectively for fish vessels. The results 
suggest that over this period, for shrimp vessels, technical change is capital-saving but 
both effort-using and labour-using; and for fish vessels, technical change is both capital-
saving and labour-saving, but effort-using.  
 
The results indicate that for shrimp vessels, the isoquant is shifting inwards at a faster 
rate over time in the capital intensive part of the input-space, which indicates that high 
depreciation costs of engines that are too old. On the other hand, for fish vessels, the 
isoquant is shifting inwards at a faster rate over time in both capital and labour intensive 
parts of the input-space, which indicates that high depreciation costs of engines that are 
too old and high marginal cost of production. The effort-using results for both shrimp 
and fish vessels indicate that too much effort is being used over this period and the 
negative sign of the coefficient indicating that both shrimp and fish vessels are 
producing low output with high effort. It also shows an indication of decline in high-
valued stock as shrimp vessels are more concentrated in high-valued catch and an 
indication of need for improvement of fishing technology as a declining trend of 
technical change of fish vessels is seen in Figure 2.7. 
 
2.5.5  Productivity  
 
The marginal product of engine power, crew and fishing days for shrimp vessels are 
0.16, 0.53 and 0.39, respectively and for fish vessels are 0.44, 0.45 and 0.61, 
respectively (Table 2.12). Variations in marginal productivity of inputs show that the 
changes in output in shrimp vessels is mainly due to an additional use of crew followed 
by an additional increase in fishing days and an additional use of engine power. On the 
other hand, changes in output in fish vessels is mainly due to an additional increase in 
fishing days followed by an additional use of both number of crew and engine power.  
 
The mean total factor productivity (TFP) of shrimp and fish vessels is -0.08 and 0.11, 
respectively.  Between 2001 and 2007, the total factor productivity of shrimp vessels 
varies from -0.19 to -0.01 and fish vessels varies from -0.20 to 1.45. The frequency 
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distribution of TFP in Figure 2.8 show that most fish vessels’ (75 percent) TFP is 
negative and only 25% vessel’s TFP is positive, but, quite large. As a result, the mean 
TFP of fish vessels is positive. On the other hand, only 33 percent shrimp vessels’ TFP 
is negative and 67 percent vessels’ TFP is positive, but, quite small. As a result, the 
mean TFP of shrimp vessels are negative.  
 
Figure 2.8 Frequency distribution of total factor productivity 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
The mean total factor productivity of shrimp and fish vessels in Figure 2.9 shows that 
the negative TFP of shrimp vessels are mainly due to both technical efficiency change 
and technical change, while the positive TFP of fish vessels are mainly due to scale 
change. 
 
Figure 2.9  Mean Total Factor Productivity (TFP)  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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The mean technical efficiency change (TEC), technical change (TC), scale change (SC) 
and total factor productivity (TFP) of both shrimp and fish vessels over time is shown in 
Figure 2.10 (Appendix B).  The trend of TFP of both shrimp and fish vessels in Figure 
2.10 show that the sources of TFP vary in different periods during 2002-2007, which is 
summarize in Table 2.14. 
 
Table 2.14 Sources of TFP over time 
 
Period Sources of TFP 
 Shrimp vessel Fish vessel 
2002-03 TEC SC 
2003-04 TEC TC and TEC 
2004-05 TEC, TC and SC SC 
2005-06 TEC, TC and SC TEC, TC and SC 
2006-07 TEC and SC TEC 
Source: Figure 2.10 
 
Overall, the change in TFP during 2003-07 is positive for shrimp vessels (0.03) and 
negative for fish vessels (-0.27). The change in TFP over time for both vessels is shown 
in Figure 2.11.  
 
Figure 2.11 Change in TFP over time  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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both are managed by input control. The performance of vessels in this study is measured 
in terms of efficiency and productivity. Efficiency is measured using Translog 
production function and technical efficiency effect model; and productivity is measured 
using Total Factor Productivity.   
 
Considering heterogeneity between shrimp and fish fleets, separate models are 
estimated for both. Stochastic Frontier Analysis is used to measure change in technical 
efficiency, technical change, scale change and total factor productivity. A normalized 
and balanced panel data set for both shrimp and fish vessels for the period 2001-2007 
are used. Theoretical consistencies of translog production function for both vessels are 
checked. Output elasticity associated with all inputs, elasticity of scale and marginal 
productivity of all inputs for both vessels are also examined.  Results show that the 
deviation in output for both shrimp and fish vessels are mainly due to inefficiency 
effects, although the random effect is still relevant. Both production functions show that 
output increases monotonically with engine power, size of crew and fishing days. The 
positive value of output elasticity associated with all inputs for both vessels shows a 
well-behaved production technology and the production technology exhibits increasing 
returns to scale for both vessels.  
 
Results show that during 2001-2007, the mean TFP of shrimp vessels is negative and 
fish vessels are positive and the negative TFP of shrimp vessels is mainly due to both 
technical efficiency change and technical change, while the positive TFP of fish vessels 
is mainly due to scale change. Results show that technical efficiency change, technical 
change and scale change are important sources of total factor productivity of 
Bangladesh industrial marine fishery. During 2001-2007, though the mean technical 
efficiency of fish vessels is higher than shrimp vessels, both vessels are producing 
below the maximum level of output. Results show that all vessels of both fleets engaged 
in fishing over this period are too old to be technically efficient. The overuse of 
unregulated inputs is also an important source of technical inefficiency of both fleets. 
Results also show that mainly domestic market oriented vessels in both fleets are 
overusing inputs. The estimated results show that adequate quality control, use of small 
gear and single ownership are important for vessels to be technically efficient. Results 
indicate that input controls may make replacement of vessels more difficult and hence 
vessels’ operators are intensively using more unregulated inputs. 
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Traditionally, shrimp vessels exploit high-valued stocks and fish vessels exploit low-
valued stocks. All vessels in both shrimp and fish fleets of industrial marine fishery are 
export-oriented and export their catch either directly to the foreign market or via 
commission agent from the domestic market. The number of foreign buyers of 
estimated shrimp vessels is higher, while the number of domestic buyers is higher for 
fish vessels. In this study, a common price of catch considered for all vessels, which 
varies over time and the value of output for fish vessels are higher due to high volumes 
of catch. High volumes of catch of fish vessels may be due to two reasons. First of all, a 
sharp increase in volume of total fish vessels, while volume of total shrimp vessels is 
almost constant over time. Second, most fish vessels incur minimal costs for 
maintaining their vessels given that these costs are largely met by commission agents, 
whereas shrimp vessel operators incur greater costs to maintain quality control of their 
vessels in order to meet the conditions of foreign buyers. As a result, fish vessels are 
exploiting more stocks compared to shrimp vessels, but not producing maximum with 
the given sets of inputs used in fishing.   
 
The estimated non-neutral technical progress of both fleets is negative, technical change 
over time of this study shows that, the technical change of shrimp vessels are increasing 
and fish vessels are decreasing over time. Results show that over the period, the 
technical change of shrimp vessels is capital-saving but both effort-using and labour-
using; and the technical change of fish vessels is both capital-saving and labour-saving, 
but effort-using. Results indicate that vessels in both fleets are using too much effort 
over the period, but producing low output. This may be due to different reasons for 
shrimp and fish vessels. As the number of vessels in shrimp fleet is almost constant over 
time and an increasing trend in technical change is also seen for vessels in shrimp fleet,  
vessels in shrimp fleet is producing low output may be a result of a decline in high-
valued species (though the stock information is not known). On the other hand, as the 
number of vessels in fish fleet is shraply increasing over time and a decreasing trend in 
technical change is seen in fish fleet, vessels in fish fleet is producing low output may 
be a result of a use of inadequate fishing technology.  
 
The study indicates that both shrimp and fish fleets in industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh are producing below the maximum level of output and are too small in their 
scale of operation. Second, input control induces vessels operators to intensify usage of 
unregulated inputs. Third, vessels in both fleets are too old to be technically efficient. 
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The inward shift of production of all vessels in both fleets towards capital-intensive part 
of input space shows a high depreciation costs and low return. Fourth, marginal cost of 
production varies across fleets. Shrimp fleets face low marginal costs of production in 
employing labour; while fish fleet’s marginal cost of production is high. The inward 
shift of production of fish vessels towards labour-intensive part of input space shows a 
high marginal cost of production and the outward shift of shrimp vessels towards 
labour-intensive part of input space shows a low marginal cost of production. Fifth, 
decline in catches in both fleets are confirmed from the study. The outward shift of 
production of all vessels in both fleet shows over the period too much effort is being 
used and indicates a possible decline in catch. The high-valued catch in industrial 
marine fisheries of Bangladesh is in decline may be due to decline in stock as increasing 
trend in fishing technology is reported from the technical change. The low-valued catch 
may be in decline due to an inadequate use of fishing technology as reported from the 
technical progress. Finally, the negative change in both technical efficiency and 
technical progress are adversely affecting the total factor productivity of all vessels in 
both fleets. Overall, the results of this study indicate that to improve vessels efficiency 
and productivity; to increase the level of high-valued stocks and to introduce adeaquate 
fishing technology for low-valued stocks an alternative management strategy for 
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is needed. 
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Appendix A:  Table 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Summary statistics for key variables 
 
Variable Unit Average Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
A.       Shrimp vessel* 
Total value  000, US$ 943 2125 110 511 
Engine power  Brake Horse Power (BHP) 664 960 450 168 
Total crew  Number 32 41 26 6 
Fishing days  Days per year 175 246 14 43 
Storage capacity  Tonnes 76 181 41 33 
Quality control  000, US$ 6 16 0.2 4 
Vessel age  Year 18 25 4 5 
Gear  Metre 23 32 22 2 
Owner Number 4 10 1 3 
B. Fish vessel** 
Total value  000, US$ 1391 2459 435 511 
Engine power  Brake Horse Power (BHP) 694 960 450 205 
Total crew  Number 30 41 24 6 
Fishing days  Days per year 169 254 120 28 
Storage capacity  Tonnes 90 119 54 24 
Quality control  000, US$ 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.01 
Vessel age  Year 11 19 2 5 
Gear  Metre 33 40 30 4 
Owner Number 3 10 1 3 
Note: *   denotes balanced panel data: 126 observations for 18 shrimp vessels, 2001-07 
          ** denotes balanced panel data: 56 observations for 8 fish vessels, 2001-07 
Source:  Marine Fisheries Department 2009, ‘Unpublished office records’, Chittagong. 
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Table 2.4  Hypothesis test for model specification: shrimp vessel 
 
Hypothesis LR test Critical value Decision 
 
1. 0....: 23100 ===== δδδγH   
(No technical inefficiency) 
123.55 ( )
2
250.χ = 37.652 0H  Rejected 
 
2. 0:0 =γH    
(Inefficiency effects are not stochastic) 
123.55 ( )
2
105.χ = 2.706 0H  Rejected 
 
3. 0....: 23100 ==== δδδH   
(Inefficiency effects have a half-normal distribution) 
109.20 ( )
2
240.χ = 36.415 0H  Rejected 
 
4. 0....: 2310 === δδH   
(Inefficiency effects have a truncated-normal 
distribution) 
106.96 ( )
2
230.χ = 35.172 0H  Rejected 
 
5. 0....: 2370 === δδH   
(Inefficiency effects do not come from vessels specific 
fixed effects) 
88.78 ( )
2
170.χ = 27.587 0H  Rejected 
 
6. 0:0 === nttttH βββ  
(No technical change) 
47.16 ( )
2
505.χ =11.070 0H  Rejected 
 
7.  0:0 == ntttH ββ  
(Hick-neutral technical change) 
39.92 ( )
2
405.χ =9.488 0H  Rejected 
8. 0:0 === ntttnmH βββ   
(Cobb Douglas production function) 
154.60 ( )
2
1005.χ = 18.307 0H  Rejected 
 
9. 0: 40 =δH   
(Inefficiency effects do not come from  gear length )  
21.1 ( )
2
105.χ = 3.841 0H  Rejected 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 2.5 Model comparison-1: shrimp vessel 
 
Model-1* Model- 2 Model-3 Model-4 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 
Production Function 
 
 0.73 4.88 -0.04 -0.18 -0.13 -0.62 0.03 0.17 
ln        -0.25 -2.36 0.12 0.62 0.12 0.62 -0.23 -1.07 
ln        1.20 99.12 0.63 3.95 0.64 4.09 1.01 6.42 
ln        1.52 8.47 0.99 3.06 1.05 3.48 0.99 3.03 
_2004 0.05 1.74 0.20 2.32 0.20 2.34 0.28 5.38 
 -0.28 -7.81 -0.06 -0.84 -0.06 -0.90 -0.11 -2.45 
ln  ∗ ln  0.06 5.64 -0.11 -1.33 -0.10 -1.19 -0.20 -2.75 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.22 -11.40 0.07 1.33 0.07 1.33 0.04 0.76 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.16 -2.53 0.90 4.62 0.75 4.15 1.00 4.88 
ln  ∗ ln  0.36 10.89 0.21 4.48 0.21 4.56 0.33 8.81 
ln  ∗ ln  0.12 1.56 -0.52 -2.76 -0.34 -1.94 -0.47 -2.17 
ln  ∗ ln  0.30 13.43 0.21 1.80 0.21 1.98 0.10 0.81 
 0.02 27.48 0.01 0.91 0.01 1.08 0.01 2.08 
ln X∗  0.04 5.44 0.03 1.78 0.03 1.54 0.02 1.13 
ln X∗  -0.06 -5.83 -0.04 -2.68 -0.03 -2.27 -0.05 -3.72 
ln X∗  -0.14 -8.41 0.20 3.94 0.20 4.94 0.23 4.87 
 
Technical Efficiency Model 
 
                  -2.45 -3.82 -19.34 -0.70 -0.97 -1.46 
ln !       1.97 6.39   -0.21 -1.44 
ln !       -1.51 -118.02   -0.04 -0.36 
ln !       0.08 1.22   -0.35 -1.46 
ln !"       -3.05 -15.60   -0.25 -0.70 
#_$% 0.55 1.02   -0.42 -0.86 
#_&ℎ() -1.37 -3.48   0.41 1.64 
sigma-
squared              0.15 15.14 0.27 5.13 5.57 0.75 0.25 3.92 
gamma                      0.99 1.E+03 0.93 2.E+01 0.99 1.E+02 0.99 3.E+07 
LLF 22.70 -31.90 -30.78  -21.69  
LR test 123.55 14.35 16.59  34.77  
Mean 
Efficiency 0.65 0.70 0.78  0.64  
Note: * denotes vessel dummies in the technical efficiency model are not reported.   = *( )&, 
 = +&,  = ,(ℎ(* -., ! = * +)+(., ! = /(. +, ! = 
 *, 
!" = * *ℎ. 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 2.6 Model comparison-2: shrimp vessel 
 
Model-1* Model- 5* Model-6* Model-7* 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 
Production Function 
 
 0.73 4.88 0.18 1.47 0.22 1.61 0.55 1.52 
ln        -0.25 -2.36 1.11 3.52 0.88 3.86 -0.92 -2.36 
ln        1.20 99.12 0.26 1.47 0.53 1.51 2.08 2.82 
ln        1.52 8.47 1.12 5.77 0.99 4.63 1.66 2.32 
_2004 0.05 1.74 -0.05 -0.68 -0.03 -2.84 0.05 0.41 
 -0.28 -7.81 -0.03 -2.30 -0.25 -4.15 
ln  ∗ ln  0.06 5.64 0.47 3.33 0.41 4.42 -0.27 -2.56 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.22 -11.40 -0.26 -3.07 -0.26 -2.27 0.04 0.41 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.16 -2.53 0.36 1.42 0.12 0.59 0.12 0.73 
ln  ∗ ln  0.36 10.89 0.18 3.69 0.24 2.80 0.59 3.02 
ln  ∗ ln  0.12 1.56 -0.07 -0.43 0.20 1.26 0.30 3.02 
ln  ∗ ln  0.30 13.43 0.15 1.46 0.07 0.62 0.00 -0.03 
 0.02 27.48 0.02 3.52 
ln X∗  0.04 5.44 0.02 1.66 
ln X∗  -0.06 -5.83 -0.05 -2.35 
ln X∗  -0.14 -8.41 -0.08 -0.68 
 
Technical Efficiency Model 
 
                  -2.45 -3.82 -1.12 -1.67 -1.08 -1.55 -0.14 -0.22 
ln !       1.97 6.39 0.68 2.36 0.81 2.86 0.79 1.05 
ln !       -1.51 -118.02 -1.00 -5.41 -0.97 -5.75 -0.79 -1.66 
ln !       0.08 1.22 0.84 1.92 0.50 0.96 -0.29 -0.51 
ln !"       -3.05 -15.60 -1.47 -4.02 -1.41 -3.20 
#_$% 0.55 1.02 0.81 1.24 0.41 0.63 -0.68 -1.09 
#_&ℎ() -1.37 -3.48 -0.98 -2.14 -0.78 -1.68 -0.74 -0.69 
sigma-
squared              0.15 15.14 0.14 5.77 0.14 5.95 0.21 2.34 
gamma                      0.99 1.E+03 0.99 2.E+02 0.99 6.E+06 0.99 6.E+04 
LLF 22.70 -0.88 2.74 12.15 
LR test 123.55 118.73 115.22 102.44 
Mean 
Efficiency 0.65 0.59 0.61 0.66 
Note: * denotes vessel dummies in the technical efficiency model are not reported.   = *( )&, 
 = +&,  = ,(ℎ(* -., ! = * +)+(., ! = /(. +, ! = 
 *, 
!" = * *ℎ. 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 2.7  Hypothesis test for model specification: fish vessel  
 
Hypothesis LR test Critical value Decision 
 
1. 0....: 4100 ===== δδδγH   
(No technical inefficiency) 
58.25 ( )
2
605.χ = 12.592 0H  Rejected 
 
2. 0:0 =γH    
(Inefficiency effects are not stochastic) 
58.25 ( )
2
105.χ = 2.706 0H  Rejected 
 
3. 0....: 4100 ==== δδδH   
(Inefficiency effects have a half-normal distribution) 
30.4 ( )
2
505.χ =11.070 0H  Rejected 
 
4. 0....: 410 === δδH   
(Inefficiency effects have a truncated-normal 
distribution) 
19.28 ( )
2
405.χ =9.488 0H  Rejected 
 
5. 0....: 1150 === δδH   
(Inefficiency effects do not come from vessels specific 
fixed effects) 
7.64 ( )
2
705.χ = 14.067 0H  Accepted 
 
6. 0:0 === nttttH βββ  
(No technical change) 
38.6 ( )
2
505.χ =11.070 0H  Rejected 
 
7.  0:0 == ntttH ββ  
(Hick-neutral technical change) 
33.52 ( )
2
405.χ =9.488 0H  Rejected 
8. 0:0 === ntttnmH βββ   
(Cobb Douglas production function) 
53.94 ( )
2
1005.χ = 18.307 0H  Rejected 
 
9. 0: 40 =δH   
(Inefficiency effects do not come from  gear length )  
10.7 ( )
2
105.χ = 3.841 0H  Rejected 
 
10.
 
0:
_0 =capacitystorageH δ   
(Inefficiency effects do not come from  storage 
capacity )  
2.98 ( )
2
105.χ = 3.841 0H  Accepted 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 2.8 Model comparison-1: fish vessel 
 
Model-1 Model- 2 Model-3 Model-4* 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 
Production Function 
 
 -0.97 -78.57 -1.58 -6.61 -1.50 -5.27 -0.84 -2.89 
ln        -0.34 -1.41 -0.43 -1.97 -0.50 -3.39 -0.56 -2.13 
ln        -1.48 -5.39 -0.75 -2.26 -0.72 -3.55 -1.53 -5.52 
ln              1.61 3.54 0.32 0.49 0.76 1.19 2.01 3.12 
_2004 0.45 4.04 0.50 4.53 0.49 4.51 0.44 4.63 
 0.38 4.87 0.52 4.20 0.58 7.44 0.29 3.47 
ln  ∗ ln  0.26 3.84 0.06 0.65 0.11 1.03 0.28 5.18 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.86 -3.76 -0.30 -1.54 -0.40 -1.82 -0.92 -5.15 
ln  ∗ ln  0.05 0.41 -0.27 -0.49 -0.32 -4.33 -0.28 -0.59 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.10 -0.82 -0.07 -0.55 -0.03 -0.39 -0.23 -2.55 
ln  ∗ ln  0.07 0.22 0.57 0.72 0.50 1.73 0.51 0.85 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.05 -0.24 -0.29 -1.07 -0.17 -0.51 0.23 0.72 
 -0.05 -6.42 -0.06 -3.50 -0.07 -9.08 -0.04 -4.66 
ln X∗  0.03 1.07 0.02 0.39 0.02 1.01 -0.01 -0.37 
ln X∗  0.12 3.92 0.16 2.87 0.15 4.93 0.16 4.98 
ln X∗  -0.21 -12.27 -0.08 -0.94 -0.15 -2.36 -0.24 -4.27 
 
Technical Efficiency Model 
 
                  -0.39 -0.69 -1.46 -25.70 -0.01 -0.02 
ln !       1.25 19.54   1.36 2.44 
ln !       0.78 7.70   0.12 0.16 
#_$% 1.39 2.83   0.98 1.30 
#_&ℎ() -1.78 -10.91   -0.99 -1.25 
sigma-
squared              0.66 20.62 0.42 5.22 0.91 3.56 0.35 3.94 
gamma                      0.99 1.E+07 0.99 2.E+04 0.99 2.E+05 0.99 2.E+03 
LLF 0.93 -14.27 -8.71  4.75  
LR test 58.25 27.84 38.97  65.90  
Mean 
Efficiency 0.71 0.72 0.72  0.72  
Note: * denotes vessel dummies in the technical efficiency model are not reported.   = *( )&, 
 = +&,  = ,(ℎ(* -., ! = 
 *, ! = * *ℎ 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 2.9 Model comparison-2: fish vessel 
 
Model-5 Model- 6 Model-7 Model-8* 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 
Production Function 
 
 -0.48 -6.62 -1.05 -17.34 -1.23 -3.83 -0.69 -4.34 
ln        -0.69 -3.83 -0.92 -5.26 -0.58 -1.48 -0.53 -6.83 
ln        -0.76 -4.03 -0.19 -0.64 -1.10 -2.13 -1.48 -11.92 
ln              1.19 5.31 0.19 2.94 1.17 1.53 2.45 6.01 
_2004 0.49 26.44 0.47 252.66 0.42 3.53 0.38 5.56 
 0.05 18.37 0.40 3.91 0.32 6.10 
ln  ∗ ln  0.17 6.29 0.03 0.69 0.19 0.76 0.29 13.32 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.83 -10.73 -0.94 -4.64 -0.74 -2.05 -0.91 -11.21 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.28 -0.77 0.17 0.61 -0.20 -0.49 -0.27 -2.21 
ln  ∗ ln  0.00 0.01 0.61 3.12 -0.05 -0.29 -0.25 -6.84 
ln  ∗ ln  0.28 0.63 0.06 0.13 0.50 0.84 0.60 3.51 
ln  ∗ ln  0.54 2.37 -0.51 -8.52 -0.19 -0.49 0.41 2.04 
 -0.05 -3.63 -0.05 -7.02 
ln X∗  0.02 0.65 -0.01 -0.42 
ln X∗  0.14 3.63 0.16 41.33 
ln X∗  -0.18 -2.63 -0.26 -4.17 
 
Technical Efficiency Model 
 
                   0.69 0.99 0.28 0.41 -0.36 -0.54 -0.31 -0.40 
ln !       -0.41 -0.93 
ln !       2.18 4.89 3.06 4.54 0.99 2.37 1.66 2.33 
ln !       0.84 1.16 -0.93 -1.38 0.18 0.22 
#_$% 1.69 2.50 2.66 3.87 1.28 1.83 0.54 0.63 
#_&ℎ() -1.00 -1.28 -2.38 -3.01 -1.64 -2.35 -0.85 -0.95 
sigma-
squared              0.77 5.89 0.70 4.17 0.50 5.00 0.34 3.73 
gamma                      0.99 3.E+07 0.99 7.E+07 0.99 5.E+04 0.99 1.E+06 
LLF -18.37 -15.83 -4.42 6.24 
LR test 48.71 42.05 47.55 68.87 
Mean 
Efficiency 0.62 0.58 0.69 0.73 
Note: * denotes vessel dummies in the technical efficiency model are not reported.   = *( )&, 
 = +&,  = ,(ℎ(* -., ! = * +)+(., ! = 
 *, ! = * *ℎ. 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 2.10  Main results: shrimp vessel 
 
 
Model 1: Translog* Model 1: Cobb-Douglas* 
OLS MLE OLS MLE 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 
Production Function 
 
 -0.37 -1.45 0.73 4.88 -0.73 -5.81 -0.81 -5.06 
ln        0.12 0.48 -0.25 -2.36 0.24 4.41 0.22 3.59 
ln        0.67 3.59 1.20 99.12 -0.11 -2.82 -0.19 -5.14 
ln        1.17 3.25 1.52 8.47 0.68 6.31 0.40 2.32 
_2004 0.24 2.27 0.05 1.74 0.21 1.70 0.15 0.94 
 -0.05 -0.56 -0.28 -7.81 -0.05 -2.21 -0.02 -0.83 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.11 -1.05 0.06 5.64 
ln  ∗ ln  0.10 1.46 -0.22 -11.40 
ln  ∗ ln  0.80 4.13 -0.16 -2.53 
ln  ∗ ln  0.20 3.65 0.36 10.89 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.44 -2.33 0.12 1.56 
ln  ∗ ln  0.23 1.87 0.30 13.43 
 0.01 0.55 0.02 27.48 
ln X∗  0.04 1.62 0.04 5.44 
ln X∗  -0.05 -3.04 -0.06 -5.83 
ln X∗  0.17 3.17 -0.14 -8.41 
 
Technical Efficiency Model 
 
                  -2.45 -3.82 -0.58 -0.77 
ln !       1.97 6.39 -0.02 -0.04 
ln !       -1.51 -118.02 -0.49 -1.48 
ln !       0.08 1.22 0.59 0.80 
ln !"       -3.05 -15.60 -0.35 -0.79 
#_$% 0.55 1.02 0.73 0.66 
#_&ℎ() -1.37 -3.48 -1.19 -1.55 
 
sigma-
squared              0.12 0.15 15.14 0.23 0.19 3.88 
gamma                      0.99 1.E+03 0.31 2.10 
LLF -39.07 22.70 -81.99 -54.60 
LR test 123.55 54.77 
Mean 
Efficiency 0.65 0.76 
Note: * denotes vessel dummies in the technical efficiency model are not reported.   = *( )&, 
 = +&,  = ,(ℎ(* -., ! = * +)+(., ! = /(. +, ! = 
 *, 
!" = * *ℎ. 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 2.11 Main results: fish vessels 
 
 
Model 1: Translog Model 1: Cobb-Douglas 
OLS MLE OLS MLE 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 
Production Function 
 
 -0.31 -0.52 -0.97 -78.57 0.17 0.80 0.72 25.79 
ln        0.28 0.58 -0.34 -1.41 0.13 1.73 0.02 2.87 
ln        -0.97 -1.55 -1.48 -5.39 -0.34 -3.06 0.15 5.90 
ln              2.83 2.43 1.61 3.54 1.32 4.92 0.21 6.64 
_2004 0.62 2.54 0.45 4.04 0.99 4.87 0.52 13.63 
 0.35 1.77 0.38 4.87 -0.11 -3.25 -0.19 -24.44 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.02 -0.09 0.26 3.84 
ln  ∗ ln  0.29 0.65 -0.86 -3.76 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.14 -0.43 0.05 0.41 
ln  ∗ ln  -0.19 -0.86 -0.10 -0.82 
ln  ∗ ln  0.06 0.12 0.07 0.22 
ln  ∗ ln  0.71 1.10 -0.05 -0.24 
 -0.05 -2.06 -0.05 -6.42 
ln X∗  0.06 1.54 0.03 1.07 
ln X∗  0.12 2.24 0.12 3.92 
ln X∗  -0.26 -1.92 -0.21 -12.27 
 
Technical Efficiency Model 
 
                  -0.39 -0.69 -11.83 -1.38 
ln !       1.25 19.54 -6.77 -1.26 
ln !       0.78 7.70 4.50 1.36 
#_$% 1.39 2.83 -13.19 -1.51 
#_&ℎ() -1.78 -10.91 1.37 1.28 
 
sigma-
squared              0.22 0.66 20.62 0.25 10.20 1.48 
gamma                      0.99 1.E+07 0.99 1.E+05 
LLF -28.20 0.93 -37.65 -26.04 
LR test 58.25 23.23 
Mean 
Efficiency 0.71 0.64 
Note:   = *( )&,  = +&,  = ,(ℎ(* -., ! = 
 *, ! = * *ℎ 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Appendix B:  Figure 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Frontier output and actual output over time 
 
 
A. Shrimp vessel 
 
B. Fish vessel 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Figure 2.10 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) over time  
 
A. Shrimp vessel 
 
B. Fish vessel 
 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Chapter 3 
 
Biomass dynamic models for  
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Renewable natural resources, such as fish stock can be a sustainable natural resource 
and have long been an important source of food and other products for people and 
animals (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). Fish stock is affected by various activities. 
Fishing activities are one of these by which fish stocks are affected to an increasing 
extent. Fishing is a typically important activitiy in developing economies compared to 
developed economies in terms of both small-scale personal consumption and large-scale 
commercial fishing. Social well-being of the harvester and the economic success of 
fishing industries totally depend on the state of fish stock. Success of fisheries, 
including the resource conservation and long-term social and economic interests, 
depends on the state of fish stocks (Gulland 1983). The state of fish stocks provides 
indicators to the decision-makers/managers to support rational choices and guide 
decision-makers/managers to decide whether an increase or decrease of effort is needed 
and how urgently action needs to be taken. The state of fish stocks also provides the 
past and current status of fish stock and provides the basis for applying harvest control 
rules and hence providing resources management advice.   
 
The management of fish stocks is different to other agricultural resources, such as 
domestic stocks. Signalled by a drop in catches in a specific fishery, the 
government/fishery managers take necessary actions by introducing specific regulations 
to counteract overfishing so that the stock can be rebuilt. Different management tools42 
are considered to maintain healthy fish stock and healthy fishing industry and the choice 
of best management tool depends on the information on stock (Cooper n.d.). The effects 
of fishing on the stocks and on the catch are important management issues. For instance, 
in a trawl fishery the use of an appropriate size of mesh in the cod-end allows the small 
fish to escape, but the enforcement causes difficulties to the fishers who fish for smaller 
                                                 
42
 Quotas, size limits, gear restrictions, season limits and area closures.  
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species. In addition, without taking appropriate measures, increasing additional effort in 
the fishery would cause the significant rise in the catch rate and tends to reduce the 
stock, hence falls in catch rates are sustained. On the other hand, there are some other 
factors that considerably influence the catch rate and in most cases, these influences are 
greater on the catch rate than the overall abundance of stock. These factors are mainly 
the size of trawler, the skill of the skipper, the precise ground, the season, the weather 
and the time of the day of fishing (Gulland 1983). In addition, the catch rate is also 
influenced by types of fishing patterns. For instance, two different patterns of fishing 
such as trawl with large and small meshes in the cod-end, also make huge differences to 
the catch in particular years.  
 
To make the resource available in the future, most management measures are concerned 
with controls on the current fishery. A common and traditional objective of 
management is to maintain Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). MSY gives a useful 
description of fish stocks and contains three different ideas such as maximizing 
quantity, ensuring sustainability and the physical yield that is being an appropriate 
measure of the well-being of a fishery. The concept of MSY serves as the foundation of 
most biological reference points, which give decision-makers guidance in determining 
whether stocks are too small or fishing pressure is too great.  If the abundance of stock 
is above MSY, the stock is considered under-exploited; if below MSY, the stock is 
overfished and management actions are urgently needed. If the stock is the same as 
MSY, then the fishery looks well (Gulland 1983). MSY provides quantitative values of 
targets and thresholds (Cooper n.d.). Targets are values for stock size and fishing 
mortality rates that managers aim to achieve and maintain. Targets are determined by a 
combination of biological and socio-economic factors, where the optimum yield (the 
amount of catch) is important in providing overall long-term benefits to the society. On 
the other hand, thresholds are referred to limits, which are defined as specific fishing 
mortality rate or stock size that is some fraction of MSY. Overfishing occurs when the 
fishing mortality rate exceeds a specific threshold, while a stock is determined to be 
overfished when stock size falls below a specific threshold. If a stock is overfished, or, 
if overfishing is occurring, managers are required to put measures in place to correct the 
situation. In order to manage stock, decision-makers define a stock size threshold, 
which can be defined in one of two ways: the stock size threshold may be defined either 
as a percentage of MSY, normally half of MSY, but never less than half; or, the smallest 
stock size that could grow to MSY in ten years, if the fishing mortality rate is as low as 
96 
 
possible (Cooper n.d.). The MSY is developed and applicable to spawner-recruit 
models, surplus production models, delay-difference models, age-structured and size-
structured models and so on (e.g., Getz & Haight 1989; Hilborn & Walters 1992; Quinn 
& Deriso 1999). In the absence of information on age or length structure, surplus 
production models are used and the analyses are done based on effort and catch data 
(e.g., Chen & Andrew 1998; Hilborn & Walters 1992).   
 
The objective of this study is to estimate biological reference points of industrial marine 
fisheries of Bangladesh in order to find out the current status of the industrial marine 
fisheries. A number of surveys have been conducted in the marine waters of the 
Bangladesh continental shelf and these surveys were conducted to assess the stock of 
the marine resources during 1958-1984, which are considered as obsolete. These 
surveys identified various fishing grounds and made some assessment of the standing 
stock and potential catch in the marine sector. The area of these surveys was 10-100 
metres depth within the EEZ of Bangladesh, and the surveys assessed the pelagic and 
demersal stocks. Signals of overfishing and stock exhaustion are noticeable and 
reported from artisanal capture fisheries (FAO 2006). Controversy exists about the 
extent of fish resources, and whether the marine fisheries are under or over-exploited 
within the EEZ of Bangladesh. Alam & Thomson (2001) expressed their concern over 
whether or not marine fisheries are over-exploited in Bangladesh. The World Bank 
(1991) believes that marine fisheries of Bangladesh have reached a maximum 
sustainable level and there is limited scope for expansion. According to the annual 
report (2007) published by the Department of Fishery (DoF), marine shrimp fishery is 
over-exploited as almost all fishermen have reported a serious decline in their catch and 
some have shifted from their preferred catches to other species in order to continue 
fishing. DoF’s report (2007) highlights that marine fish fishery is under-exploited due to 
knowledge and information on the availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and 
partly due to the lack of technological developments for harvesting the new resources. A 
need for new surveys and new information to prescribe a rational management strategy 
is highlighted in DoF’s report (2007). No literature is found that describes surveys that 
have been done separately for artisanal fisheries and industrial fisheries.  
 
This is the first kind of study that covers beyond 40 metres depth within the EEZ of 
Bangladesh to estimate biological reference points and to measure the current status of 
industrial marine fisheries. The biological reference points of this study are measured 
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using biomass dynamic models: a dynamic version of surplus production models and a 
time series data for the period 1992-2007 is used. This is the first kind of study of the 
industrial marine shrimp and fish fisheries in Bangladesh, where Clarke, Yoshimoto & 
Pooley (CY&P) models are used to apply the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method and 
to calculate the biological parameters. Using these biological parameters the current 
abundance of biomass, biomass at MSY and the biomass at the steady-state are 
measured. The study shows that the shrimp stock of the industrial marine fisheries is 
over-exploited and the fall in catch per unit effort (CPUE) over time of the industrial 
marine shrimp fishery is due to the fall in stock size. On the other hand, the fish stock of 
the industrial marine fisheries is under-exploited and the fall in CPUE over time of the 
industrial marine fish fishery is due to inadequate knowledge and information on the 
availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and lack of technological developments 
for harvesting the new resources. The study also shows that to maintain steady-state 
equilibrium and adequate growth rate of both shrimp and fish, fishing patterns need to 
be modified. The study also indicates that the current management system fails to 
increase the level of high-valued shrimp stocks and to increase the catch level of the 
low-valued stocks.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. Section 3.2 presents the 
theoretical framework followed by data and variables in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
presents the models for both shrimp and fish stocks including the discussion of the 
results. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.  
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Considering the importance of population dynamics and stock assessment in fisheries 
management, fisheries management modeling was introduced in the early 20th century. 
Fishery models are mainly about the population dynamics of single-species and have 
gradually expanded to take account of externalities and linked bio-physical, socio-
economic and governance systems. According to the Smith & Fulton (2010), the first 
model was introduced by Baranov (1914) and extended by Graham (1935). Then a 
series of papers contributed to the fisheries management modeling (Beverton & Holt 
1957; Ricker 1954; Schaefer 1954) and economic considerations were taken into 
account in the fisheries management modeling by Gordon (1954) in the same period. 
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All these models are classified as either holistic or analytical. Holistic models assume 
that fish stock is a homogeneous biomass. These models do not consider length or age 
structure of the stock. Two simple methods are used in the literature: the swept area 
method and the surplus production model. The swept area method is based on research 
trawl survey catches per unit of area. The surplus production model uses catch per unit 
of effort as input. The model assumes that the biomass of fish is proportional to the 
catch per unit of effort. Production models are the simple models in where analysis is 
done with little information, such as catch, abundance and amount of fishing. These 
models are suitable in the absence of information on age or length structure (e.g., Chen 
& Andrew 1998; Hilborn & Walters 1992). The detailed information (such as growth of 
individual fish, mortality due to fishing, natural causes (disease, predation and so forth) 
and reproduction), which determines the increase and decrease in abundance of fish 
stocks, can be incorporated in a group of separate models. These models allow the 
parameters to vary in accordance with the density of stocks, which are more complex 
and known as analytical models. Analytical models have been developed by Baranov 
(1914), Thompson & Bell (1934) and Beverton & Holt (1956). These models require 
the age composition of catches and are age-structured models43 which use mortality 
rates and individual body growth rates. Based on holistic and analytical models different 
fisheries assessment models are used such as the production model, spawner-
recruitment model, simulation model, sequential population assessment model (VPA 
and/or cohort analysis), delay-difference models, age-structured model, size-structured 
model and dynamic pool model (such as yield-per-recruit model) (e.g., Getz & Haight 
1989; Hilborn & Walters 1992; Quinn & Deriso 1999).   
 
All models, both holistic and analytical, mainly deal with a single target species 
exploited by a single-fleet (e.g., Funk et al. 2000; Hilborn & Walters 1992; Motos & 
Wilson 2006). Multi-species fisheries models in fisheries management are very recent 
concepts and were introduced between the 1970s and 1980s using several approaches. 
Of these, some are an extension of predator-prey models (e.g., Beddington & May 
1982; May et al 1979). Others relate to the concept of natural mortality in the existing 
single-species models (e.g., Helgason & Gislason 1979; Pope 1979). A few models 
consider broader trophic and eco-system properties of fishery systems (e.g., Bax 1985; 
                                                 
43
 The concept in the age-structured model is that of a cohort.  A cohort of fish is a group of fish all the 
same age belonging to the same stock (Sparre & Venema 1998). If the fish are caught too young there is a 
growth overfishing of the stock. Two major elements describe the dynamics of a cohort. The first element 
is the average body growth in length and weight and the second element is the death process. 
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Laevastu & Larkins 1981; Polovina 1984). Very few early models consider practical 
fisheries assessment and management (Smith & Fulton 2010). One of the most 
influential multi-species models was introduced by Anderson & Ursin (1977) and used 
by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Multi-species 
Working Group (Pope 1991). Then the multi-species VPA approach was developed 
(Sparre 1991).  
 
Sparre & Venema (1998) argued that many aspects of the models for a multi-species or 
multi-fleet are yet to be investigated and/or understood. A few multi-species or multi-
fleet models based on dynamic pool models (also known as Beverton and Holt’s yield-
per-recruit model) are either length-structured44 or age-structured (e.g., Ye 1998). A 
multi-species mortality model for dynamic pool models is suggested in Sparre & 
Venema (1998), which estimates fishing mortalities for two species. Recent models on 
multi-species and multi-fleet have been developed based on VPA analysis and used 
simulation tools45. Thompson & Bell (1934) used aged-based single-species analysis for 
fleet. The dynamics of fleet for stock assessment through dynamic pool models are not 
widely used and the associated literature is also limited. Models dealing with multi-fleet 
and/or multi-species for stock assessment are very limited46. A multi-fleet mortality 
model for the dynamic pool model is found in Garcia & von Zalinge (1982), which 
estimates one species (shrimp). Kompas et al (2010) describe technical interactions of 
two fleets between two tiger species and two endeavor species under the Australian 
Northern Prawn Fishery using spawner stock and recruitment models. Kompas & Che 
(2006) use the population dynamics of growth-length relationship for a multi-species 
and multi-fleet Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery.  
 
The age and length structure of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh are unknown, 
hence this study uses biomass dynamic models: a dynamic version of surplus 
production models. Biomass dynamic models apply the basic population dynamics 
model to data on catches. The two dominant variables for biomass dynamic models are 
carrying capacity and the intrinsic growth rate. Targets and thresholds derived from 
biomass dynamic models are almost completely predetermined by the choice of model 
structure and the values of carrying capacity and intrinsic growth rate. Common 
                                                 
44
 For example, Chen & Gordon 1997;  Nedreaas et al 1996;  Sainsbury 1984;  Shephard 1988;  Spencer 
et al 2002. 
45
 For example, Drouineau et al 2006; Mahevas & Pelletier 2004; Ulrich et al 2002. 
46
  For example, Kompas et al (2010); Kompas & Che (2006). 
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density-dependent models include Schaefer (or, Graham-Schaefer) model and the 
Gompertz-Fox models. Other models, such as the Pella-Tomlinson model are somewhat 
more flexible, because they add parameters to describe how the growth rate changes 
with respect to stock size. But, the values of targets and thresholds in the Pella-
Tomlinson model are no less sensitive to errors and biases in carrying capacity or 
intrinsic growth rate than the more common density-dependent models.  
 
The fitted biomass dynamic model that is used in this study is: 
 
( ) tttt CBgBB −+=+1                     (3.1) 
 
tB  is the biomass at the start of year t ; tC  is the catch in weight during year t  and 
( )tBg  is the biomass-dynamic as a function of biomass.  
 
According to the Clarke et al (1992), five different models are found for ( )tBg  to 
describe the biological production relationship: the Schaefer model (1957), the Fox 
model (1970), the Schnute model (1977), which is a modified version of the Schaefer 
model, a threshold model by Sathiendrakumar & Tisdell (1987), and the CY&P model 
(1992), which is a modified version of the Fox model. These models are different in 
terms of different production relationships. The Schaefer and Schnute models show 
parabolic/logistic relation between yield and effort; the Fox and CY&P models show 
Gompertz curve (Richards 1959) and the threshold model has a logarithmic relation 
between yield and effort. The Schaefer, Schnute, Fox and CY&P models describe the 
relation between stock size, fishing effort and yield to one another (Clarke et al 1992), 
which are derived from generalized stock production model (Pella & Tomlinson 1969): 
 
CB
K
r
rB
dt
dB m
−





−=                    (3.2) 
 
dt
dB
 is the growth rate of biomass; r is the intrinsic growth; B is the current biomass; K
is the maximum stock level or virgin biomass and C is the catch rate. Based on the 
value of m , the growth rate follows either logistic or Gompertz curve. When 2=m , the 
growth rate is logistic: 
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and when 1→m  the growth rate follows Gompertz curve: 
 
 C
B
K
rB
dt
dB
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

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
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= ln           (3.4) 
 
The difference between Equation 3.3 and 3.4 is the logistic growth is symmetrical, 
while the Gompertz is an extreme case and shows a potential extinction of the fishery 
(Clarke et al 1992).  
 
The catch rate in Equation 3.2 is: 
 
qEBC =            (3.5) 
 
Where, q  is the catchability coefficient, E  is effort and B is biomass. Using Equation 
3.5, catch per unit effort (CPUE) can be defined as: 
 
E
CU =            (3.6) 
 
Thus, the biomass can be written in terms of CPUE as: 
 
q
UB =
           (3.7) 
 
Using biomass Equation 3.7 and multiplying both sides of Equation 3.4 by 
U
q
 the 
growth rate can be written in terms of CPUE as: 
 
( ) ( ) qEUrqKr
dt
dU
U
−−= lnln1         (3.8) 
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To solve Equation 3.8, finite difference approximation is used by Schaefer (1957) and 
Fox (1970) models; Schnute (1977) develops a modified version of the Schaefer (1957) 
model and uses integration procedure; CY&P (1992) model applies a similar approach 
to the Fox (1970) model and uses Taylor approximation. After the approximation, in all 
models the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique is applied to estimate parameters r , 
q  and K .  
 
This study uses the CY&P (1992) model for both shrimp and fish fisheries, which is 
associated with the biological production relationship of the Gompertz curve described 
in Equation 3.4.  The CY&P (1992) model incorporates a non-linear assumption and has 
a good fit to the limited time series data. Following Appendix A of the Clarke et al 
(1992), the CY&P (1992) model for this study can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 2ln22ln22ln ++ + +− +
−
+





+
= tttt EE
r
qU
r
rqK
r
rU    (3.9) 
 
Equation 3.9 can be simplified as follows and the OLS technique can be applied to the 
equation: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )13211 lnln ++ +++= tttt EEcUccU                (3.10) 
 
From Equation 3.10, three parameters ( )( )2
2
1
12
c
c
r
+
−
= , ( )rcq +−= 23  and 
( )
q
eK
r
rc
2
21 +
=  can 
be estimated.  
 
The results depend on how good an approximation the Taylor polynomial gives. If 
instantaneous values of CPUE for a given year, t, are suspected to fluctuate 
considerably away from tU , the Taylor approximation becomes invalid and another 
method to estimate the integral of ( )Uln
 
is needed (Clarke et al 1992).  
 
Using the estimated values of the parameters r , q  and K , the current abundance of 
biomass, biomass at MSY and biomass at steady-state, can be estimated. Both catch and 
effort at the MSY and at the steady-state also can be estimated. 
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3.3 Data and variables 
 
Either fishery-dependent47 or fishery-independent48 data can be used for stock 
assessment (Cooper n.d.). In this study, fishery-dependent data is used and collected 
from the fishing log books from the Marine Fisheries Department (MFD) under the 
Department of Fishery (DoF) of Bangladesh. A time series data for the period 1992- 
2007 is used in this study. 
 
The Bangladesh coastline extends for 714 km with an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
of 166,000 square km of which 44 percent is continental shelf. The marine water 
extends beyond the continental shelf, measuring 200 nautical miles from the base line 
(10 fathoms) including rivers and estuaries. Marine fisheries of Bangladesh consist of 
two fisheries: artisanal49 fisheries and industrial50 fisheries. Industrial fisheries are 
associated with open access and industrial fleets have been expanding over time (MFD 
2009).   
 
Industrial fishing vessels are divided into two broad categories: shrimp fleet and fish 
fleet. Vessels in the shrimp fleet are double-rigged vessels, fitted with two side beams 
from which two shrimp-trawl nets are simultaneously operated. A standard shrimp 
vessel is made of steel hull and the mesh size of the net at the cod-end is 45mm. Shrimp 
trawls occur beyond 40 metres depth within the EEZ of Bangladesh. On the other hand, 
vessels in the fish fleet are stern vessels with a single-rigged trawl-net operated behind 
the vessels and these vessels are smaller than shrimp vessels (MFD 2009). These 
vessels generally have both wooden and steel hulls and the mesh size of the net at the 
cod-end is 60mm. Fish trawls occur in four different fishing areas. Traditional fish 
trawls occur beyond 40 metres depth at high tide to catch fin fish and shrimp; modern 
fish trawls occur between 40 and 100 metres depth to catch fin fish; demersal trawls 
                                                 
47
 Fishery-dependent data are derived from the fishing process itself and are collected through such 
avenues as self-reporting, landing records, onboard observers, portside surveys, log book and vessel trip 
reports, telephone surveys or vessel-monitoring systems.  
48
 Fishery-independent data are derived from activities that do not involve the commercial or recreational 
harvest of fish, such as trawl, acoustic, video and side-scan sonar research surveys and some tagging 
experiences. The majority of this sort of data comes from research surveys conducted by the government. 
49
 The artisanal fisheries are small-scale onshore fishery and fishing occurs up to 40 metres depth with 
mechanized and non mechanized boats. 
50
 The industrial fisheries are large-scale offshore fishery and fishing occurs beyond 40 metres depth 
within the EEZ of Bangladesh with industrial vessels. 
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occur between 100-200 metres depth to target demersal white fish and mid water trawls 
occur beyond 40 metres depth to catch mid water fish.   
 
Commercially important fishery resources are normally harvested by the industrial 
fishing vessels. The key commercial marine shrimp species those are harvested by the 
industrial vessels are tiger shrimp (Penaeus monodon) and brown shrimp (Metapenaeus 
monodon). Penaeus monodon (tiger shrimp) is the most valuable and hence the targeted 
species. But the highest (almost two thirds of the total) contribution to the total catch is 
from Metapenaeus monodon (brown shrimp). On the other hand, more than ninety fish 
species are commercially important. These fall under the common group. The major 
commercial fin fish species exploited by the industrial vessels are pomfret (Pampus 
argenteus), goatfish (Upenuus sulphureus), bream (N. japonicas), lizard fish (Saurida 
tumbil), grunter (Popmadasys hasta), red snapper (Lutjanus johnii) and carangid 
(Arioma indica) (MFD 2009).  According to the data of the Marine Fisheries 
Department (MFD) of Bangladesh between 2001 and 2007, the major amount of total 
targeted catches of shrimp comes from shrimp fleet (99.09 percent) and the amount of 
total targeted catches of fish comes from fish fleet (71.93 percent). The catch of shrimp 
and fish by different fleets in the period 2001-2007 is shown in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Shrimp and fish catch by different fleets 
 
Year Shrimp catch (tonnes) Shrimp catch (%) Fish catch (tonnes) Fish catch (%) 
Shrimp 
fleet 
Fish 
fleet 
Total Shrimp 
fleet 
Fish 
fleet 
Fish 
fleet 
Shrimp 
fleet 
Total Fish 
fleet 
Shrimp 
fleet 
2001 3156 15 3171 99.53 0.47 13180 6453 19633 67.13 32.87 
2002 2769 23 2792 99.18 0.82 14820 4820 19640 75.46 24.54 
2003 2616 42 2658 98.42 1.58 17158 7559 24717 69.42 30.58 
2004 3061 8 3069 99.74 0.26 21122 7911 29033 72.75 27.25 
2005 3266 9 3275 99.73 0.27 22505 8305 30810 73.04 26.96 
2006 3398 41 3439 98.81 1.19 21890 7889 29779 73.51 26.49 
2007 2146 39 2185 98.21 1.79 19662 7567 27229 72.21 27.79 
Mean 2916 25 2941 99.09 0.91 18620 7215 25834 71.93 28.07 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Both shrimp and fish are demersal51 resources of the industrial marine fisheries. The 
management conditions allow both shrimp and fish fleets to catch 30 percent of 
bycatch, but due to the use of different gear and mesh sizes, the average bycatch of both 
fleets, in fact, is very low. So, the bycatch of both shrimp fleet (28.73 percent fish) and 
                                                 
51
 Demersal and ground fish are those that feed on ocean or lake bottoms and typically do not range over 
a wide area. 
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fish fleet (0.91 percent shrimp) are ignored in this study and the targeted resources 
(shrimp and fish) are considered as homogeneous biomasses. On the other hand, both 
shrimp and fish fleets are operated with two different sets of gear: double riggers (for 
shrimp) and stern trawl (for fish) with 45mm and 60mm mesh sizes of the net at the 
cod-end, respectively. All vessels within the fleets are considered as homogeneous 
vessels in terms of gear. Both fleets are independent in their targeted catch. Hence, this 
study uses two different biomass dynamic models for both shrimp and fish fisheries by 
using two different CY&P (1992) models. 
 
Catch per unit effort (CPUE) is used to estimate CY&P models for both shrimp and fish 
stocks. To estimate CPUE, catch and effort data are collected from MFD (2009). Catch 
data is measured in tonnes per year. The total catch for both shrimp and fish are 
calculated as: 
 
 ∑
=
=
n
i
s
it
s
t cC
1
           (3.11) 
 
∑
=
=
n
i
f
it
f
t cC
1
           (3.12) 
 
In Equation 3.11 and 3.12, s   and f  denote shrimp and fish, respectively; ni ,....,2,1=  
number of vessels; nt ,....,2,1=  year; stC is the total catch of shrimp in year t ; ∑
=
n
i
s
itc
1
 is 
the sum of the total catch of shrimp by all vessels in the shrimp fleet in year t ; ftC  is 
the total catch of fish in year t  and ∑
=
n
i
f
itc
1
 is the sum of total catch of fish by all vessels 
in the fish fleet in year t .   
 
Data shows that between 1992 and 2007, there is a huge variation in catch between 
shrimp and fish fisheries. The amount of catch of shrimp varies from 2185 tonnes to 
4579 tonnes per year with an average of 3148 tonnes per year, and the standard 
deviation is 638 tonnes. On the other hand, in the same period the amount of catch of 
fish varies from 6621 tonnes to 30810 tonnes per year with an average of 16730 tonnes 
and the standard deviation is 8935 tonnes. The trends of total catches of both shrimp 
and fish in the period 1992-2007 are shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Trend of total catches of shrimp and fish over time (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the trend of shrimp catch is decreasing overall, while the trend of 
fish catch shows a sharp increase over time. The sharp increase in fish catch may be due 
to the increase in the number of fish vessels over time, which is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Number of shrimp and fish vessels over time (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Between 1992 and 2007, an average of 43 shrimp vessels per year are engaged in 
fishing, which varies from 37 to 48 vessels per year and the standard deviation is 3 
vessels. In the same period, fish vessels that are engaged in fishing vary from 11 to 88 
vessels per year with an average of 32 vessels and the standard deviation is 26 vessels. 
The total vessels engaged in fishing between 1992 and 2007 vary from 49 to 127 with 
an average of 75 vessels per year and the standard deviation is 26. 
 
Effort data is measured in fishing days per year. The total effort to catch both shrimp 
and fish is calculated as: 
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∑
=
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n
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f
it
f
t eE
1
                      (3.14) 
 
In Equation 3.13 and 3.14, s  and f  denotes shrimp and fish, respectively; ni ,....,2,1=  
number of vessels; nt ,....,2,1=  year; stE is the total fishing days to catch shrimp in year 
t  ; ∑
=
n
i
s
ite
1
 is the sum of total fishing days to catch shrimp by all vessels in the shrimp 
fleet in year t ; ftE  is the total fishing days to catch fish in year t  and ∑
=
n
i
f
ite
1
 is the sum 
of total fishing days to catch fish by all vessels in the fish fleet in year t .  The trends of 
total effort to catch both shrimp and fish in the period from 1992 to 2007 are shown in 
Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Trend of total effort to catch shrimp and fish over time (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Figure 3.3 shows that the trend of total effort to catch both shrimp and fish is increasing, 
but the trend of effort to catch fish shows a sharp increase over time. The sharp increase 
in fish catch may also be due to the increase in the number of fish vessels over time, 
which is shown in Figure 3.2.  
 
Data shows that between 1992 and 2007, effort data varies between shrimp and fish 
fisheries. Between 1992 and 2007, the total effort that is used to catch shrimp species 
varies from 6191 days to 9050 days per year with an average of 7457 days per year, and 
the standard deviation is 772 days per year. On the other hand, in the same period the 
amount of effort that is used to catch fish species varies from 781 days to 9553 days per 
year with an average of 3447 days and the standard deviation is 2866 days. 
 
Catch per unit effort for both shrimp and fish are calculated as: 
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In Equation 3.15 and 3.16, ni ,....,2,1=  number of vessels; nt ,....,2,1=  year; stU is the 
catch per unit effort for shrimp in year t  ; ∑
=
n
i
s
itc
1
 is the sum of total catch of shrimp by 
all vessels in shrimp fleet in year t ; ∑
=
n
i
s
ite
1
 is the sum of total fishing days to catch 
shrimp by all vessels in shrimp fleet in year t ; ftU  is the catch per unit effort for fish in 
year t ; ∑
=
n
i
f
itc
1
 is the sum of total catch of fish by all vessels in fish fleet in year t ; ∑
=
n
i
f
ite
1
 
is the sum of total fishing days to catch fish by all vessels in fish fleet in year t .   
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Data shows that between 1992 and 2007, there is a huge variation in catch per unit 
effort between shrimp and fish fisheries. The catch per unit effort for shrimp species 
varies from 0.30 to 0.64 with an average of 0.43, and the standard deviation is 0.09. On 
the other hand, in the same period the catch per unit effort for fish species varies from 
3.12 to 8.48 with an average of 6.07 and the standard deviation is 1.68. The trends of 
catch per unit effort for shrimp and fish in the period 1992-2007 are shown in Figure 
3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Trend of total CPUE for shrimp and fish over time (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Figure 3.4 shows that the trend of catch per unit effort (CPUE) of both shrimp and fish 
is decreasing over time, but the trend of CPUE of fish shows a sharp decrease compare 
to the CPUE of shrimp. The sharp decrease in CPUE of fish may be due to the increase 
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in ther number of fish vessels over time, which is shown in Figure 3.3. On the other 
hand, according to the Department of Fisheries’ annual report (2007), decline in shrimp 
catch is may be due to overexploitation of the marine shrimp fishery, while the report 
highlights that the marine fish fishery is under-exploited due to knowledge and 
information on the availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and partly due to lack 
of technological developments for harvesting the new resources. 
 
The summary statistics of catch, effort and CPUE are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics: catch, effort and CPUE 
 
Variable Unit  Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Catch Tonnes per year Shrimp 2185 4579 3148 638 
Fish 6621 30810 16730 8935 
Effort Fishing days per year Shrimp 6191 9050 7457 772 
Fish 781 9553 3447 2866 
CPUE Tonnes per fishing days Shrimp 0.30 0.64 0.43 0.09 
Fish 3.12 8.48 6.07 1.68 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
3.4 Models and Results 
 
The biomass dynamic models for both shrimp and fish are estimated using CY&P 
models. The CY&P (1992) model is estimated for a shrimp fishery: 
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and the OLS technique for the shrimp fishery is applied to the following equation: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )ststsstssst EEcUccU 13211 lnln ++ +++=       (3.18) 
 
From Equation 3.18, three parameters of a shrimp fishery ( )( )s
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=  are estimated.  
112 
 
The CY&P (1992) model is estimated for a fish fishery: 
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and the OLS technique for the fish fishery is applied to the following equation: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )ftftfftffft EEcUccU 13211 lnln ++ +++=       (3.20) 
 
From Equation 3.20, three parameters of a fish fishery ( )( )f
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 are estimated.  
 
Using the estimated parameters r , q  and K  the biomass dynamic models for both 
shrimp and fish fisheries are estimated.   
 
The OLS results of CY&P models for both shrimp and fish models are obtained from 
the solver macro of Microsoft Office EXCEL 2007 software, which are shown in Table 
3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Results: CY & P models 
 
A. Shrimp fishery: 
( ) ( ) ( )
14.2:     DW                       
46.0:R Adjusted               
 0.54  :               R               
0.74 :   R Multiple               
  (0.00003)         0.273)((0.377)         :se 
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B. Fish fishery 
( ) ( ) ( )
76.1:      DW                       
94.0:R Adjusted               
 0.95  :               R               
0.97 :   R Multiple               
  (0.00001)         )279.0((0.587)         :se 
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Note: ‘se’ denotes standard error 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
All coefficients in CY&P models for both shrimp and fish have the expected signs.  But, 
the standard errors on the model coefficient are very high, indicating the problems of 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity exists due to the classic ‘one way-trip’ which is a 
common problem when estimating surplus production models comparing CPUE series 
(Figure 3.4) with the effort series (Figure 3.3). The Durbin-Watson test for 
autocorrelation is applied for both models. The Durbin-Watson test for shrimp model 
(2.14) and fish model (1.76) show similar results to the CY&P model (2.92) and the Fox 
model (1.80) applied by Clarke et al (1992).  
 
Both shrimp and fish models show a good fit to the time series data. The R Multiple , 
2R and 2R  Adjusted of shrimp model is smaller than those of the fish model. In both 
cases, the 2R  and 2R  Adjusted  also show similar results of the different models 
applied by Clarke et al (1992).  
 
114 
 
Using the estimated parameters r , q  and K  from Table 3.3 both shrimp and fish 
biomass, catch and effort at the equilibrium (steady-state) and at the MSY are estimated, 
shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Biomass, catch and effort  
 
 Equilibrium MSY 
A. Shrimp fishery 
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B. Fish fishery 
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
The derivation of biomass, catch and effort at the equilibrium (steady-state) and at the 
MSY are shown in Appendix C and D. The current biomass for both shrimp and fish is 
calculated using 
s
s
s
current q
UB =
 and f
f
f
current q
UB = , respectively.  
 
Estimated results show that between 1992 and 2007, average abundance of shrimp 
biomass per year (1594 tonnes) is below the biomass at MSY level (2034 tonnes). The 
results also show that average fishing pressure per year (7457 fishing days) is larger 
than the fishing effort at the MSY (5857 fishing days) level. The average catch per year 
(3148 tonnes) is a little lower than the catch at MSY (3178 tonnes).  The result of the 
average abundance of shrimp biomass being below the biomass at MSY shows that the 
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shrimp stock of the industrial marine fisherise is over-exploited, which is consistent 
with Department of Fisheries’ report (2007) and indicates urgent need for management 
actions for shrimp fisheries. It is confirmed from the results that the fall in CPUE over 
time in Figure 3.4 of the industrial marine shrimp fishery is due to the fall in stock size. 
Results also show that too much effort is used to maintain high catch in the shrimp 
fishery which leads to the possible extinction of the shrimp fishery as the current effort 
(7457 fishing days) is higher than the effort at MSY level (5857 fishing days). So, there 
is a need for a reduction of effort in shrimp fishery. The estimated parameters; current 
abundance of biomass; biomass, catch and effort at MSY; biomass, catch and effort at 
steady-state of the shrimp fishery are shown in Table 3.5.   
 
Table 3.5 Values of estimated parameters, biomass, catch and effort of shrimp        
              
 Description Current MSY Steady-state equilibrium 
sB  Biomass (tonnes) 1594 2034 1549 
sC  Catch (tonnes) 3148 3178 3081 
sE  Effort (fishing days) 7457 5857 7291 
sr  Intrinsic growth rate 1.562462   
sq  Catchability in fishing days 0.000267   
sK  Maximum biomass 
(tonnes) 
5533   
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The estimated results between 1992 and 2007 show that the average abundance of fish 
biomass per year (51556 tonnes) is above the biomass at MSY level (25156 tonnes). 
The results also show that average fishing pressure per year (3447 fishing days) is 
smaller than the fishing effort at the MSY (8642 fishing days) level. The average catch 
per year (16730 tonnes) is also lower than the catch at MSY (25574 tonnes).  The result 
of the average abundance of fish biomass being above the biomass at MSY shows that 
the fish stock of the industrial marine fisheries is under-exploited. Hence, it is 
confirmed that the fall in CPUE over time in Figure 3.4 of the industrial marine fish 
fishery is not due to the fall in stock size. It may be due to the knowledge and 
information on the availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and may be partly due 
to the lack of technological developments for harvesting the new resources as 
mentioned in the DoF’s Report (2007). So, it is important to increase the knowledge and 
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information on the availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and to improve 
technological development of harvesting the marine fish resource. The estimated 
parameters; current abundance of biomass; biomass, catch and effort at MSY; biomass, 
catch and effort at steady-state of the fish fishery are shown in Table 3.6.  
  
Table 3.6 Values of estimated parameters, biomass, catch and effort of fish  
 
 Description Current MSY Steady-state equilibrium 
fB  Biomass (tonnes) 51556 25156 45918 
fC  Catch (tonnes) 16730 25574 18620 
fE  Effort (fishing days) 3447 8642 2446 
fr  Intrinsic growth rate 1.016615   
fq  Catchability in fishing days 0.000118   
fK  Maximum biomass 
(tonnes) 
68425   
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The abundance of biomass and actual catch in Table 3.5 and 3.6 show that to maintain 
steady-state biomass for both shrimp (1594 tonnes) and fish (45918 tonnes), in both 
shrimp and fish fisheries, steady-state catch should be 3081 tonnes and 18620 tonnes, 
respectively (in both cases, average current effort levels between 1992 and 2007 are 
used). The actual average catch of both shrimp (3148 tonnes) and fish (16730 tonnes) 
shows that both fisheries are not in steady-state equilibrium. It also indicates that the 
growth of both shrimp and fish are also not at adequate levels. As correspondence to 
each biomass level, a certain catch rate balances the growth rate of the resource and thus 
maintains steady-state equilibrium, the situation signals that both shrimp and fish are 
caught in small sizes. This may be due to the fishing pattern or technology (such as 
mesh size). Currently in the industrial marine fisheries, 45mm and 60mm mesh size of 
the net at the cod-end are used for a shrimp fishery and a fish fishery, respectively. To 
maintain steady-state equilibrium by maintaining adequate growth rate of both shrimp 
and fish, fishing patterns may also need to be modified.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This study is the first of its kind in terms of its study area and use of models to calculate 
the biological parameters. This study goes beyond 40 metres depth within the EEZ of 
Bangladesh to estimate biological reference points and to measure the current status of 
the industrial marine fisheries. This study uses CY&P (1992) models to calculate the 
biological parameters. Using two separate CY&P models, this study develops biomass 
dynamic models: dynamic versions of surplus production models for the shrimp fishery 
and the fish fishery of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. A time series data 
over the period from 1992 to 2007 is used in this study. Biological reference points are 
estimated in terms of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). To find out the biological 
reference points, the OLS technique is applied. Using the OLS results intrinsic growth 
rate, catchability coefficient and maximum biomass are estimated, which gives the 
abundance of biomass, biomass at the MSY and biomass at the steady-state for both 
shrimp and fishery. The steady-state catch and effort for both shrimp and fish fishery 
are also estimated.  
 
The estimated results show that the average abundance of shrimp biomass is below the 
biomass at MSY. Results indicate that the shrimp stocks of the industrial marine 
fisheries are over-exploited and the fall in CPUE over time of the industrial marine 
shrimp fishery is due to the fall in stock size. Results also show that too much effort is 
used to maintain high catch in the shrimp fishery, which will lead to the possible 
extinction of the shrimp fishery. So, there is a need for a reduction of effort in shrimp 
fishery and management actions are urgently needed for shrimp fishery to increase the 
stock size. On the other hand, the result of the average abundance of fish biomass is 
above the biomass at MSY and the current effort of fish fishery is much smaller than the 
critical level of effort at MSY level. The average abundance of fish biomass indicates 
that the fish stocks of the industrial marine fisheries are under-exploited and the fall in 
CPUE over time of the industrial marine fish fishery doesn’t show that it is due to the 
fall in stock size. It may be due to the knowledge and information on the availability of 
the sizes of different fish stocks and may be partly due to lack of technological 
developments for harvesting the new resources. So for fish fishery, management action 
is needed to increase the knowledge and information on the availability of the sizes of 
different fish stocks, and to improve technological development of harvesting the 
marine fish resource. Both shrimp and fish fisheries results are consistent with the 
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results in Chapter 2, which shows an outward shift of production of all vessels in both 
shrimp and fish fleets over the period indicating that too much effort is being used and 
signalling a possible decline in catch for both high-valued and low-valued catch. Results 
of this study also show that high-valued shrimp stock is small, as much literature shows 
a decline in high-valued stock and the low-valued fish stock is large due to an 
inadequate use of fishing technology as reported from the technical progress in Chapter 
2.  
 
The steady-state equilibrium results show that both shrimp and fish fisheries are not in 
steady-state equilibrium. It also indicates that the growth rate of both shrimp and fish 
stocks are also not in the adequate level. The situation signals that both shrimp and fish 
are caught in small sizes. This may be due to the fishing pattern and technology (such as 
mesh size). To maintain steady-state equilibrium and adequate growth rate of both 
shrimp and fish stocks, fishing patterns may also need to be modified. Overall, the 
results of this study indicate that the current management system (such as input control 
by licensing for both shrimp and fish fisheries and season closure for shrimp fishery) is 
not enough to increase the level of high-valued shrimp stocks and to increase the catch 
level of the low-valued stocks. Results show a need for an alternative management 
strategy for industrial marine fisheries in Bangladesh. 
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Appendix C 
 
Derivation of the equilibrium solution  
 
In the absence of harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
 

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
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
=
B
K
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dt
dB ln          (C1) 
 
Harvest function:  
 
qEBC =            (C2) 
 
With harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
 
C
B
K
rB
dt
dB
−





= ln           (C3) 
 
At steady-state, 0=
dt
dB
 
 
C
B
K
rB =





⇒ ln                     (C4) 
 
From Equation C4, equilibrium effort and biomass are obtained: 
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Substituting 





=
B
K
q
rEeq ln  and r
qE
eq KeB
−
=
 into Equation C2, the equilibrium harvest 
is obtained: 
120 
 
 
r
qE
eq qEKeC
−
=
         (C7) 
 
So, the biomass, effort and harvest at the equilibrium are: 
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−
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Appendix D 
 
Derivation of MSY 
 
Taking first derivative of harvest in Equation C7 (Appendix C) with respect to effort,  
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1
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At maximum, 0=
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−−
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                                                                                           (D2) 
 
Solving Equation D2, the effort at MSY is obtained: 
 
q
rEMSY =           (D3) 
 
Substituting 
q
rEMSY =  into Equation C6 (Appendix C), the biomass at MSY is 
obtained: 
 
72.2
KBMSY =           (D4) 
 
Substituting 
q
rEMSY =  and 72.2
KBMSY =  into Equation C2 (Appendix C), the harvest at 
MSY is obtained: 
 
72.2
rKCMSY =           (D5) 
 
So, the biomass, effort and harvest at the MSY are: 
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Biomass: 
72.2
KBMSY =  
 
Effort: 
q
rEMSY =  
 
Harvest: 
72.2
rKCMSY =  
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Chapter 4 
 
Economic efficiency of the industrial marine fisheries 
of Bangladesh: a bio-economic analysis  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Overcapacity, overharvesting, habitat damage and poor economic returns are considered 
main challenges to many of the world’s fisheries (Hilborn et al 2003). In an open access 
resource issues such as lack of property rights over the fish; effective management of 
the resource; cooperation among harvesters and free entry into a fishery by outsiders 
increase negative externalities in fisheries, known as tragedy of the commons. To 
prevent negative externalities, many fisheries in the world have taken some policy 
actions, such as restricting access to fishing grounds, limiting Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) by fishing fleets and so on. Despite these policy actions there have been several 
stock collapses occurred, such as northern cod fishery of Newfoundland and Labrador 
(Grafton et al 2006). Many economists argue that the most extreme example of 
management mistakes are stock collapses, which is caused by a lack of appropriate 
incentives and institutions that encourage fishers to behave in a sustainable way.   
 
To maintain sustainable stocks, the traditional approach has been input and output 
control measures, such as restricting the number of vessels, use of gear, number of 
fishing days, the length of closed seasons, the size of the catch limit, etc.. Studies show 
that input control increases substitution from regulated to unregulated inputs (Wilen 
1979) and results in effort-creep, and excessive and wasteful competition (Kompas et al. 
2009) in the fishery. In the long run, these measures cannot prevent economic 
overfishing, and fail to maximize economic profit and hence economic efficiency in the 
fishery. Overall, a laissez-faire approach to fisheries doesn’t work to address a tragedy 
of commons and other failures associated with open access fisheries (Grafton et al 
2006). So, an economic perspective of fisheries management is necessary, which shows 
marine resources should be managed sustainably so that they can contribute to and 
provide net benefit for the nation as a whole. Thus, an economically viable fishery can 
be an ecologically sustainable fishery.   
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To achieve maximum economic efficiency from a fishery correct and effective 
management targets are important. Efficient management of a fishery protects stocks, 
guarantees sustainability and assures correct allocation of resources in a way that 
maximizes the returns from fishing (Grafton et al 2006; Kompas 2005).  A benchmark 
to compare current economic performances in fishery with potential economic 
performances is explained by Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), which depends on a 
combination of biological and economic factors (Grafton et al 2006).  The combination 
of biological and economic factors gives a simultaneous biological and economic 
equilibrium in a fishery, which is commonly known as bio-economic52 equilibrium.  
 
A good deal of research on bio-economic modeling has been done on both single-
species fisheries53 and multi-species and/or multi-fleet fisheries54. A limited number of 
studies (Kar & Chakraborty 2011; Khan 2007; Khan & Karim n.d.) are done on marine 
shrimp fishery of Bangladesh. Based on area, marine fisheries of Bangladesh consist of 
two fisheries: artisanal55 fisheries and industrial56 fisheries and the characteristics of 
these two fisheries are different. The study done by Kar & Chakraborty (2011) doesn’t 
highlight the area of study, that is, whether the study deals with artisanal shrimp or 
industrial shrimp or marine shrimp fishery as a whole. The other two studies (Khan 
2007; Khan & Karim n.d.) have been done on shrimp trawl fishery, that is, the area of 
study of these two studies is industrial shrimp. Khan (2007) calculates optimal stock, 
harvest and effort level in discrete time frames and shows that the fishery is not 
managed and utilized optimally. Khan & Karim (n.d.) calculate optimal fishing effort 
and harvest level using both static and dynamic models and shows that shrimp capture 
fishery is exploited in an unsustainable manner. Kar & Chakraborty (2011) also use 
both static and dynamic frameworks to investigate the optimal utilization of shrimp 
resources, sustainability of stock and resource rent earned. The previous studies on 
                                                 
52
 Bio-economic models explain functional relationships between specific characteristics of the natural 
resource base, (for example, a fishery resource), and the human activities to make use of such a natural 
resource (FAO 1998).   
53
 Abaunza et al 2003; Anderson 2002; Armstrong & Skonhoft 2006; Bene et al 2001; Bjorndal et al 
2004; Bolmo et al 1978; Chaudhuri & Johnson 1990; Christensen & Vestergaard 1993; Clarke et al 1992; 
Conard 1989; Eggert & Ulmestrand 2000; Grant et al 1981; Holland 2000; Ibaibarriaga et al 2008; Kar & 
Matsuda 2008; Khan 2007; Mackinson et al 1997; McConnell & Sutinen 1979; Rettig 1987. 
54
 Agar & Sutinen 2004; Bhat & Bhatta 2006; Chaudhuri 1986; Chaudhuri 1988; Crutchfield 1983; 
Eggert 1998; Fredou et al 2009; Kompas & Che 2006; Kompas et al 2010; Lleonart et al 2003; Matsuda 
& Abrams 2006; Pelletier et al 2009; Pradhan & Chaudhuri 1999; Ruttan et al 2000; Ulrich et al 2002; 
Ward 1994.   
55
 The artisanal fisheries are small-scale onshore fisheries and fishing occurs up to 40 metres depth with 
mechanized and non mechanized boats. 
56
 The industrial fisheries are large-scale offshore fishery and fishing occurs beyond 40 metres depth 
within the EEZ of Bangladesh with industrial vessels. 
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marine shrimp of Bangladesh (Kar & Chakraborty 2011; Khan 2007; Khan & Karim 
n.d.) use the logistic growth model. The biological parameters and price of shrimp of 
these studies are used from secondary sources.  
 
The objective of this study is to measure the economic performance of the industrial 
marine fisheries of Bangladesh. This is the first study of its kind that covers both shrimp 
and fish of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. The industrial marine fisheries 
of Bangladesh are open access fisheries and the industrial fishing fleets of Bangladesh 
have been expanding over time (Marine Fisheries Department (MFD) 2009). The 
management system of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is mainly designed to 
control the effort level in order to prevent stock depletion. The management system is 
licensing vessels and the license fees are based on Gross Tonnage (GT) of the vessels. 
Commercially important fisheries resources: shrimp57 and fish58 are harvested by the 
industrial fishing vessels. Based on target species, industrial fishing vessels are divided 
into two broad categories: shrimp59 fleet and fish60 fleet. Hence, this study develops two 
single-species and single-fleet models separately for both shrimp and fish fisheries. 
Current and potential economic performance of both shrimp and fish fisheries in this 
study are measured using three different bio-economic models: a bio-economic model 
for open access fishery, a static profit maximization problem and a dynamic present 
value-maximization problem in continuous time. A harvest function given by Schaefer 
(1954) and Munro (1981, 1982) is used in this study. For both shrimp and fish of the 
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh, this is the first kind of study that uses the 
Gompertz curve (Richards 1959) in the biological growth models; biological parameters 
are derived following CY&P (1992) models. Price of harvest and cost per unit effort in 
this study are estimated separately. The equilibrium biomass, effort and profit at bio-
economic equilibrium of open access fishery, at static MEY and dynamic MEY are 
compared with the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). Sensitivity to changes in price 
                                                 
57
 The key commercial marine shrimp species harvested by the industrial vessels are tiger shrimp 
(Penaeus monodon) and brown shrimp (Metapenaeus monodon). Penaeus monodon (tiger shrimp) is the 
most valuable and hence the targeted species. But the highest (almost two thirds of the total) contribution 
to the total catch is from Metapenaeus monodon (brown shrimp) (MFD 2009). 
58
 More than ninety fish species are commercially important. These fall under the common group. The 
major commercial fin fish species exploited by the industrial vessels are pomfret (Pampus argenteus), 
goatfish (Upenuus sulphureus), bream (N. japonicas), lizard fish (Saurida tumbil), grunter (Popmadasys 
hasta), red snapper (Lutjanus johnii) and carangid (Arioma indica) (MFD 2009).  
59
 Vessels in the shrimp fleet are double-rigged vessels, fitted with two side beams from which two 
shrimp-trawl nets are simultaneously operated. A standard shrimp vessel is made of a steel hull and mesh 
size of the net at the cod-end is 45mm. 
60
 Vessels in fish fleet are stern vessels with a single-rigged trawl-net operated behind the vessels. These 
vessels generally have both wooden and steel hulls and the mesh size of the net at the cod-end is 60mm. 
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of harvest, changes in cost per unit effort and changes in social discount rate on biomass 
are also examined. The study shows that excessive use of efforts makes both shrimp and 
fish fisheries economically inefficient in the form of low stock biomass and profit. Thus 
both shrimp and fish fishery show that both fisheries are neither, economically viable 
nor, ecologically sustainable.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 focuses on the 
theoretical framework followed by models for the industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 describes the data and variables. Section 4.5 
presents results, while Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
 
A benchmark to compare current economic performances in fisheries with potential 
economic performances is explained by Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). MEY 
depends on a combination of biological and economic factors (Grafton et al 2006).  The 
combination of biological and economic factors gives a simultaneous biological and 
economic equilibrium in a fishery, which is commonly known as bio-economic 
equilibrium (FAO 1998). Bio-economic modeling in fisheries helps to describe the 
management of fisheries resources and to integrate the economic and biological 
influences in determining appropriate levels of stock and harvest (Knowler 2002).  
 
Bio-economic modeling can be done based on stochastic and deterministic conditions. 
The optimal policy under stochastic conditions is qualitatively different from the 
optimal policy under deterministic conditions (Anderson & Sutinen 1984) and on 
average deterministic policies are reasonably good substitutes for stochastic policies 
(Lewis 1981; Smith 1977). Bio-economic modeling can also be done using static (time-
independent) and dynamic (time-dependent) analysis. Since the 1970s, a major 
development and decisive shift away from static to dynamic analysis has placed 
economists in a position to effectively analyze fisheries management programs (Clark et 
al. 1985). A dynamic modeling approach for the resource performs estimations and 
predictions of the bio-economic impact derived from different management strategies 
(FAO 2002). Recent literature shows that the dynamic bio-economic model has started 
to become accepted as an important and implementable target in fisheries management 
(eg., Grafton et al. 2010).  However, both static and dynamic approaches are used in this 
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study to measure the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) along with the open access bio-
economic equilibrium for both shrimp and fish fisheries.   
 
Bio-economic models are used for both single-species/single-fleet and multi-
species/multi-fleet fisheries. Different types of bio-economics models for single-
species/single-fleet are used in the literature. These include static and dynamic versions 
of the Schaefer model (Gordon 1953, 1954); a distributed-delay fleet dynamics model 
based on Smith’s model (1969); and yield-mortality models and age-structured dynamic 
models (Seijo & Defeo 1994) and so on. The majority of multi-species/multi-fleet 
models are extension of single-species/single-fleet models (FAO 1998). Bio-economic 
models for multi-species/multi-fleet fisheries depend on mainly three interactions: 
biological, technical and economic. Biological interaction describes the interaction 
between and within fish stocks and this interaction is caused by predation and food 
competition. Studies on biological interactions have been conducted by many authors. 
Most popular models on biological interactions are the ‘Multi-species VPA’61. The 
classical predator-prey models are based on logistic models and Lotka-Volterra models 
(Lotka 1925; Volterra 1926) and these models are used in some studies (Goh 1976; 
Hastings 1978).  Food web modeling is also found in a few studies, such as Walters & 
Martell (2004). Simultaneous harvest of groups of species is involved with technical 
interactions. Models where two ecologically independent stocks are jointly harvested 
with the same gear are based on the Gordon-Schaefer model (Gordon 1953, 1954) and 
models where two ecologically independent stocks are harvested independently and 
competition exists between two stocks are based on the Gause model (Gause 1935). 
Technical interaction models, such as those used in Brown et al (1976) and Ralston & 
Polovina (1982) can be appropriate both for interacting and non-interacting species 
groups (Hollowed et al 2000).  
 
Economic interaction describes the competition between fleets. The more one fleet 
catches of the limited resource the less will be left for its competitors (FAO 1998). The 
economic interactions capture price and value of harvest and these models are also 
known as the prediction models. The first prediction models were developed by 
Thompson & Bell (1934), where economic interaction of several fleets was introduced 
to the age-based models. Economic interaction is also described by the Beverton & Holt 
                                                 
61
 For example, Helgason & Gislason 1979; Gislason & Helgason 1985; Pope 1979; International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 1984, 1986, 1987; Gislason & Sparre 1987. 
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models (1957). Market interaction also played an important role in multi-species/multi-
fleet fisheries and this interaction is considered when the quantity of one species 
supplied affects the market price of another species (Flaaten 1998). This study uses 
single-species and single-fleet models for the bio-economic analysis of the industrial 
marine shrimp and fish fisheries of Bangladesh.  
 
The bio-economic model consists of two components: a biological growth model and 
economic model (Perman et al 2011). The biological growth model describes the natural 
growth process of the fishery, while the economic model describes the economic 
behavior of the vessel owners.   
 
4.2.1 Biological growth model 
 
In the absence of harvest, the rate of change of biomass depends on the current biomass, 
which is known as the biological growth model and can be expressed as: 
 
( )BF
dt
dB
=                                              (4.1) 
 
In the Equation 4.1, B  is the biomass; t  is the year; 
dt
dB
 is the growth rate of biomass 
and ( )BF  is the growth function of biomass. According to Clarke et al (1992), five 
different models for ( )BF  are used in different studies to describe the biological 
production relationship. All these models are mentioned in Chapter 3 (see page 100). 
These models are different in terms of different production relationships, such as 
parabolic/logistic relation between yield and effort in the Schaefer model (1957) and the 
Schnute model (1977); Gompertz curve (Richards 1959) in the Fox model (1970) and 
the CY&P model (1992); logarithmic relation between yield and effort in the Threshold 
model by Sathiendrakumar & Tisdell (1987). A parabolic/logistic curve for Bangladesh 
marine shrimp fishery is used in Kar & Chakraborty (2011); Khan (2007) and Khan & 
Karim (n.d.). Following the CY&P model (1992), this study uses Gompertz curve 
(Richards 1959) in the biological growth model.  
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A steady-state biological equilibrium occurs when the net growth of biomass is exactly 
equal to the rate of harvest and the fishery can then continue indefinitely in this position 
of sustained harvesting of fish. Thus, the biological equilibrium can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )BEhBF ,=                                             (4.2) 
 
4.2.2 Economic model 
 
The economic model consists of harvest function, cost function, revenue/benefit 
function and profit function, and can be expressed as: 
 
( )
( )
( )







−=
=
=
=
TCTR
hBTR
ECTC
BEhh
pi
,
                                  (4.3) 
 
In Equation 4.3, h  is the harvest and the size of harvest normally depends on many 
factors. In this case, harvest depends on mainly two factors. The first factor is effort E , 
which can be measured either in terms of number of vessels or number of fishing days. 
The second factor is biomass B . For any given level of effort, the larger the biomass the 
greater the harvest. Depending on different assumptions, different harvest functions are 
used in different studies. The foundation of harvest functions for most dynamic fishery 
models is the Scheafer or the biomass and effort Cobb-Douglas harvest function (Morey 
1986). Mainly, two types of harvest functions are used in the literature. Of these, the 
harvest functions depends on the amount of fishing effort and biomass given by 
Schaefer (1954) and Munro (1981, 1982) is considered as a good approximation to the 
actual relationship. The other harvest function is the Beverton and Holt (1954, 1957) 
harvest function, which depends on recruitment, growth of stock and fishing mortality. 
Harvest functions given by Scheafer (1954) and Munro (1981 and 1982) are used in this 
study.   
 
With harvest, the growth rate of biomass in Equation 4.1 depends on the current 
biomass less the quantity of harvest, which can be expressed as: 
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( ) ( )BEhBF
dt
dB
,−=                                           (4.4) 
 
The total cost of harvest TC in Equation 4.3 depends on amount of effort E . In a 
commercial fishery, the gross benefit is the total revenue of the fishery (Perman et al 
2011) and the total revenue TR  depends on amount of harvest h .  The profit function 
pi
 in Equation 4.3 shows that the profit is the difference between total revenue (TR ) 
from harvest and total cost (TC ) of harvest.   
 
Gordon (1954) shows62 that in the absence of entry limitations, total revenues and costs 
eventually equilibrate and all resource rent/profit will be dissipated. Thus, in an open 
access fishery the economic equilibrium occurs when profit is zero, that is, the total 
revenue from harvest is exactly equal to the total cost of harvest. Hence, the economic 
equilibrium of the open access fishery can be expressed as: 
 
TCTR =⇒= 0pi                       (4.5) 
 
The equilibrium condition in Equation 4.5 shows at the steady-state,  0=
dt
dE
 and effort 
is constant. Because, in an open access fishery, the entry and exit of vessels (fishing 
effort) depends on profit, which is determined as: 
 
δpi=
dt
dE
                                         (4.6) 
 
With positive profit ( 0>pi ), vessels will enter into the fishery and with negative profit  
( 0<pi ), vessels will leave the fishery, which can be written as: 
 



⇒<
⇒>
⇒



==
exit
entry
dt
dEE
0
0
.
pi
piδpi                                        (4.7) 
 
                                                 
62
 Gordon (1954) analysis assumed that the fleet was homogeneous and the average cost equal to the 
marginal cost, and also includes a normal return to capital. 
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The magnitude of entry into and exit from a fishery depends on the positive parameter 
δ  that indicates the responsiveness of the fishing industry size to industry profitability 
(Perman et al 2011).   
 
By solving biological equilibrium presented in Equation 4.2 and economic equilibrium 
in Equation 4.5, the steady-state biomass, effort and amount of harvest for an open 
access fishery are obtained.  
 
MEY is the equilibrium level, where the economic rent/profit is maximized. A static 
MEY is obtained using the following profit maximization problem: 
 
Max )()()( ETCETRE −=pi                                (4.8) 
 
The first order necessary condition for maximum profit is 0=
∂
∂
E
pi
, which shows that at 
maximum profit, the marginal revenue from harvest is equal to the marginal cost of 
harvest: 
 
( ) ( )
dE
EdTC
dE
EdTR
=                     (4.9) 
 
Solving the biological equilibrium presented in Equation 4.2 and the economic 
equilibrium in Equation 4.9, the steady-state biomass, effort and amount of harvest for 
static MEY are obtained.  
 
A dynamic MEY is obtained using present value-maximizing models, which considers 
the value of time (Clark 1989) and takes account of the process of adjustment by which 
an optimal stock size is attained (Knowler 2002). This model requires the use of optimal 
control theory where harvest ( )h , fishing effort ( )E  and biomass ( )B  are expressed as 
functions of time. The fisheries resource manager’s problem is to maximize the present 
value of exploiting the resources and the general form of dynamic problem in 
continuous time is expressed as: 
 
138 
 
 
Max NB  ( ) dtte t .
0
piρ∫
∞
−
=   subject to:  
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                                (4.10)              
   
In Equation 4.10, NB  is the net benefit; ρ  is the instantaneous annual discount rate or 
the social discount rate of the resource; t  is the year and ( )tpi  is the profit function.  The 
constraint the net growth rate of biomass, ( )[ ] ( )thtBF
dt
dB
−=  is the state equation; 0B  
is the initial value of the biomass; ( )th  is the harvest and ( )tE  is effort.  It is largely a 
matter of convenience whether harvest or effort is used as constraint (Perman et al 
2011). As the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is an effort-controlled fishery, 
this study uses effort as the control variable for both shrimp and fish fisheries.   
 
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )[ ]thtBFtBEH c −+= µpi,
                             (4.11) 
 
The necessary conditions or, the maximum principles for optimal solution are: 
 
( )
( )
( ) 







∂
∂
−=−
=
∂
∂
=
∂
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B
Hiii
dt
dBHii
E
Hi
c
c
c
ρµµ
µ

0
                  (4.12) 
  
At steady-state, 0== µB . The optimal biomass, optimal effort and optimal harvest for 
a dynamic MEY are obtained by solving maximum principles. Depending on ρ , there 
may be one, several or no solutions (Clark 1973).  
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4.3 Models  
 
All vessels within the fleets in the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh are 
considered as homogeneous vessels in terms of gear. Both shrimp and fish fleets are 
independent in their targeted catch. According to the data of the Marine Fisheries 
Department (MFD) of Bangladesh between 2001 and 2007, the major amount of total 
targeted catches of shrimp comes from shrimp fleet (99.09 percent) and the amount of 
total targeted catches of fish comes from fish fleet (71.93 percent). The management 
conditions allow both shrimp and fish fleets to catch 30 percent of bycatch, but due to 
the use of different gear and mesh sizes the average bycatch of both fleets, in fact, is 
very low. So, the bycatch of both shrimp fleet (28.73 percent fish) and fish fleet (0.91 
percent shrimp) are ignored in this study and the targeted resources (shrimp and fish) 
are considered as homogeneous biomasses. Hence, both shrimp and fish fisheries in this 
study are considered as two different independent single-species fisheries. Hence, this 
study uses two separate single-species and single-fleet models for a shrimp fishery and a 
fish fishery. These models are developed under two assumptions. First, the models are 
considered as equilibrium models. Second, state of nature has no uncertainty.  
 
4.3.1 Biological growth model 
 
Using a Gompertz curve (Richards 1959) the biological growth models for both shrimp
( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh are measured 
separately, which are expressed as: 
 
( ) 





==
s
s
ssss
s
B
KBrBF
dt
dB ln                  (4.13) 
 
( ) 





== f
f
ffff
f
B
KBrBF
dt
dB ln                 (4.14) 
 
Equation 4.13 and 4.14 show that for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries of industrial 
marine fisheries of Bangladesh, the growth rate of the biomass 
dt
dB
 and the shape of the 
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growth ( )BF  relies on the two biological parameters r  and K , where r  is the intrinsic 
growth rate and K is the maximum stock level or virgin biomass.  
 
4.3.2 Economic model 
 
The two economic models for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries of industrial marine 
fisheries of Bangladesh consist of four functions: harvest function, total cost function, 
total revenue function and profit function. The economic models of both shrimp ( )s  and 
fish ( )f  fisheries are expressed as: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 




−⇒−=
⇒⇒=
⇒=
=⇒=
ssssssss
sssssssss
sssss
ssssssss
EwBqpTCTR
EBqphphBTR
EwECTC
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,
                (4.15) 
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=⇒=
ffffffff
fffffffff
fffff
ffffffff
EwBqpTCTR
EBqphphBTR
EwECTC
EBqhBEhh
pi
,
               (4.16) 
 
Harvest function qEBh =  given by Scheafer (1954) and Munro (1981, 1982) is used in 
both Equation 4.15 and 4.16. The harvest function is ∑
=
=
n
i
ich
1
 , where ni ,...,2,1=  
denotes number of vessels engaged in fishing and c  denotes catch of vessel i . The 
harvest function relies on a simple multiplicative relationship between a constant 
catchability coefficient q , biomass B  and total effort E . In the harvest function, 
∑
=
=
n
i
ieE
1
 where  ni ,...,2,1=  denotes number of vessels engaged in fishing and e  
denotes total effort given by vessel i . 
 
With harvest, the growth rate of biomass of both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries of the 
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh depend on the current biomass less the 
quantity of harvest and are expressed as: 
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( ) ( ) sss
s
s
sssssss
s
EBq
B
KBrBEhBF
dt
dB
−

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
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⇒−= ln,                                      (4.17) 
 
( ) ( ) ffff
f
fffffff
f
EBq
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dt
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−





⇒−= ln,                                      (4.18) 
 
Equation 4.17 and 4.18 depend on three parameters: the intrinsic growth r , the 
catchability coefficient q  and the maximum stock level or virgin biomass K .  
 
Under the assumption that all efforts given in both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  harvesting of 
the industrial marine fisheries are targeted, the harvesting cost of this study is 
considered as a linear function of effort. Hence, Equation 4.15 and 4.16 show the 
harvesting cost is a linear function of effort E , that is, wETC =  where w  is the cost 
per unit of harvesting effort and considered as constant; and ∑
=
=
n
i
ieE
1
, ni ,...,2,1=  is 
the number of vessels engaged in fishing or total fishing days and e  denotes total effort 
of harvest used by vessel i .   
 
The total cost of harvest ( )332211 xwxwxwTC ++=  for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  
fisheries of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is calculated separately using 
both fixed (total engine power 1x ) input cost and variable input (total crew 2x  and total 
fishing days 3x ) cost of both fleets. The input prices of total engine power, total crew 
and total fishing days 1w , 2w  and 3w are derived using a cost minimization problem and 
calculated as, 
2
1
21 F
F
ww =   and 
2
3
23 F
F
ww = , where 1F , 2F and 3F are the marginal 
productivity of engine power, crew and fishing days, respectively. 
 
Equation 4.15 and 4.16 show that the total revenue for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  
fisheries of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh is a simple multiplicative 
relationship between market price p  and amount of harvest h . The amount of harvest 
used in this study is a sum of total catch by all vessels in the fleet. In an open access 
fishery, perfect competition exists and price is fixed for all vessels, i.e. pp =  and the 
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price of harvest is derived using long-run equilibrium condition where price is equal to 
average cost of harvest.  
 
The profit function pi  for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries of industrial marine 
fisheries of Bangladesh in Equation 4.15 and 4.16 shows that the profit is the difference 
between total revenue from harvest TR  and total cost of harvest TC .  
 
4.3.3 Bio-economic equilibrium for open access fishery 
 
The bio-economic equilibrium of both open access shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries 
satisfies the following conditions: 
 
(i) ( ) hBF =  (biological equilibrium) 
 
(ii) TCTR =   (economic equilibrium) 
 
By solving these two conditions, equilibrium biomass, effort and harvest for both open 
access shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are derived separately. The derivation of the 
solution is presented in Appendix E. The solution for equilibrium biomass ( )BEB , effort 
( )BEE
 and harvest ( )BEh  for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries at the open access 
bio-economic equilibrium are reported in the Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Solution: bio-economic equilibrium (BE) of open access fishery 
 
Shrimp fishery Fish fishery 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
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Using the solution in Table 4.1, total revenue from harvest ( )BETR , total cost of harvest 
( )BETC
 
and total profit ( )BEpi  at the bio-economic equilibrium of both open access 
shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are obtained. 
 
4.3.4 Static MEY 
 
The static MEY of both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries satisfy the following 
conditions: 
 
(iii) ( ) hBF =    (biological equilibrium) 
 
(iv) MCMR =  (economic equilibrium) 
 
Solving these two conditions, solution of equilibrium biomass, effort and harvest at 
static MEY for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are derived separately. The 
derivation of the solution is presented in Appendix F. The solution for equilibrium 
biomass ( )staticB , effort ( )staticE  and harvest ( )statich  for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  
fisheries at the static MEY are reported in the Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Solution: static MEY 
 
Shrimp fishery Fish fishery 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Using the solution, total revenue from harvest ( )staticTR , total cost of harvest ( )staticTC
and total profit ( )staticpi  at the static MEY of both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are 
obtained. 
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4.3.5 Dynamic MEY 
 
The optimal harvest policies, that is, the dynamic MEY for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  
fisheries of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh are solved by maximizing the 
present value of profit of these two fisheries separately: 
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The separate current value Hamiltonian for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are: 
 
( ) ( ) 
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The optimum solution of a present value-maximizing problem satisfies the following 
maximum principles: 
 
(i) 0=∂
∂
E
H c
 
 
(ii) BH
c

=
∂
∂
µ  
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(iii) 
B
H c
∂
∂
−=− ρµµ
 
 
The first maximum principle gives the following equations for both shrimp ( )s  and fish
( )f  fisheries: 
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      (4.23) 
 
At steady-state, 0== µB .  Solving the second maximum principles, 
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third maximum principle for shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries respectively, following 
equations for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are obtained: 
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 Using Equation 4.23 and 4.24, solutions for optimal biomass,  effort  and harvest are 
derived separately for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries. The derivation of these 
solutions is presented in Appendix G. The solution for equilibrium biomass ( )dynamicB , 
effort ( )dynamicE  and harvest ( )dynamich  for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries at the 
dynamic MEY are reported in the Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Solution: dynamic MEY  
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Using the solution, total revenue from harvest ( )dynamicTR , total cost of harvest ( )dynamicTC
and total profit ( )dynamicpi  at the dynamic MEY of both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries 
are obtained. 
 
4.3.6 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) 
 
Equilibrium biomass, effort and harvest at the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for 
both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries derived in Chapter 3 (Appendix D) are used to 
compare the result of the bio-economic equilibrium (BE), static and dynamic MEY for 
both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries. The solution for biomass ( )staticB , effort ( )staticE  
and harvest ( )statich  for both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries at the MSY derived in 
Chapter 3 (Appendix D) are reported in the Table 4.4. Using the solution, total revenue 
from harvest ( )MSYTR , total cost of harvest ( )MSYTC
 
and total profit ( )MSYpi  at the MSY 
of both shrimp ( )s  and fish ( )f  fisheries are obtained. 
 
Table 4.4 Solution: MSY 
 
Shrimp fishery Fish fishery 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
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4.4 Data 
 
The growth rate of the biomass and the shape of the growth of both shrimp and fish 
fisheries of industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh relies on the two biological 
parameters: r  and K , where r  is the intrinsic growth rate and K
 
is the maximum 
stock level or virgin biomass. Following CY&P models (Clarke et al 1992) and 
applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique, the value of r , q  and K  are 
calculated in Chapter 3 of this research, which are used in this study. The calculated 
values of r , q  and K  for the shrimp fishery are 1.56246156, 0.00026675 and 5533 
tonnes respectively and for the fish fishery are 1.01661534, 0.00011764 and 68425 
tonnes respectively.  
 
To calculate the total cost function both fixed and variable inputs are used. The fixed 
input is the average total engine power per year, which is a simple multiplication of 
average engine power per vessel and average total number of vessels in the fleet per 
year. Data for both engine power and number of vessels are collected from MFD 
(2009). The calculated average engine power per vessel of both shrimp and fish fleet are 
drawn from Chapter 2 of this research. The calculated average engine power of shrimp 
and fish vessels are 664 Brake Horse Power (BHP) and 694 BHP, respectively. The 
number of vessels in both shrimp and fish vessels varies between 1993 and 2006. As 
there is a significant variation of the number of vessels in the fleet between two periods 
(1993-2000 and 2001-2006), the average total number of vessels in the fleet per year for 
the period 2001-2006 is used in this study. Data shows that in the period 2001-2006, the 
average number of vessels per year in shrimp and fish fleets is 44 and 50 per year, 
respectively. The calculated average of the total engine power per year in shrimp and 
fish fisheries are 29,327 BHP and 34, 931 BHP, respectively.  
 
Two variable inputs, average total crew per year and average total fishing days per year 
are used in the total cost function. The average total crew per year is also derived from a 
simple multiplication of average number of crew per vessel per year and average 
number of vessels in the fleet per year. Data for the number of total crew is also 
collected from MFD (2009). The calculated average number of crew per vessel of 
shrimp and fish vessels is 32 and 30 per year, respectively and drawn from Chapter 2 of 
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this research. The calculated average of the total crew per year in shrimp and fish 
fisheries is 1413 and 1510, respectively.  
 
The average total fishing days per year is also derived from a simple multiplication of 
average total fishing days per vessel per year and average number of vessels in the fleet 
per year. Data for the number of total fishing days is also collected from MFD (2009).  
The calculated average fishing days per vessel of shrimp and fish vessels is 175 and 169 
days per year, respectively and drawn from Chapter 2 of this research. The calculated 
average of the total fishing days per year in shrimp and fish fisheries is 7729 and 8506, 
respectively. 
 
To calculate three input prices of the total cost function, real wage rate index of fisheries 
sector in Bangladesh is collected from Bangladesh Economic Review (MoF 2012) and 
used for input prices of crew. The calculated marginal value product of engine power, 
crew and fishing days of vessels in the shrimp fleet are 0.16, 0.53 and 0.39, respectively 
and in the fish fleet are 0.44, 0.45 and 0.61, respectively. All these values of the 
marginal products are drawn from Chapter 2 of this research. Using real wage rate index 
and marginal value product of three inputs (engine power, crew and fishing days), the 
input price index of engine power and fishing days are calculated. Thus the calculated 
input price index of engine power, crew and fishing days in the shrimp fishery are 36, 
118 and 87 respectively. On the other hand, the calculated input price index of engine 
power, crew and fishing days in the fish fishery are 115, 118 and 160 respectively. 
 
The cost per unit of effort is calculated using total costs described above and total effort. 
The average of the total fishing days per year is considered as effort. The calculated 
average of the total effort per year in shrimp and fish fisheries is 7729 and 8506 vessel 
days, respectively. The calculated cost per unit of effort for shrimp and fish fisheries is 
244 and 655, respectively. Price of harvest for both shrimp and fish fishery is calculated 
using long run equilibrium condition, where price is equal to the average cost. Hence, 
the average cost of harvest is calculated to find out the price of harvest for both shrimp 
and fish fisheries. The average cost of harvest is calculated using the ratio of total cost 
of harvest and the amount of total harvest. Input price index is used to measure input 
cost of the total cost of harvest, hence the calculated price of harvest for both shrimp 
and fish fishery is also an index. The calculated price index for both shrimp and fish 
fisheries is 582 and 333, respectively.  
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For optimal solution, both average deposit rate per year (6.92%) and average lending 
rate per year (12.41%) for the period 2001-2006 are used as the Social Discount Rates 
(SDRs) and both the SDRs are used for both shrimp and fish fisheries. Both average 
deposit rate per year and average lending rate per year are collected from the 
Bangladesh Economic Review (MoF 2012).  For sensitivity analysis, different social 
discount rates (30%, 25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, 5%, 3%, 1% and 0%) are used and these 
social discount rates are taken as arbitrary.  
 
The value of all variables and the value of parameters of those used in this study are 
reported in the Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5 Variables and the parameters 
 
 Shrimp Fish 
Total engine power per year (BHP) 29327 34931 
Total crew per year (number) 1413 1510 
Total fishing days per year (days) 7729 8506 
Factor price index of inputs (engine power) 36 115 
Factor price index of inputs (crew) 118 118 
Factor price index of inputs (fishing days) 87 160 
Cost per unit of effort (index) 244 655 
Price index of harvest  582 333 
Total harvest per year (tonnes) 3237 16702 
Total vessels per year (number) 44 50 
   
Intrinsic growth rate 1.56246156 1.016615339 
Cathability coefficient 0.000266751 0.00011764 
Virgin biomass (tonnes) 5533 68425 
  Source:  Author’s calculation. 
 
 
4.5 Results and sensitivity analysis 
 
 
The bio-economic equilibrium (BE) for both open access shrimp and fish fisheries are 
calculated separately using the solution obtained in Appendix E. Equilibrium at static 
MEY and dynamic MEY are calculated using the solutions obtained in Appendix F and 
G, respectively. For both open access shrimp and fish fisheries, the bio-economic 
equilibrium (BE) is obtained by setting profit equal to zero and the equilibrium at the 
static MEY is obtained from a profit maximization problem. On the other hand, the 
equilibrium at dynamic MEY is obtained through a present value-maximization 
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problem. The present value of profit is maximized separately through a choice of effort 
subject to the constraints imposed by the biological growth models of shrimp and fish. 
The equilibrium at static and dynamic MEY, and the bio-economic equilibrium of open 
access fishery are compared with the equilibrium at the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY). All equilibrium values of both shrimp and fish fishery and sensitivity results are 
obtained using Microsoft Office EXCEL 2007 software. Results of open-access BE; 
static & dynamic MEY; and MSY for both shrimp and fish fisheries are reported in the 
Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 Results: BE, MEY and MSY 
 
 BE MEY (Static) MEY (Dynamic) MSY 
SDR=6.92% SDR=12.41% 
Shrimp fishery 
Biomass (tonnes) 1570 6049 5396 5000 2034 
Effort (vessel days) 7378 4337 4337 4337 5857 
Harvest (tonnes) 3090 6999 6243 5784 3178 
Total revenue (value) 1796975 4070053 3630766 3363917 1848304 
Total cost (value) 1796975 1056384 1056384 1056384 1426680 
Profit (value) 0 3013668 2574382 2307532 421624 
Number of vessels 42 25 25 25 33 
Fish fishery 
Biomass (tonnes) 16690 40618 37218 35138 25156 
Effort (vessel days) 12193 5091 5091 5091 8642 
Harvest (tonnes) 23940 24325 22289 21043 25574 
Total revenue (value) 7982592 8111165 7432117 7016779 8527583 
Total cost (value) 7982592 3332945 3332945 3332945 5657768 
Profit (value) 0 4778220 4099172 3683835 2869814 
Number of vessels 72 30 30 30 51 
Note: SDR= Social Discount Rate. For dynamic MEY, SDR: 6.92% is the average deposit rate per year and 
SDR: 12.41% is the average lending rate per year in Bangladesh.   
BE= Bio-economic Equilibrium of the open access fishery 
MEY= Maximum Economic Yield 
MSY= Maximum Sustainable Yield 
 Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
For the dynamic models presented in Table 4.6, both average deposit rate per year 
(6.92%) and average lending rate per year (12.41%) of Bangladesh are used as the 
social discount rate ( )ρ . The price index of harvest ( )p  for shrimp (582) and fish (333); 
and the cost per unit effort ( )w  of harvesting shrimp (244) and fish (655); and the 
catchability coefficient ( )q  for shrimp (0.00026675) and fish (0.00011764) are used. 
The price index of harvest ( )p  shows that shrimp is high-valued biomass and fish is 
low-valued biomass. On the other hand, cost per unit effort ( )w  of harvesting shrimp is 
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low compared to the harvesting fish. In the shrimp fishery, the price index of shrimp 
( )p
 
is higher than the cost per unit effort ( )w  of harvesting shrimp, but in the fish 
fishery, the cost per unit effort ( )w  of harvesting fish is higher than the price index of 
harvest ( )p . The cost per unit effort ( )w  of harvesting fish may be higher may be due 
to the declining trend of technical change of fish vessels as reported in the Chapter 2 of 
this research.   
 
The results in Table 4.6 show that effort at bio-economic equilibrium (BE) of both open 
access shrimp and fish fisheries is higher than effort at both static and dynamic MEY 
and MSY levels; biomass and profit at the BE are lower than both static and dynamic 
MEY and MSY levels. The results indicate that in open-access industrial fisheries in 
Bangladesh, excessive use of efforts makes both shrimp and fish fisheries economically 
inefficient in the form of low stock biomass and profit. On the other hand, the biomass 
at both static and dynamic MEY is higher than the biomass at the MSY level. The result 
is consistent with Gordon (1954), which shows that biomass at the MEY is always 
greater than MSY in a static framework. But, in a dynamic framework, there is an 
ongoing debate about whether MEY is greater or smaller than MSY. A dynamic 
framework with zero discount rate is developed by Smith (1969) and shows that 
biomass at the MEY is always greater than MSY. Clark (1973), Clark & Munro (1975) 
and others also develop dynamic frameworks, albeit in an inter-temporal setting with 
discounting. Studies show that biomass at the dynamic MEY could be less than MSY 
level with a high enough discount rate (Clark 1973). The dynamic MEY could be either 
greater or smaller than MSY depending on some factors: discount rate, sensitivity of 
costs and revenues to biomass and harvest, and the marginal growth in biomass (Clark 
& Munro 1975). The dynamic MEY could exceed the MSY level under a range of 
conditions: with a variable stock effect, technological change, with an increase in the 
cost per unit effort, when the discount rate exceeds the intrinsic growth rate (Grafton et 
al 2010).   
 
However, results in Table 4.6 show that by setting biomass target at the MEY will give 
an economically viable (with high profit) and ecologically sustainable (with high stock 
biomass) shrimp and fish fisheries in Bangladesh. Grafton et al (2010) shows that MEY 
has “…the potential to generate a ‘win-win’ that increases both economic profits and 
the size of the fishery whenever the current biomass is the less than dynamic MEY.”  
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Recent studies also show that the MEY target is considered as an efficient management 
target, because it protects resources, guarantees sustainability and maximizes economic 
yield (Grafton et al 2006). The study on Australian Northern prawn fishery (Kompas et 
al 2010) and Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery (Kompas & Che 2006) also show 
similar arguments in favor of the MEY target, suggesting the importance of conserving 
stocks for profitability.  
 
4.5.1 Sensitivity analysis  
 
The equilibrium biomass at static MEY- 





−
=
rqE
r
pq
wB , dynamic MEY- 
( )
( )[ ]qErpq
rwB
−+
+
=
ρ
ρ ) and the bio-economic equilibrium of open access fishery- 
pq
wB =
 of this study depends on price of harvest ( )p ; cost per unit effort ( )w  and 
catchability coefficient ( )q .  In addition to that both static and dynamic MEY depends 
on the intrinsic growth rate ( )r  and efforts level ( )E . Dynamic MEY also depends on 
another factor: social discount rate ( )ρ . Sensitivity of biomass to the changes in price of 
harvest ( )p , changes in cost per unit effort ( )w  and changes in social discount rate ( )ρ
on shrimp and fish stock biomasses are examined, but the study doesn’t cover the 
sensitivity to changes in catchability coefficient; the intrinsic growth rate and efforts 
level.  
 
The sensitivity to changes in price of harvest ( )p ; changes in cost per unit effort ( )w  and 
changes in social discount rate ( )ρ  of biomass at dynamic MEY and sensitivity to 
changes in price of harvest ( )p and changes in cost per unit effort ( )w  of both biomass 
at static MEY and biomass at BE are found using comparative static analysis presented 
in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 Comparative static analysis 
 
 Dynamic MEY Static MEY BE 
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in price of 
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- - 
Note: BE= Bio-economic Equilibrium of the open access fishery and MEY= Maximum Economic Yield 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Changes in price of harvest ( )p : Table 4.7 shows that equilibrium biomass at BE, static 
and dynamic MEY are all sensitive to the changes in price of harvest ( )p , which is 
inversely related. The inverse relation of sensitivity of biomass to the changes in price 
of harvest ( )p  shows that biomass falls with the increase in price of harvest ( )p  and 
biomass rebuilds with the decrease in price of harvest ( )p . The sensitivity results to the 
changes in price of harvest ( )p  for both shrimp and fish fisheries are reported in Table 
4.8. The results show that both shrimp and fish biomasses are sensitive to the change in 
price of harvest. Results also show that with fixed unit cost of effort ( )w  and changes in 
price of harvest ( )p , both shrimp and fish biomasses at the bio-economic equilibrium 
(BE) are lower than both static & dynamic MEY, and MSY levels.  Sensitivity results in 
Table 4.8 also show that with both an increase and a decrease in price of harvest ( )p , 
both shrimp and fish biomasses at the static and dynamic MEY exceed the MSY level. 
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Table 4.8  Sensitivity of shrimp and fish biomasses: changes in p and fixed w  
 
  SDR 
(%) 
Shrimp stock biomass  
(tonnes) 
Fish stock biomass  
(tonnes) 
0pp =  01 ppp >=( )p↑
 
02 ppp <=  ( )p↓
 
0pp =  01 ppp >=  ( )p↑
 
02 ppp <=  ( )p↓
 
BE   1570 1339 1894 16690 12853 23885 
MEY  
(static) 
  6049 5158 7299 40618 31279 58128 
MEY 
(dynamic) 
6.92 5396 4602 6511 37218 28661 53262 
12.41 5000 4263 6032 35138 27059 50285 
MSY   2034 2034 2034 25156 25156 25156 
Note: SDR= Social Discount Rate. For dynamic MEY, SDR: 6.92% is the average deposit rate per year and 
SDR: 12.41% is the average lending rate per year in Bangladesh.   
BE= Bio-economic Equilibrium of the open access fishery 
MEY= Maximum Economic Yield 
MSY= Maximum Sustainable Yield 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
Changes in cost per unit effort ( )w :  Table 4.7 shows that equilibrium biomass at BE, 
static and dynamic MEY are all sensitive to the changes in cost per unit effort ( )w , 
which is positively related. The positive relation of sensitivity of biomass to the changes 
in cost per unit effort ( )w
 
shows that biomass rebuilds with the increase in cost per unit 
effort ( )w  and biomass falls with the decrease in cost per unit effort ( )w . The sensitivity 
results to the changes in cost per unit effort ( )w  for both shrimp and fish fisheries are 
reported in Table 4.9.  The sensitivity results in Table 4.9 show that both shrimp and 
fish biomasses are sensitive to the change in cost per unit effort ( )w . Results show that 
with fixed price of harvest ( )p and changes in cost per unit effort ( )w , fish biomass at 
the bio-economic equilibrium (BE) are lower than both static and dynamic MEY and 
MSY levels. On the other hand, with fixed price of harvest ( )p and changes in cost per 
unit effort ( )w , shrimp biomass at the bio-economic equilibrium (BE) is lower than both 
static and dynamic MEY. But, higher with increase in cost per unit effort ( )w  and lower 
with decrease in cost per unit effort ( )w  compare to MSY levels.  Sensitivity results in 
Table 4.9 also show that with both increase and decrease in cost per unit effort ( )w , both 
shrimp and fish biomasses at the static and dynamic MEY exceed the MSY level.  
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Table 4.9  Sensitivity of shrimp and fish biomasses: changes in w  and fixed p   
 
  SDR 
(%) 
Shrimp stock biomass 
(tonnes) 
Fish stock biomass 
(tonnes) 
0ww =  01 www >=( )w↑
 
02 www <=( )w↓
 
0ww =  01 www >=( )w↑
 
02 www <=( )w↓
 
BE   1570 2218 928 16690 19247 14149 
MEY  
(static) 
  6049 8544 3576 40618 46841 34433 
MEY 
(dynamic) 
6.92 5396 7622 3190 37218 42919 31550 
12.41 5000 7061 2956 35138 40521 29787 
MSY   2034 2034 2034 25156 25156 25156 
Note: SDR= Social Discount Rate. For dynamic MEY, SDR: 6.92% is the average deposit rate per year and SDR: 
12.41% is the average lending rate per year in Bangladesh.   
BE= Bio-economic Equilibrium of the open access fishery 
MEY= Maximum Economic Yield 
MSY= Maximum Sustainable Yield 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Changes in social discount rate ( )ρ : Table 4.7 shows that only the equilibrium biomass 
at dynamic MEY is sensitive to the changes in social discount rate ( )ρ , which is 
inversely related and shows that the higher the discount rate the lower the biomass, that 
is, the high discount rates have the effect of causing biological overexploitation (Clark 
1973).  To see the sensitivity of change in biomass at the dynamic MEY compare to the 
MSY level, nine different cases are examined, where nine combinations of fixed and 
variable price of harvest ( )p  and cost per unit effort ( )w  are used with changes in social 
discount rate ( )ρ . The sensitivity results to the changes in social discount rate ( )ρ  with 
fixed and variable price of harvest ( )p  and cost per unit effort ( )w  for both shrimp and 
fish fisheries are reported in Table 4.10. The sensitivity results show that the higher the 
discount rate the lower the biomass for both shrimp and fish fisheries. Sensitivity results 
also show that in all cases, shrimp biomass at the dynamic MEY exceeds the MSY 
level. But, fish biomass at the dynamic MEY exceeds the MSY level except two 
situations. Fish biomass at the MSY is higher than dynamic MEY at higher discount 
rates with the combination of (i) higher price of harvest ( )p  and fixed cost per unit 
effort ( )w ; and (ii) higher price of harvest ( )p  and lower cost per unit effort ( )w .  
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Table 4.10 Sensitivity of shrimp and fish biomasses: changes in  ρ   
 
MEY (dynamic) MSY 
SDR 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.0692 0.1 0.1241 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 
A. Shrimp biomass (tonnes) 
Case-1 6049 5942 5741 5558 5396 5163 5000 4840 4570 4341 4145 2034 
Case-2 5158 5066 4895 4739 4602 4403 4263 4127 3897 3702 3534 2034 
Case-3 7299 7169 6926 6706 6511 6230 6032 5840 5514 5238 5001 2034 
Case-4 8544 8391 8108 7849 7622 7292 7061 6836 6454 6131 5854 2034 
Case-5 3576 3513 3394 3286 3190 3053 2956 2861 2702 2567 2450 2034 
Case-6 7285 7155 6914 6693 6499 6218 6021 5829 5504 5228 4992 2034 
Case-7 3050 2995 2894 2802 2720 2603 2521 2440 2304 2188 2089 2034 
Case-8 10308 10125 9782 9470 9196 8798 8520 8247 7787 7397 7063 2034 
Case-9 4315 4238 4095 3964 3849 3683 3566 3452 3260 3097 2956 2034 
B. Fish biomass (tonnes) 
Case-1 40618 40059 39015 38060 37218 35997 35138 34296 32871 31660 30617 25156 
Case-2 31279 30848 30045 29309 28661 27720 27059 26411 25313 24380 23577 25156 
Case-3 58128 57328 55834 54468 53262 51514 50285 49081 47042 45308 43815 25156 
Case-4 46841 46196 44992 43891 42919 41511 40521 39550 37907 36510 35307 25156 
Case-5 34433 33958 33073 32264 31550 30515 29787 29073 27865 26838 25954 25156 
Case-6 36071 35574 34647 33800 33051 31967 31204 30457 29191 28115 27189 25156 
Case-7 26516 26151 25469 24846 24296 23499 22938 22389 21459 20668 19987 25156 
Case-8 67033 66110 64387 62812 61421 59406 57989 56600 54248 52249 50528 25156 
Case-9 49276 48598 47331 46173 45151 43669 42628 41607 39878 38408 37143 25156 
Note:  
Case-1: both p and w are fixed 
Case-2: increases in p and fixed w  
Case-3: decreases in p and fixed w  
Case-4: fixed p and increases in w  
Case-5: fixed p and decreases in w  
Case-6: increases in both p and w  
Case-7: increases in p and decreases in w  
Case-8: decreases in p and increases in w  
Case-9: decreases in both p and w  
Note: SDR= Social Discount Rate; MEY= Maximum Economic Yield and MSY= Maximum Sustainable Yield 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This study measures the economic performance of the industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh. The industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh are open access fisheries and 
the industrial fishing fleets of Bangladesh have been expanding over time. This study 
covers commercially important two fisheries: shrimp and fish, harvested by two 
different fishing fleets. This study develops two single-species and single-fleet models 
separately for both shrimp and fish fisheries. Current and potential economic 
157 
 
performances of both shrimp and fish fisheries in this study are measured using three 
different bio-economic models: a bio-economic model for open access fishery, a static 
profit maximization problem and a dynamic present value-maximization problem in 
continuous time. A harvest function given by Scheafer (1954) and Munro (1981, 1982) 
is used in this study. For both shrimp and fish fisheries of the industrial marine fisheries 
of Bangladesh, this is the first study that uses Gompertz curve (Richards 1959) in the 
biological growth models and biological parameters are derived following CY&P 
models (Clarke et al 1992); price of harvest and cost per unit effort are estimated 
separately. The equilibrium biomass, effort and profit at bio-economic equilibrium of 
open access fishery, at static MEY and dynamic MEY are compared with the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY).  Sensitivity to changes in price of harvest; changes in cost per 
unit effort and changes in social discount rate on biomass are also examined. 
 
The estimated results show that effort at bio-economic equilibrium (BE) of both open 
access shrimp and fish fisheries are higher than effort at static MEY, dynamic MEY and 
MSY levels; both biomass and profit at the BE are lower than static MEY, dynamic 
MEY and MSY levels. Results also show that biomass at both static and dynamic MEY 
exceeds the biomass at the MSY level. The sensitivity results show that both shrimp and 
fish biomasses are sensitive to the changes in price of harvest, changes in cost per unit 
effort and changes in social discount rates. Both shrimp and fish biomasses both at static 
and dynamic MEY exceed MSY levels in response to both the changes in price of 
harvest and changes in cost per unit effort.  Similarly, sensitivity results show that both 
shrimp and fish biomasses at MSY exceed open access BE levels in response to both the 
changes in price of harvest and changes in cost per unit effort except one situation for 
shrimp fishery. Biomass at the open access BE of the shrimp fishery can exceed MSY 
level when cost per unit effort increases with fixed price of harvest.  On the other hand, 
with different social discount rates, both shrimp and fish biomasses at dynamic MEY 
level exceed MSY levels depending on both the changes in price of harvest and changes 
in cost per unit effort except two situations for fish fishery. Results show that with high 
social discount rates, fish biomass at dynamic MEY is lower than MSY when either 
increases in both price of harvest and cost per unit effort or price of harvest increases 
with fixed cost per unit effort. In general, results confirm that the higher the discount 
rate the lower the biomass for both shrimp and fish fisheries. That is, with higher 
discount rates biological overexploitation occurs. 
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Results indicate that in Bangladesh industrial fisheries, excessive use of effort makes 
both shrimp and fish fisheries economically inefficient in the form of low stock biomass 
and profit. The study suggests that both economically viable (with high profit) and 
ecologically sustainable (with high stock biomass) shrimp and fish fisheries in industrial 
marine fisheries of Bangladesh could be achieved by setting management target at the 
MEY level and hence excessive use of efforts in both shrimp and fish fisheries needs to 
be reduced. The effort use in this study is the multiplication of the number of vessels 
and the number of fishing days per year. So, to reduce the excessive use of effort a 
reduction in number of vessels in both fleets are needed by keeping the fishing days per 
year per vessels constant that is, 175 days per year per vessel for shrimp fleet and 169 
days per year per vessel for fish fleet. As MEY captures both biological and economic 
factors, it would help to rebuild stock biomass and to maximize the profit of the shrimp 
and fish fisheries of Bangladesh.  
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Appendix E 
 
Derivation of the solution of bio-economic equilibrium of open access fishery  
 
In the absence of harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
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Harvest function:  
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With harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
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Solving Equation E4, gives the equilibrium biomass (eq) as a function of fishing effort 
is obtained: 
 
r
qE
eq KeB
−
=
          (E5) 
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Substituting r
qE
eq KeB
−
=
 into Equation E2 equilibrium harvest as a function of effort 
can be obtained: 
  
r
qE
eq qEKeh
−
=
         (E6) 
 
Equation E6 represents the long-term production function of the fishery. 
 
The economic rent/profit of the fishery can be defined as: 
 
( )EwpqB
wEph
TCTR
−=⇒
−=⇒
−=
pi
pi
pi
         (E7) 
 
In an open access fishery, equilibrium occurs when total revenue of harvest equals total 
cost of harvest and thus 0=pi , where there is no stimulus for entry and exit to the 
fishery:   
 
wEpqBE
TCTR
=⇒
=⇒
= 0pi
         (E8) 
 
Solving Equation E8, the biomass at the bio-economic equilibrium (BE) for an open 
access fishery is obtained: 
 
pq
wBBE =           (E9) 
 
From Equation E4,  
 






=
B
K
q
rE ln           (E10) 
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Substituting 
pq
wBBE =  into 





=
B
K
q
rE ln , the effort at the bio-economic equilibrium 
(BE) for an open access fishery is obtained: 
 






=
w
pqK
q
rEBE ln          (E11) 
 
Substituting 
pq
wBBE =  and 





=
w
pqK
q
rEBE ln  into Equation E2, the harvest at the bio-
economic equilibrium (BE) for an open access fishery is obtained: 
 






=
w
pqK
pq
wrhBE ln          (E12) 
 
So, the biomass, effort and harvest at the bio-economic equilibrium (BE) for an open 
access fishery are: 
 
Biomass: 
pq
wBBE =  
 
Effort: 






=
w
pqK
q
rEBE ln  
 
Harvest: 






=
w
pqK
pq
wrhBE ln  
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Appendix F 
 
Derivation of the solution of static MEY 
 
In the absence of harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
 






=
B
K
rB
dt
dB ln          (F1) 
 
Harvest function:  
 
qEBh =            (F2) 
 
With harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
 
h
B
K
rB
dt
dB
−





= ln          (F3) 
 
At steady-state, 0=
dt
dB
 
 
h
B
K
rB =





⇒ ln                     (F4) 
 
Total revenue: 
 
phTR =             (F5) 
 
Total cost: 
 
wETC =
             (F6) 
 
The economic rent/profit of the fishery is: 
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TCTR −=pi
                      (F7) 
 
From Equation F4, the equilibrium effort and biomass are obtained: 
 






=
B
K
q
rEeq ln            (F8) 
 
r
qE
eq KeB
−
=             (F9) 
 
Substituting 





=
B
K
q
rEeq ln  and r
qE
eq KeB
−
=  into Equation F2, the equilibrium harvest 
is obtained: 
 
r
qE
eq qEKeh
−
=          (F10) 
 
Substituting r
qE
eq qEKeh
−
= into Equation F5, the total revenue as a function of effort is 
obtained: 
 
r
qE
pqEKeTR
−
=          (F11) 
 
Substituting r
qE
pqEKeTR
−
= and wETC =  into Equation F7, the economic rent/profit is 
obtained: 
 
( ) wEpqEKeE rqE −= −pi         (F12) 
 
The maximization problem is: 
 
Max ( ) wEpqEKeE rqE −= −pi                   (F13) 
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MEY is the equilibrium level, where the economic rent/profit is maximized. The 
equilibrium occurs when marginal revenue equals marginal cost and the first-order 
necessary condition for maximum profit is, 0=
dE
dpi
.    
 
Solving MCMR = , 
 
w
r
qEpqKe r
qE
=



−⇒
−
1          (F14) 
 
w
r
qEpqB =



−⇒ 1
         (F15) 
 




−
=⇒
r
qEpq
wB
1
 
 






−
=⇒
qEr
r
pq
wB
 
 






−
=⇒
rqE
r
pq
wB MEYstatic _  
 
Solving Equation F15,  
 
pqB
w
r
qE
=−⇒1
   
       
pqB
w
r
qE
−=⇒ 1
         
 






−=⇒
pqB
w
q
rE MEYstatic 1_                                                                            
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Substituting 





−=
pqB
w
q
rE MEYstatic 1_  and 





−
=
rqE
r
pq
wB MEYstatic _  into Equation F2 
( )qEBh = , the equilibrium harvest at static MEY is obtained: 
 
 ( )rqEp
wrEh MEYstatic
−
=⇒
_
     
 
So, the equilibrium biomass, effort and harvest at the static MEY are: 
 
 
 
                                                           
  
Biomass: 






−
=
rqE
r
pq
wB MEYstatic _  
  
Effort: 






−=
pqB
w
q
rE MEYstatic 1_  
 
Harvest:  
( )rqEp
wrEh MEYstatic
−
=
_
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Appendix G 
 
Derivation of the solution of dynamic MEY 
 
In the absence of harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
 






=
B
K
rB
dt
dB ln          (G1) 
 
Harvest function:  
 
qEBh =           (G2) 
 
With harvest, biological growth of biomass:  
 
h
B
K
rB
dt
dB
−





= ln          (G3) 
 
Total revenue: 
 
pqBEphTR ==           (G4) 
 
Total cost: 
 
wETC =            (G5) 
 
Total profit: 
 
TCTR −=pi
    
( )EwpqB −=⇒ pi                              (G6) 
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Dynamic problem with continuous time: 
 
 
Max ( ) dtEwpqBe t .
0
−∫
∞
−ρ
  subject to:  
 
( )
( )








≤≤
=
−





=
max
0
0
0
ln
EtE
BB
qEB
B
K
rB
dt
dB
                     (G7)                
 
Current-value Hamiltonian: 
 
( ) ( ) 





−





+−= qEB
B
K
rBEwpqBBEH ln, µ
       (G8) 
 
The optimal biomass, effort and harvest are obtained using the following maximum 
principles: 
 
 
(i) 0=
∂
∂
E
H c
 
(ii) BH
c

=
∂
∂
µ  
(iii)  
B
H c
∂
∂
−=− ρµµ
 
 
 
                                                   (G9) 
 
Solving the maximum principle 0=∂
∂
E
H c
,  
 
0=−−⇒ qBwpqB µ  
 
qB
wp
qB
wpqB
−=
−
=⇒ µ
                                                                                     (G10)  
  
Solving the maximum principle BH
c

=
∂
∂
µ ,  
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qEB
B
K
rB
dt
dBB −





==⇒ ln                                                                                     (G11) 
 
At steady-state, 0=B  
 
qEB
B
K
rB =





⇒ ln   
 






=⇒
B
K
rqE ln                                                                                                         (G12) 
 
Solving maximum principle
B
H c
∂
∂
−=− ρµµ , 
 






−−





−−=−⇒ qEr
B
K
rpqE lnµρµµ
       (G13) 
 
Using Equation G12,  
 
[ ]qErqEpqE −−−−=−⇒ µρµµ        
 
rpqE µρµµ +−=−⇒                    
 
pqEr −=−−⇒ µρµµ  
 
( ) pqEr −=+−⇒ ρµµ  
 
At steady-state, 0=µ  
 
E
r
pq






+
=⇒
ρ
µ
                                        (G14) 
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Using Equation G10 and G14, 
 
 
qB
wpE
r
pq
−=





+
⇒
ρ         (G15) 
 






−




 +
=⇒
qB
wp
pq
rE MEYdynamic
ρ
_
       (G16) 
 
Rearranging Equation G15,  
 
E
r
pqp
qB
w






+
−=⇒
ρ  
 
 
 
 
( )
( )[ ]pqErpq
rwB
−+
+
=⇒ ρ
ρ
 
 
( )
( )[ ]qErpq
rwB MEYdynamic
−+
+
=⇒ ρ
ρ
_
       (G17) 
 
Substituting ( )( )[ ]qErpq
rwB MEYdynamic
−+
+
= ρ
ρ
_
 and 





−




 +
=
qB
wp
pq
rE MEYdynamic
ρ
_
 into 
Equation G2 ( )qEBh = , the equilibrium harvest at dynamic MEY is obtained: 
 
( )
( )[ ]qErp
Erwh MEYdynamic
−+
+
= ρ
ρ
_
                                                                                 (G18) 
 
So, the equilibrium biomass, effort and harvest at the dynamic MEY are: 
 


















+
−
=⇒
E
r
pqp
q
wB
ρ
1
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Biomass: ( )
( )[ ]qErpq
rwB MEYdynamic
−+
+
= ρ
ρ
_
 
 
  
Effort: 






−




 +
=
qB
wp
pq
rE MEYdynamic
ρ
_
 
 
  
Harvest:  ( )
( )[ ]qErp
Erwh MEYdynamic
−+
+
= ρ
ρ
_
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Chapter 5 
 
Command and control in marine fisheries  
management: evidence from Bangladesh 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The potential of the marine fisheries sector in Bangladesh is considerable in view of the 
country’s 714 km coastline and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 166,000 square 
kms. The marine water extends beyond the continental shelf, measuring 200 nautical 
miles from the base line (10 fathoms) including rivers and estuaries (DoF 2011).  
Bangladesh industrial marine fisheries are a part of Eastern Indian Ocean. The Bay of 
Bengal in the Indian Ocean is recognized as one of the most poorly studied area in the 
world and the most commercial fish stocks of the Bay of Bengal are considered as 
overexploited and are, under threat. A recent study on Indian Ocean shows that 41 
stocks or species groups out of 47 were determined moderate-full exploited to full-
overexploited and at there is a little room for further expansion. The study suggested 
that a better control over growth in fishing fleet capacity and a sustainable fisheries 
management are needed (FAO 2006). The FAO (2006) study recognized that excess 
capacity of fishing fleet are the main cause of overfishing, degradation of marine 
fisheries resources, decline in food production and significant economic waste in the 
Indian Ocean.  
 
In Bangladesh fish plays a major role in different ways, such as, animal protein demand, 
foreign exchange earnings and socioeconomic development of the rural poor by 
alleviating poverty through employment generation. It is estimated that demand for fish 
will grow by 4.1 percent from 2010 to 2020 (GoB 2010). Marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh constitute about 19 percent of total fish production (with a growth of 5.4 
percent per annum).  Industrial marine fishery contributed 7.10 percent of the total catch 
and the share of total catch of the industrial marine fisheries has been static more than 
two decades (FAO 2007). In recent years, fish exports have played a significant role in 
the export sector performance of Bangladesh.  Bangladesh earns 4.76 per cent of its 
foreign exchange from fisheries and aquaculture exports (FAO 2006). Although the 
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share of export earnings from the fisheries sector has declined from 7.57 per cent in 
1993 to 4.9 per cent in 2007, the quantity of fish exported has more than doubled 
between 1993 (26,607 tonnes) and 2007 (73,704 tonnes) (DoF 2007). The total value of 
fisheries exports has increased from US$ 178.91 million in 1992 to US$ 515.3 million 
in 2007 (BB 2007). Production from the marine shrimp accounts for around 6.25 per 
cent of the total exportable production of Bangladesh (DoF 2006). 
 
Fisheries resources from artisanal63 fisheries are used for domestic consumption and 
from industrial64 fisheries are used for export earnings. To promote exports and 
encourage investment in export oriented activities, the Government of Bangladesh took 
a number of initiatives for trade liberalization and trade promotion in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Industrial marine fisheries enjoy fiscal concessions and credit facilities 
including direct incentive such as, a value added tax refund from fuel subsequent to 
export and indirect incentives such as duty free imports of capital machinery and raw 
materials, fiscal incentives for export, income tax rebates, duty drawback facilities, 
speedy customs clearance and subsidized credit as a part of the trade liberalization and 
export orientation policy of Bangladesh.  
 
Marine fisheries in Bangladesh are a common property resource, which are subject to 
possible overexploitation in the absence of efficient and effective management. 
Bangladesh has centralized fisheries management system under Department of Fisheries 
of the Ministry of Fisheries and Animal Resources with implementation of management 
through district and sub-district (upazilla) offices.  Management tools those are used in 
industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh are issuance of fishing licence; gear 
restrictions (mesh size, gear type); temporal restrictions (closed season, days of fishing); 
and spatial restrictions (marine protected area/ sanctuary).  The industrial fishery of 
Bangladesh is managed by the Marine Fisheries Ordinance 1983 (GoB 1983a) and the 
Marine Fisheries Rules 1983 (GoB 1983b). The Marine Fisheries Ordinance 1983 (GoB 
1983a) regulates the management, conservation and development of marine fisheries. 
The Marine Fisheries Rules 1983 (GoB 1983b) regulate the issuance and conditions of 
fishing licenses, license conditions, types of fishing gear, mesh size, fishing area and 
                                                 
63
 The artisanal marine fishery is a small scale onshore fishery and fishing occurs up to 40 meters depth 
with mechanized and non mechanized boats. 
64
 The industrial marine fishery is a large scale offshore fishery and fishing occurs beyond 40 meters 
depth within the EEZ of Bangladesh with industrial vessels. 
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fishing days. Fisheries management in the industrial fishery in Bangladesh were 
introduced in 1983 and modified several times between 1983 and 2004 to protect both 
shrimp and fish stocks and to reduce sea water pollution (details in Table 5.1, Appendix 
H ) . 
 
A number of surveys have been conducted to assess the pelagic and demersal stock and 
the survey area was at 10 to 100 meters depth65 within the EEZ of Bangladesh (MFD 
2009). But, controversy remains about the extent of fish resources within the EEZ. 
There exists also controversy whether the marine fisheries are under or overexploited. 
Signals of overfishing and stock exhaustion were perceptible and being reported from 
artisanal capture fisheries (FAO 2006) rather the industrial trawl fisheries. No surveys 
have been done separately yet for artisanal and industrial fisheries. Some measures 
(such as, Alam & Thomson 2001 and World Bank 1991) have been taken based on a 
few reports and without research based evidence on industrial marine fishery in 
Bangladesh. Hence, this research estimates the impact of input control on vessels 
performance (Chapter 2) in term of technical efficiency and productivity; stock 
assessment (Chapter 3); and the economic efficiency (Chapter 4) of the Bangladesh’s 
industrial marine fishery to find out whether the fishery is overcapitalized, whether 
stocks are biologically overexploited and whether the fishery is economically profitable.  
 
Based on research output of three studies (Chapter 2, 3 and 4), this research gives an 
idea of the performance of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh. The study in 
Chapter 2 shows that vessels are producing below the maximum level of output and are 
too small in their scale of operation. It also shows input control induces vessels 
operators to intensify usage of unregulated inputs. The study shows that the input 
control that is employed in industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh fails to increase 
vessels efficiency and productivity.   
 
The study in Chapter 3 shows that the shrimp stock of the industrial marine fisheries is 
over-exploited and the fall in catch per unit effort (CPUE) over time of the industrial 
marine shrimp fishery is due to the fall in stock size. On the other hand, the fish stock of 
the industrial marine fisheries is under-exploited and the fall in CPUE over time of the 
industrial marine fish fishery is due to inadequate knowledge and information on the 
availability of the sizes of different fish stocks and lack of technological developments 
                                                 
65
 Includes both artisanal and industrial fisheries. 
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for harvesting the new resources. The study also shows that to maintain steady-state 
equilibrium and adequate growth rate of both shrimp and fish, fishing patterns need to 
be modified.  
 
The study in Chapter 4 shows that excessive use of efforts makes both shrimp and fish 
fisheries economically inefficient in the form of low stock biomass and profit.  The 
study also shows that reductions in the number of vessels in both shrimp and fish fleets 
are needed. The study indicates that the MEY is the best management target compare to 
the MSY to improve the economic efficiency of both industrial marine shrimp and fish 
fisheries of Bangladesh. Based on the findings of these three studies, this research 
confirms that in the absence of correct management targets and property rights, the open 
access Bangladesh industrial marine fisheries becomes inefficient and overcapitalized. 
The fishery also suffers overcapacity and is economically unprofitable. 
 
The objective of this Chapter is to discuss the impact of traditional ‘command and 
control’ approach to reduce overcapacity and overexploitation in marine fisheries 
management with an evidence of industrial marine fishery of Bangladesh. The 
remainder of this Chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.2 describes the causes 
of overfishing and overcapacity in fisheries management. Section 5.3 presents the 
traditional ‘command and control’ approaches to fisheries management with an 
evidence of Bangladesh. Section 5.4 concludes the Chapter. 
 
5.2 Causes of overfishing and overcapacity in fisheries 
management 
 
 The mismanagement of natural resources increases widespread concerns in recent years 
over loss of biodiversity (e.g., Fisher 1988); overconsumption of the natural capital 
stock (e.g., Dasgupta 1990) and overexploitation of renewable resources (e.g., Sandal & 
Steinshamn 1996). The management of natural resource involves many factors such as, 
lack of well-defined property rights (Scott 1985), market failures (e.g., Panayotoy 
1993), subsidies for exploiting the natural capital stock (e.g., Feder 1977) and 
inadequate consideration of future generations (e.g., Howarth & Norgaard 1995). FAO 
(2002) indicates that one of the important causes of the failure of the fisheries 
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management is absence of clear and precise objectives66 and hence the problems of 
overcapacity and overfishing have become key issues for fisheries management (FAO 
2004).   
 
Fisheries are common-pool resources67 and the ‘tragedy of commons’ or lack of 
property rights (Hardin 1968) have been viewed as the underlying cause of overfishing; 
even lead to extinction of fish species. The property rights to resource are often unclear 
and access to resources is unrestricted (e.g., Grimble & Wellard 1997) and the property 
rights to the common resources arise when the benefits of defending claims to a 
resource exceed the cost of doing so (Hannesson 2010). The common property or 
‘common pool’ (Ostrom 1990) of the nature of the resource promotes overcapacity 
(e.g., Parsons 2010), which is widely recognized as a major problem affecting world 
fisheries and can lead to the erosion of management control (Beddington et al 2007); 
causes severe stock depletion (e.g., Bjorndal & Conard 1987) and overexploitation (e.g., 
Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968; Clark 1990) and has resulted in the collapse of important 
fish stocks such as, Canada’s northern Atlantic cod (Gadhus morhua) fishery (e.g., 
Hutchings & Myers 1994). Stock collapses (such as, northern cod fishery in 
Newfoundland and Labrador) are the most extreme example of management mistakes 
(Grafton et al 2006) or mismanagement (Moxens 1998) or management failure 
(Townsend 2010); and caused from incorrect economic incentives (e.g., Buchanan & 
Tullock 1962) or incentives for rent seeking (Kreuger 1974; Tullock 1967; Townsend 
2010) or lack of appropriate incentives and institutions (that encourage fishers to behave 
in a sustainable way) limit the improvements in achieving economic efficiency.  In the 
absence of incentives to fishers, the lack of property right leads to a build up of capital 
and excess capacity.  
 
                                                 
66
 Fisheries management depends on four goals: biological, economic, ecological and social. Biological 
goals maintain the target species at or above the levels to ensure their continued productivity. Economic 
goals maximize the net profit of the fishers involve in the fishery. Ecological goals minimize the impacts 
of fishing on the physical environment and on the non-target (by-catch), associated and dependent 
species. Social goals include political and cultural goals. Social goals maximize employment 
opportunities for those dependent on the fishery for their livelihoods (FAO 2004).   
67
 Common pool resources have two distinct features- the catches are rivalrous, where fishing by one 
person reduces the catch available to others; and common pool resources are costly to effectively control 
the access and the harvest from them (Grafton et al 2004). 
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In open access68 fisheries resources use, the existence of market failure (Hartwick & 
Olewiler 1998) and the ‘race-to-fish’ increases the number of fishers and vessels; and 
can lead to stocks depletion, fall in catch per unit effort (CPUE), decline in incomes and 
overcapitalization (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955). In common-pool resources, it is difficult 
to monitor the fishers and to enforce the regulation. To achieve sustainable use of 
renewable resource management actions are necessary (Heino 1997) and open 
access/common-pool cannot achieve an efficient allocation of resource without some 
form of government intervention, the creation of private property rights or both 
(Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). For an example, the common property problem in many 
fisheries requires right to harvest a specified amount of fish (e.g., Walden et al 2010). 
Most common form of property rights or right-based management is individual 
transferrable quotas (e.g., Hannesson 2004) which can motivate fishers as owners, to 
make production decisions that are not dominated by the imperative race-to-fish 
(Libecap 2010).   
 
However, many open accesses or common-pool resources are in danger of being 
exhausted even with various types of government regulation such as, traditional 
‘command and control’ approaches to fisheries management. Many regulations have not 
been successful due to putting ‘fishers before fish’, which has contributed to the 
problems of overfishing (Larkin 1978). Munro & Scott (1985) argue that unlike other 
renewable resources, the common property fishery resources are difficult to manage 
effectively. Because, fisheries management needs to put emphasis on many issues (eg., 
Hilborn & Walters 1992; Stephenson & Lane 1995), such as stock assessment, 
information on fishing capacity, behavior of fishing industries, constraints of harvesting, 
institutional capability, alternative uses, environmental impacts and so forth. On the 
other hand, the success of a management system is often defined in terms of biological, 
economic, social and political objectives. It is argued that while a stock is in such a 
depleted state that the long-term sustainability of the fishery is threatened- economic 
and social objectives will not be met. At the same time, without consideration being 
given to economic and social objectives- biological objectives are unlikely to be met 
(Beddington et al 2007).  Argument shows that the fisheries management regime goal 
must be to reduce overinvestment in fishing and improve both conservation and 
                                                 
68
 Open access natural resources include many fisheries and environmental resources, such as, air and 
water.  Fisheries and environmental resources have remained as open access for long period of times 
(Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). 
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economic/ social outcome (Ridgeway & Schmidt 2010) and a governance framework 
aligns with incentives can coherently deliver responsible outcomes of sustainable use of 
marine resources (Ridgeway & Rice 2010). Kompas et al (2009) argue that in the 
absence of correct management targets inefficient fisheries suffer overcapacity and low 
profits; and hence fisheries become both biologically over-exploited and economically 
unprofitable.  
 
In an open-access fishery, subsidies69 can exacerbate the common-property, or, 
‘common-pool’ problems (FAO 2000; Munro & Sumaila 2002; OECD 2000) that is, 
subsidizing fisheries is the cause of overcapacity and overexploitation of fish stocks 
(e.g., Beddington et al 2007; Cox & Sumaila 2010; Munro & Sumaila 2002; Willmann 
& Kelleher 2010). Subsidies combined with rapid technological advancement encourage 
a ‘race-to-fish’, with consequent adverse impacts on fish stocks and often deplete stocks 
below the minimum biological reference point (Grafton et al 2010). Subsidies in 
fisheries reduce the cost of harvest (eg. through vessel construction subsidies or fuel tax 
exemptions) which encourages further vessels to enter into the fishery (direct affect on 
the fishing capacity) and hence considered as the cause of dissipation of economic rent 
(e.g., Cox & Sumaila 2010; Hannesson 2001; OECD 2006; Willmann & Kelleher 
2010). It is argued that depending on the fisheries management regime (whether open 
access or controlled by property rights) and the state of the fish stock (whether above or 
below maximum sustainable yield) (Hannesson 2001; OECD 2006; Porter 2002; Cox & 
Sumaila 2010), subsidies have different impacts on the economic and resource effects 
and the impacts depend critically on the effectiveness with which management 
regulations are enforced. The issue of subsidies is closely related to the fiscal policies70 
for fisheries and also related to the weak property rights in most fisheries which directly 
undermine the sustainability of fisheries because they lead to a bio-economic 
equilibrium with high levels of fishing and low stock size (Beddington et al 2007).  
 
                                                 
69
 “….Common fisheries sector subsidies include grants, concessional credit and insurance, tax 
exemptions, fuel price support (or fuel tax exemption), direct payments to industry (eg, vessel buyback 
schemes), fish price support, and public financing of fisheries access agreements…..Policy changes such 
as relaxation of environmental regulations governing fisheries, or special work permits for migrant fish-
workers (crew) can also reduce costs in the sector, and such distortions have also been regarded as a form 
of subsidy” (Willmann & Kelleher 2010). 
70
 “…Fisheries subsidy have been provided  for a wide range of purpose, including stimulating industry 
development, supporting regional communities, providing fisheries infrastructure and support services, 
retiring fishing capacity and supporting early retirement for fishers” (Cox & Sumaila 2010). 
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5.3 ‘Command and control’ approaches in fisheries 
management 
 
To address overcapacity and overexploitation of common pool marine capture fisheries 
resource, traditional ‘command and control’ approaches and ‘right-based’ approaches 
are mainly used as fisheries management tools. The traditional ‘command and control’ 
and ‘right-based’ approaches are often known as ‘incentive blocking measures’ and 
‘incentive adjusting measures’, respectively (FAO 2004). This Section focuses on the 
‘command and control’ approaches that often results in unforeseen and undesirable 
consequences (Holling & Mefe 1995).  
 
Traditional ‘command and control’ approaches involve mainly output or harvest 
control, limited entry and input control. Output or harvest controls are used to maintain 
or rebuild fish stocks by establishing a total allowable catch (TAC) (FAO 2004) that 
helps to decide how the annual catches from a fish stock should be adjusted in response 
to stock size to achieve sustainability and other objectives set by the management 
(Hilborn & Walters 1992), but, TACs have not proved effective or precautionary in 
preventing stock depletion (Caddy 1999). Many TAC regulated fisheries have 
experienced an unexpected increase in fishing capacity, as additional vessels enter the 
fishery in response to (temporarily) positive rents. TACs would maintain a stock level 
well above that of bio-economic equilibrium, if the TAC is correctly specified and 
enforced. TACs also encourage ‘race-to-fish’, overcapitalisation in terms of both 
investments on board and fishing capacity, for example, Italian fisheries (Spagnolo 
2010); illegal-unregulated-unreported (IUU) fishing, for example, Eastern Baltic cod 
fishery (Beddington et al 2007). On the other hand, harvest control strategies have to 
cope with fluctuations in the stock size, with inherent inaccuracy of the estimates of 
stock size (Ludwig et al 1993; Walters & Maguire 1996) and must take into account 
economical, political, and social consequences (Hilborn & Walters 1992).  
 
The limited-entry (such as, issuing fishing license) is used in many fisheries like, 
Bangladesh industrial marine fisheries, to address the open-access problem by 
restricting entry of fishing vessels to the fishery. It is argued that limited entry licensing 
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is not a sufficient measure to address overcapacity and overinvestment71 (Parsons 
1993), because it gives a privilege of fishing, but, doesn’t confer property rights to the 
fisher (Parsons 2010). In many fisheries, for example, the Pacific salmon limited-entry 
licensing program has been considered as unsuccessful (e.g., Fraser 1979; Pearse 1982) 
though the experience in the Atlantic lobster fishery shows a positive outcome (Parsons 
2010). On the other hand, limited license buybacks schemes are considered a key policy 
tool to address overcapacity, overexploitation of fish stocks and distributional issues in 
fisheries (Holland et al 1999) and have been tried in various fisheries such as, Japan, the 
United States, Canada, Norway, Australia, European Union, and Taiwan (FAO 2004). 
However, buyback generate changes in vessel-level behaviour, both intended and 
unintended and  do not resolve ‘race-to-fish’ incentives created by incomplete use or 
property rights, inadequate governance, and uncertainty (Squires et al 2010) and have 
not been successful in reducing overcapacity (Holland et al 1999).  
 
Input controls, includes restriction on mesh size, gear type and vessel length; temporal 
restrictions (such as: closed season, days of fishing) and spatial restrictions (such as: 
closed area), are used to control overcapacity and overexploitation of the marine 
fisheries resources. Many countries introduce input controls (Caddy 1999), but, fails to 
provide the incentives to vessel owners. Input control measures often increases 
substitution from regulated to unregulated inputs (Wilen 1979) and result in ‘effort-
creep’ and ‘excessive and wasteful competition’ (Kompas 2005; Kompas et al 2009) in 
many fisheries, for example, Bangladesh industrial marine fisheries. The study on 
impact of input control on vessels’ performances (in term of technical efficiency and 
productivity) of the industrial marine fisheries of Bangladesh in Chapter 2 shows input 
control induces vessels operators to intensify usage of unregulated inputs. Input controls 
also have a negative impact on technical efficiency and thus cost and profitability in a 
fishery (e.g., Greenville et al 2006; Kompas et al 2004; Pascoe & Robinson 1998), 
except the situation when the unrestricted inputs are poor substitutes for the restricted 
inputs (Anderson 1985; Campbell & Linder 1990; Townsend 1990). The study in 
Chapter 2 also shows that the input control that is employed in industrial marine 
fisheries in Bangladesh fails to increase vessels efficiency and productivity. The study 
shows that vessels in Bangladesh are producing below the maximum level of output and 
are too small in their scale of operation.  However, in general, input control measures 
                                                 
71
 Increase in vessel’s horsepower, length, breadth, and tonnage; changes in gear; changes in fishing 
periods or areas; and the adoption of technological innovations in fishing gear (FAO 2004).  
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are not successful due to two reasons (Townsend 1990). First, controls on one or more 
inputs provide an incentive to substitute uncontrolled inputs and hence results in ‘effort- 
creep’. Second, input control regime provide a very little sense of ownership such as, 
the right of access to the fishery under certain guidelines which encouraged ‘race-to 
fish’ within those rules (Grafton et al 2006; Kompas 2005; Kompas & Gooday 2007; 
Townsend 1990).  
 
However, a ‘command-and-control’ approach is considered as most inappropriate 
approach to reduce overcapacity and overexploitation (e.g., Spagnolo 2010). For 
example, the findings in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 of this research confirm that the ‘command 
and control’ approaches to the industrial marine fisheries management of Bangladesh 
fails to increase efficiency and to control overcapitalization; the fishery suffers 
overcapacity and the fishery is economically unprofitable.  The findings also confirm 
that the industrial marine shrimp fishery is biologically overexploited. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
A ‘laissez-faire’ approach to fisheries doesn’t work to address ‘tragedy of commons’ 
and ‘failures associated with open access fishery’ (Grafton et al 2006). In the long run, 
‘command and control’ approach cannot prevent economic overfishing, and fail to 
maximize economic profit and hence economic efficiency in the fishery. So, an 
economic perspective of fisheries management is necessary, which shows marine 
resources should be managed sustainably so that they can contribute to and provide net 
benefit for the nation as a whole. Thus, an economically viable fishery can be an 
ecologically sustainable fishery.  
 
Given the problems of the open access market failures and the absence of well-defined 
property rights (Grimble & Wellard 1997; Hartwick & Olewiler 1998; Perman et al 
2011), fisheries to be economically efficient requires correct management targets.  
Correct and effective management targets are important to achieve maximum economic 
efficiency from a fishery. Maximizing economic efficiency in fisheries requires setting 
appropriate level of catch and effort levels and MEY gives the maximum economic 
efficiency of fishers and shows no overcapitalization of vessels or gears. Effective 
management of fishery requires an understanding of how the fishery system is 
performing relative to reference points (Beddington et al 2007).  MSY is not a safe 
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target for management (Larkin 1977; Sissenwine 1978; Caddy 1999), while MEY is 
considered as more ‘conservationist’ than MSY as the equilibrium stock at the MEY is 
larger than at the MSY and larger stocks helps protecting the fishery from unforeseen or 
negative environmental shocks (Kompas et al 2009).   
 
Efficiency and productivity measures are also important to hold the MEY levels. 
Efficiency analysis shows the factors those are affecting the economic performance of 
the fishery and the impacts of fisheries regulations. Productivity measures also indicate 
the ratio of output to inputs and provide a benchmark of vessels performance.  If an 
effective management structure wants to prevent biological and economic 
overexploitation, improvements of efficiency by vessels are desirable. Changes in 
efficiency of vessels are also strongly influenced by regulations. Imposing restrictions 
on what gear can be used by fishers affects the ability of vessels to harvest fish, and thus 
their efficiency. Efficiency in fisheries is not possible without relating it to governance 
and management (Grafton et al 2006).  To maximize vessels efficiency vessels must use 
right amount and combination of inputs to minimize the cost of harvest at the MEY 
level.  This require fishery control instruments to encourage autonomous adjustment 
and to allow vessel owners to freely combine inputs, such as, gear, engine size, crew in 
proportion to minimize costs.  On the other hand, to remove the incentive for a wasteful 
and inefficient ‘race- to- fish’ by the vessel owners, effective property rights are also 
important.  So, for an efficient and effective fisheries management, adopting the right 
target level of effort that maximizes profits regardless changes in prices of harvest and 
the cost of fishing; and using an instrument that protects the future of the fishery to 
achieving the target are considered as the solution (Kompas et al 2009).  
 
In the absence of correct management targets, inefficient fisheries suffer 
overcapacity/excess fishing capacity and low profits and hence fisheries become both 
biologically over-exploited and economically unprofitable.  Bangladesh industrial 
marine shrimp and fish fisheries are the examples of such inefficient fisheries. The 
findings of three studies in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 of this research confirms that in the 
absence of correct management targets and property rights, the open-access Bangladesh 
industrial marine fishery becomes inefficient and overcapitalized. The fishery also 
suffers overcapacity and the fishery is economically unprofitable.  This research also 
confirms that the industrial shrimp fishery is biologically overexploited.   
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Fisheries legislation in Bangladesh is too old and policies are more focused on increased 
production with little emphasis on conservation or sustainable fisheries management. A 
reform in legislation and management system of the industrial marine fisheries of 
Bangladesh is needed. To protect economic and biological overfishing a correct 
management target and ‘right-based’ that is an incentive adjusting approach is needed 
so that the fishery could be both economically profitable and biologically sustainable.  
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Appendix H 
 
Table 5.1 Change in industrial marine fisheries management over time 
 
Year Description 
1983 Marine fisheries management introduced 
Marine Fisheries Rules 1983 
Marine Fisheries Ordinance 1983 (Ordinance no. XXXV) 
Identification of marine fisheries: artisanal fisheries (within 40 metres depth) and 
industrial fisheries ( beyond 40 metres depth) 
1985 Formation of Zaman Committee to assess the provisions of the Marine Fisheries 
Ordinance 1983  
Recommendation for no new entry into the fisheries until stock assessment will be 
done 
Number of total vessels 73 ( Shrimp: 28; Fish: 45) 
Restriction on bycatch 
Mesh size restriction: 45mm for shrimp trawl net and 60mm for fish trawl net 
1987 FAO Survey 
findings: opportunity to introduce perse seiner, long liner and mid-water trawling  and  
estimated MSY: 47, 500 metric tonnes for pelagic and meso-pelagic species 
1990 Trawling is categorized as Industry 
 Board of Investment: authority of vessel registration  
1993 Modification on bycatch restriction 
1994 Government decision for restriction on new entry 
Sailing permission: 30 days per trip for freezer vessel and 15 days per trip non-freezer 
vessels 
One month ( 15 January- 15 February) season closure for the shrimp fishery  
1996 Formation of Task Force to classify the vessels 
Recommendation of the Task Force: no new entry into the shrimp fishery and new 
entry into the fish fishery 
Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock: authority of fishing license  
1997 Inter-Ministerial Meeting  
Decision of the meeting: ‘first come first serve’ basis open access trawling for both 
shrimp and fish fisheries 
Suggestion for stock assessment 
2nd Inter-Ministerial Meeting  
Suggestion for a formation of technical committee to assess the potential and problems 
of marine and coastal fisheries 
Formation of Karim Committee for examining the potential and problems of marine 
and coastal fisheries  
Recommendation for 40 vessels, for new entry into the fisheries for harvesting pelagic 
and meso-pelagic species 
1998 Formation of a Committee to assess the number of vessels 
68 vessels ( 49 shrimp vessels and 19 fish vessels) are engaged in fishing 
Suggestion for not to increase number of vessels until stock assessment will be done 
Marine fisheries management policy in National Fisheries Policy 
Continued….. 
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Year Description 
2000 Government decision for restriction on new entry  
Entry of 10 new vessels by the order of High Court 
Identification of 4 fishing grounds 
Declaration of 698 square km marine reserve and  two marine sanctuaries  
2001 Entry of 5 new vessels by the order of High Court 
2002 Entry of 3 new vessels by the order of High Court 
Total vessels 102 ( 55 shrimp vessels and 47 fish vessels) 
2003 Shrimp vessels will be replaced by fish vessels after the end of shrimp vessels life 
Restriction on import and construction of new shrimp vessel 
Maximum 4 vessels per owner/company 
Minimum fishing days: 150 days per year per vessel 
Entry of new vessels by the order of High Court 
2004 Restriction ‘no discard’ 
Entry of new fish vessels 
2006 Marine fisheries management strategy in National Fisheries Strategy  
2009 Total vessels 146  
(116 license from Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock and 30 by the order of High 
Court) 
2010 Marine fisheries management in Perspective Plan 2010-21 
2011 Marine fisheries management in Sixth Five Year Plan 2011-15 
Total 243 (133 from Board of Investment and Ministry of Fisheries and Animal 
Resources, and 110 by High Court order) permitted vessels and among them 170 
vessels engaged in fishing  
Source: Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock 2009, ‘Unpublished official records’, Dhaka. 
Marine Fisheries Department 2009, ‘Unpublished official records’, Chittagong. 
Department of Fishery 2011, ‘Annual Report’, DoF, Dhaka. 
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